Sanjay Karol, C. J. - Whether statement of the Minister alone, as reported in the newspaper, can be made basis for invoking the principle of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, is the core issue which arises for consideration in the present petition.

[2] On 14th June, 2018, the daily newspaper "Tripura Observer" carried the following news item, inter alia quoting the statement made by the Minister for Education, Government of Tripura:

"Aiming to implement entire syllabus of NCERT for Class-I to Class-VII in all government schools of Tripura, Education minister Ratan Lal Nath today visited the SCERT office in Agartala to monitor the progress of the translation work of NCERT books.

Speaking with the media persons in front of State Council of Educational Research and Training (SCERT) office on Wednesday afternoon Education minister Nath said that "After formation of new Government, we are thinking in new ways, our students are now lagging behind in all India competitive examinations especially in education sector."

Nath said that the state government decided to implement the NCERT curriculum in to from class I to VIII and the massive translation of text books is being conducted by SCERT along with other curriculum activities. My visit aims only to review the progress of translation works, he added.

Minister said that the students reading in and passing out from the state government run schools often face obstacles because of differences in curriculum and hence, this initiative of introducing new syllabus is being taken.

Nath told that previous government had implemented only curriculum pattern of NCERT, but the present government is not in favour of any pattern, rather it will implement the entire course material of NCERT entirely." (emphasis supplied).

[3] Relying thereupon, petitioners, individually and as a body of an association of booksellers and publishers in the State of Tripura, by invoking the principles of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, lay challenge to the action of the State in calling for tenders dated 18th November, 2018 for publication of books for translation of NCERT text books into Bengali medium for Class - IX, for the academic session 2019. The action is consequently to the said assurance made out by the Minister.

[4] Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel for the writ petitioners, drawing attention of this Court to the passage of legitimate expectation in Halsburys laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol.-1(1), contends that expectation may arise from a representation or a promise made by the authority, including an implied representation as also consistent past practice. According to the learned counsel, such legitimate expectation had fructified into petitioners" legally enforceable right. For invoking the principle of promissory estoppel, petitioners would be well within their right to even plead implied promise. Respondents" failure to respond to the petitioners" representation has only reinforced such right. Also there has been favoritism in awarding the contract and most importantly, interest of children stands compromised. In support, reliance is placed on Vasantkumar Radhakisan Vora v. Board of Trustees of the port of Bombay and Anr., (1991) 1 SCC 761 [LQ/SC/1990/444] (2 Judge Bench); State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd.,(2004) 6 SCC 465 [LQ/SC/2004/663] (2 Judge Bench); Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd., v. Electricity Inspector & Etio and Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 447 [LQ/SC/2007/719] (2 Judge Bench) and Devi Multiplex and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., (2015) 9 SCC 132 [LQ/SC/2015/747] (2 Judge Bench); Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Status Spinning Mills Ltd. and Anr., (2008) 7 SCC 353 [LQ/SC/2008/1293] (2 Judge Bench); Union of India and Ors. v. Asian food Industries, (2006) 13 SCC 542 [LQ/SC/2006/1043] (2 Judge Bench); Lalaram and Ors v. Jaipur Development Authority and Anr., (2016) 11 SCC 31 [LQ/SC/2015/1599] (2 Judge Bench); R v. Secretary of State for the home Department, ex parte Khan, [1985] 1 AII ER 40; Halsburys laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol.16, Page -1017 and Corpus Jurisprudence, Vol. 31, Page 367.

[5] On the other hand, Mr. Arun Kanti Bhomik, learned Advocate General, has submitted that (a) the present petition has become infructuous rendering the discussion only academic in nature; (b) the challenge being selective confined to ClassIX, and not other classes is mala fide; (c) the Minister never lent any promise of not changing the syllabus, which, in fact, stands changed so as to bring the educational system in line with the provisions of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (for short the) and (d) The doctrine of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel do not apply for want of any specific promise or pleadings with respect thereto. In support, he has referred to the decisions of the Apex Court in State of Bihar and Ors. v. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh and Ors., (2006) 2 SCC 545 [LQ/SC/2006/5] (2 Judge Bench); Union of India and Ors. v. Hindustan Development Corporation and Ors., (1993) 3 SCC 499 [LQ/SC/1993/393] (2 Judge Bench); Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development Corporation Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy and Ors., (2011) 9 SCC 286 [LQ/SC/2011/1170] (2 Judge Bench) and the decision of the Delhi High Court in Pradeep Kumar Mahajan v. Delhi Development Authority, 2005 Legal Eagle 172 [Also 2005 (80) DRJ 699 [LQ/DelHC/2005/300] ].

[6] Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of record, we may at the outset state that allegations of favouritism, not born out from the record, needs to be rejected at the threshold. Tender was invited vide notification dated 18th November, 2018. A committee was constituted to examine the bids, which stands finalized and the work awarded to the lowest bidder on 12th December, 2018. Noticeably, the All Tripura Book Sellers & Publishers Association, Tripura, had also participated in the same. Undisputedly, the work order stands issued and supplies effected. However, we do not intend closing the petition on this ground, for it to have become infructuous.

[7] To contend that the State compromised with the interest of the children in changing the syllabus and curriculum, is absolutely fallacious for there being no foundation with regard thereto. In fact, it is the other way round. After due deliberations, spread continuous over a sufficient long time, based on the recommendations of the committee constituted for such purpose, the Government took a decision to introduce and adopt NCERT/CBSE curriculum/syllabi and text books in all the Government managed and aided schools within the State so as to enable its students to meet with the national standards and ably compete in the National Joint Entrance Examination for professional courses and competitions. The State found its children lagging behind in obtaining expected proficiencies in professional and other college/degree courses. As such, it was with this object that the Government decided to introduce the new syllabi as also fresh courses in the schools at Tripura.

[8] The Act was notified in the year 2009. The object of the was to strengthen the social fabric of democracy through provisions of equal opportunities to all. Duty was caste upon the State to provide for free and compulsory education with the corresponding parental duty to ensure the same. Despite the significant spatial and numerical expansion of elementary schools in the country, the goal of universal elementary education continued to be eluded. Children, more specifically from the disadvantages groups and weaker sections continued to be deprived of quality education. The dropout rate was immensely large. The quality of learning achievement was unsatisfactory. It was with the object of fulfilling the Constitutional mandate contained under Article 21A, that the was enacted.

[9] Under the, the curriculum and the evaluation procedure for elementary education was to be laid down by an academic authority to be specified by the appropriate Government, by notification. The State was to constitute Advisory Council for the purposes of implementation of the provisions of the. It is in this backdrop, the State took a policy decision of providing quality education, to the students falling within the ambit of the statute, after evaluating the curriculum and the syllabus of all the schools in the State. With regard to higher classes, not falling within the ambit of the provisions of the, the Government thought it prudent to uniformly apply the syllabus evolved by a national body i.e. NCERT. The Government wanted the children to be educated in a manner so that they could compete at the national level in every aspect of the matter. It is in this backdrop, that the Court finds the Government to have acted in the larger public interest.

[10] Getting to detailed factual matrix, sometime in the month of March, 2018, the Government of Tripura decided to constitute a committee for examining the possibilities of adoption of National Council of Educational Research and Training (for short "NCERT")/Central Board of Secondary Education (for short "CBSE") curriculum with respect to all the Government managed and aided schools within the State.

[11] On 5th April, 2018 a meeting was convened by the Principal Secretary, School Education, wherein a decision was also taken for constituting a Committee for translation of NCERT text books into Bengali medium for all Classes-I to XII, the endeavour being, introduction of exact CBSE Curriculum w.e.f the academic session-2019.

[12] On 25/26th June, 2018, the Committee termed as the State Level High Power Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee), after elaborate deliberations, unanimously recommended adoption of NCERT/CBSE Curriculum, syllabi and text books for students studying from Classes-I to XII in the schools of Tripura. It appears that prior thereto, several review meetings took place under the aegis of the Chief Minister of the State. This was sometime in August/November, 2018, by which time, quite apparently, the authorities had formed an opinion and taken a decision for accepting the recommendations of the Committee, so as to bring the educational system within the State, in line with the system prevalent throughout the country. Work of translation of books was keenly monitored by the Minister of Education, Government of Tripura, who, periodically carried out several inspections, with respect to such work being carried out by the appropriate authority.

[13] On 13th June, 2018 the Minister made a statement in the press that the Government had taken a decision to implement NCERT Curriculum from Classes-I to VIII.

[14] On 23rd November, 2018, the State sanctioned and transferred funds amounting to Rs. 4.98 crores (approximately) in favour of the Director, State Council for Education, Research & Training (for short SCERT).

[15] Additionally, on 30th November, 2018 more than Rs. 2.22 crores (approximately) was in turn transferred by the SCERT in favour of the Publication Division, NCERT. This was for procurement of text books.

[16] On 18th November, 2018 the Director, SCERT, Agartala invited e-tenders for printing, binding and supply of text books of Bengali, Maths, Science, History, Political Science, Economics and Geography for Class IX. It is a matter of record that with the evaluation of bids, work stands allotted to the lowest bidder.

[17] In fact, prior thereto, the Director, SCERT had invited e-tender for printing multicolor/by-colour cover pages and inner pages of text books of Classes-I to XII for academic session 2019. Work order dated 24th July, 2018, to the said tender process was subject matter of adjudication and vide judgment dated 24th September, 2018 passed in Case No.828/2018 titled as Swapna Printing works Private Ltd. and Anr. v. The State of Tripura and Ors., this Court interfered, directing the authority to consider bids of all the parties.

[18] It appears that after issuance of notice inviting tender dated 18th November, 2018, the matter was placed before the Cabinet when on 27th December, 2018 it was resolved to adopt NCERT Curriculum/Syllabi commencing from the academic session 2019 for Classes-I to XII and as a follow up action, notification dated 31st December, 2018 was issued by the Government of Tripura, Education (School) Department, Agartala.

[19] The petitioner No.1 is an association of booksellers and publishers in the State of Tripura. Vide communication dated 23rd September, 2009 they were assured by the Tripura Board of Secondary Education (for short TBSE) that there would be no change in syllabi of Classes-I to XII for the academic session 2010, but, however, were subsequently informed that there is going to be change in the syllabi and would be informed of the curriculum in due course. It appears that position continued to remain as such and in the absence of any change, petitioners kept on printing and publishing the books as per the then prevalent curriculum.

[20] However, on 12th September, 2018 having an inkling of change of syllabi with respect to all the classes from the academic session-2019 onwards, petitioners sent communication dated 12th September, 2018, seeking clarification from the Tripura Board of Secondary Education, Agartala, which was never responded to. Resultantly, petitioners preferred a representation dated 15th November, 2018 directly to the Chief Minister of the State which also was not responded to. Yet another communication was sent to Honble the Governor, State of Tripura.

[21] Petitioners have placed on record, in a tabulated form, the value of the books printed by them with respect to Classes IX XII, which runs into almost 3 crores (approximately). It is thus the petitioners" grievance that without prior information, the State unilaterally changed the syllabus for Class IXth onwards, in relation to which, books already stand published, printed and distributed; thus, causing them huge loss.

[22] According to them, with a statement recorded in the daily newspaper, namely, "Tripura Observer" dated 14th June, 2018, the Minister had reiterated the Governments decision of implementing NCERT curriculum only up to Class VIII. This statement of the Minister had generated legitimate expectations in their mind, inducing them to continue to publish the books as per the old syllabus, and with such inducement, petitioners spent huge amount of money, with the assumption that there would be no change in the curriculum/syllabi.

[23] The core issue, therefore, which arises for consideration is, as to whether, at any point in time, did the minister make any promise or represent that there would be no change of syllabus/curriculum with respect to Class IX and above.

[24] Let us first examine the law on this issue.

[25] Whether oral view expressed by a Minister would bind the State, conferring a right by way of a promissory estoppel or not came up for consideration before the Apex Court in State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Nezone Law House, Assam, (2008) 5 SCC 609 [LQ/SC/2008/819] (2 Judge Bench), wherein the Court held the doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation not to be applicable.

[26] In Nestle India Ltd. (supra) the Court categorically held announcement made by the then Chief Minister, addressing the dairy farmers at the state level function, widely publicised in all the newspapers and the said announcement made part of the speech in the presentation of the budget for the relevant year, further leading the statutory authorities to issue a specific communication with regard thereto to be binding on the Government. Here only we clarify that in view of factual matrix the ratio laid down in the said decision is inapplicable.

[27] The Apex Court in Lalaram (supra) after considering its earlier decisions rendered in Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718 [LQ/SC/1967/339] ; Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P.,(1979) 2 SCC 409 [LQ/SC/1978/389] ; Nestle India Ltd.(supra) and Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. v. Union of India,(2012) 11 SCC 1 [LQ/SC/2012/612] has traced the principle of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, as flowing from Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd.,(1956) 1 All ER 256.

[28] Essentially the principles culled out in Monnet Ispat (supra) stand reiterated and they being :

"promissory estoppel :



182.1 Where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is, in fact, so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not.

182.2. The doctrine of promissory estoppel may be applied against the Government where the interest of justice, morality and common fairness dictate such a course. The doctrine is applicable against the State even in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. However, the Government or even a private party under the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be asked to do an act prohibited in law. The nature and function which the Government discharges is not very relevant. The Government is subject to the rule of promissory estoppel and if the essential ingredients of this doctrine are satisfied, the Government can be compelled to carry out the promise made by it.

182.3. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is not limited in its application only to defence but it can also furnish a cause of action. In other words, the doctrine of promissory estoppel can by itself be the basis of action.

182.4. For invocation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, it is necessary for the promisee to show that by acting on promise made by the other party, he altered his position. The alteration of position by the promisee is a sine qua non for the applicability of the doctrine. However, it is not necessary for him to prove any damage, detriment or prejudice because of alteration of such promise.

182.5. In no case, the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be pressed into aid to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. No promise can be enforced which is statutorily prohibited or is against public policy.

182.6. It is necessary for invocation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel that a clear, sound and positive foundation is laid in the petition. Bald assertions, averments or allegations without any supporting material are not sufficient to press into aid the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

182.7. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in abstract. When it is sought to be invoked, the Court must consider all aspects including the result sought to be achieved and the public good at large. The fundamental principle of equity must forever be present to the mind of the court. Absence of it must not hold the Government or the public authority to its promise, assurance or representation.

Principles of legitimate expectation :

188.1. The doctrine of legitimate expectation can be invoked as a substantive and enforceable right.

188.2. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is founded on the principle of reasonableness and fairness. The doctrine arises out of principles of natural justice and there are parallels between the doctrine of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel.

188.3. Where the decision of an authority is founded in public interest as per executive policy or law, the court would be reluctant to interfere with such decision by invoking doctrine of legitimate expectation. The legitimate expectation doctrine cannot be invoked to fetter changes in administrative policy if it is in the public interest to do so.

188.4 The legitimate expectation is different from anticipation and an anticipation cannot amount to an assertible expectation. Such expectation should be justifiable, legitimate and protectable.

188.5 The protection of legitimate expectation does not require the fulfillment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words, personal benefit must give way to public interest and the doctrine of legitimate expectation would not be invoked which could block public interest for private benefit."

[29] Further in Lalaram (supra) it stood clarified that mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right in all circumstances, but failure to consider and give due weight to it, may render the decision arbitrary. It was thus set down that requirement of due consideration of legitimate expectation formed part of principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of rule of law. The Apex Court held that observance of this obligation as a part of good administration, is obligated by the requirement of non-arbitrariness in a state action, which as a corollary, makes it incumbent on the State to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons, likely to be affected by the decision, so much so, that any failure to do so would proclaim unfairness in the exercise of power, thus vitiating the decision by its abuse or lack of bona fide. The Court reiterated that doctrine of legitimate expectation is founded on the principle of reasonableness and fairness and arises out of principles of natural justice and can be invoked as a substantive and enforceable right.

[30] Further the Court proceeded to examine as to whether administrative discretion can be unregulated or not and observed as under :

"141. The central and cardinal canon of administrative governance, enjoins a framework of controlled use of discretion coupled with duty which is inscribed in felicitous terms in Administrative Law, 10th Edition by H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth at Page 286 as quoted:

"The first requirement is the recognition that all power has legal limits. The next requirement, no less vital, is that the courts should draw those limits in a way which strikes the most suitable balance between executive efficiency and legal protection of the citizen. .." (emphasis supplied).

[31] In Reliance Telecom Limited and Anr. v. Union of india and Anr. (2017) 4 SCC 269 [LQ/SC/2017/76] (2 Judge Bench), the Apex Court reiterated that principle of legitimate expectation can never override public interest and when there is a larger public interest, the question of legitimate expectation would not arise.

[32] The Apex Court in P. Suseela and Ors. v. University Grants Commission and ors., (2015) 8 SCC 129 [LQ/SC/2015/382] (2 Judge Bench) held that legitimate expectation can at the most be one of the grounds which may give rise to judicial review but granting relief, is very much limited.

[33] On this issue, way back in Hindustan Development Corporation and Ors.(supra); the Apex Court observed that :

"35. If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory unfair or based, gross abuse of power or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim biased on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. It can be one of the ground to consider but the court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference.

It follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is "not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the court out of review on the merits," particularly when the element of speculation and uncertainty is inherent in that very concept. As cautioned in Attorney General for New South Wales case the courts should restrain themselves and restrict such claims duty to the legal limitations. It is a well-meant caution.

Otherwise a resourceful litigant having vested interests in contracts licences etc,. can successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by directive principles thwarted to further his own interests." (emphasis supplied).

[34] The Apex Court in Union of India and Anr. v. International Trading Co. and Anr., (2003) 5 SCC 437 [LQ/SC/2003/607] (2 Judge Bench) has held that if the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into consideration national priorities and adopt trade policies.

[35] Further, the Apex Court in Ram Pravesh Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar and ors., (2006) 8 SCC 381 [LQ/SC/2006/869] (2 Judge Bench) defined the meaning of legitimate expectation to be not a legal right, but an expectation of a benefit, relief or remedy, that may ordinarily flow from the promise or established practice. The term "established practice" was held to be a regular, consistent, predicable and certain conduct, process or activity of the decisionmaking authority. The expectation would be legitimate, that is, reasonable, logical and valid. Any expectation based on sporadic or causal or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be legitimate expectation. In appropriate cases, courts may grant a direction requiring the Authority to follow the promised procedure or established practice. A legitimate expectation, even when made out, does not always entitle the expectant to a relief. Public interest, change in policy, conduct of the expectant or any other valid or bona fide reason given by the decision-maker, may be sufficient to negative the legitimate expectation. The doctrine of legitimate expectation based on established practice (as contrasted from legitimate expectation based on a promise), can be invoked only by someone who has dealings or transactions or negotiations with an authority, on which such established practice has a bearing, or by someone who has a recognized legal relationship with the authority.

[36] The Apex Court in B. Narasimha Reddy (supra) observed as under :

"45. Therefore, it is evident that the Court will not pass any order binding the Government by its promises unless it is so necessary to prevent manifest injustice or fraud, particularly, when Government acts in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity. Estoppel does not operate against the Government or its assignee while acting in such capacity."

[37] Now, can we say that the statement made by the Minister or the conduct of the State ever lent any unequivocal promise, intending to create legal relationship or right upon any one of the petitioners Can it be said that either of the parties acted upon the same knowing it to have been extended as a promise Can it be said that it is inequitable, at this point in time, to allow the State, to proceed with the work or that in the absence of any pre-existing relationship, petitioners" interest would be irrevocably or irretrievably effected warranting interference by the this Court on equitable considerations

[38] The answer, in the considered view of this Court, lies in the negative. The Minister never lent any assurance to any one, much less the petitioner. In view of dictum of Nezone Law House (supra) it cannot be so. The fundamental principle of equity, does not outweigh larger public interest, even by assuming existence of any such promise. Equity lies in advancing the cause of enhancing the standard of education in the State, vis--vis monitory rights of the petitioners. The interest of children is paramount. Now, in the instant case, whether there is clear assertion - the unequivocal promise enuring a legal right or relationship upon the petitioners". Certainly not. "Legitimate expectation" is something which cannot be abstract. It is different from anticipation which, in any event, cannot be an assertable expectation, for legitimate expectation has to be justifiable, legitimate and protectable. We may only note that save and except for the mysterious purported statement reported by the press, there is no material whatsoever establishing any right found on any principle of equity.

[39] The Minister never said that from Class IX onwards there is going to be no change of syllabus. He had gone to inspect the work of translation being carried out pursuant to the recommendation of the Committee. Yes, affirmatively, he stated that NCERT curriculum is from Class-I to VIII but then this statement cannot be construed to be an implied promise of there being no change in the syllabus from Class IX upwards. Whether the Minister had made such a statement, at all, is a different matter, but assuming hypothetically, for it to have been correctly reported by the newspaper, it was way back in June, 2018 whereafter much water had flown under the bridge, for the events which we have taken note of herein earlier.

[40] Importantly, the Ministers statement, implied in nature, inducing the petitioners to continue with the past practice does not fructify into any judicial relationship. The petitioners were running from pillar to post. They knew of the events which had taken place. They published and printed the books of their own accord. They ought to have been more vigilant while doing so. They had no legal obligation to publish the books. They did not seek any conformation from the Board or the authorities. Mere issuance of notice is of no consequence. They waited for the process to be finalised and the NIT to be published before approaching the Court from June, 2018 till 30th November, 2018, the date of filing of the petition they only represented, frantically trying to save their money, over the interest of children.

[41] Reiteratingly it is pointed out that petitioner is an association of publishers and printers of school books. It is expected of them to be vigilant and generally be aware of what all is happening in the market/trade. It is not that hurriedly Government took decision, exhibiting undue haste, in a secretive or discreet manner. It was very much in the public domain. The change in the policy was commencing, of which all were aware.

[42] Since April, 2018 the Government had been toying with an idea of introducing CBSE syllabus and curriculum in the schools. A selection committee was constituted for such purpose. In principle report of such committee stood accepted. Pursuant thereto, process for translation of the syllabus in Bengali language was initiated which also was being constantly monitored.

[43] Petitioners are not novice in their trade, nor are they new to the State. They ought to have been aware of the developments taking place in their field of operation. Hence it would be incorrect on their part to contend that they were not aware of the developments, notwithstanding there being no response to their communications by the authorities. In fact, significantly, in one such communication, they do admit of having learnt about such fact and prayed that to save the interest of publishers and printers, such decision be deferred.

[44] Reliance on R v. Secretary of State (supra) in no manner advances the case of the petitioners for in the said decision, the Court found the representation by way of a communication to be categorical and specific, entitling the general public to legitimately form an opinion of consideration of the cases for entry within the territorial limits of the State, for the purposes of adoption. There was a circular which was widely publicized and acted upon by the authorities, which is not the case in hand.

[45] Decision rendered in Vasantkumar (supra), only lays down the principle that doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine must yield place to equity and if larger public interest so requires, if it can be shown by the Government or the public authority that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it. The Court on its satisfaction would not raise equity in favour of the person to whom a promise or representation is made.

[46] Decision in Asian Food Industries (supra), in no manner helps the petitioners. The decision in Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd., v. Electricity Inspector & Etio (supra) simply lays down that a right can be preserved by reason of invocation of doctrine of promissory estoppel (para - 118) and that the said doctrine would be applicable where an entrepreneur alters his position pursuant to or in furtherance of a promise made by the State, which can be expressed by reason of notifications issued under the statue but also under the executive instructions.

[47] Importantly here, except for bald assertion of having published books valuing Rs. 3 crores (approximately) there is no proof of publication of books. Also dates are missing. Whether, alteration of position is based on such representation or not is a relevant fact. All details are conspicuously silent on this aspect.

[48] The decision rendered in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Status Spinning Mills Ltd. (supra) only reiterates the earlier view.

[49] In Devi Multiplex (supra) the Apex Court only reiterates the view taken in Nestle India Ltd. (supra).

[50] Reference of Corpus Jurisprudence is with regard to the general nature and essentials of the principle of equitable estoppel which can also be by conduct, which we find to be nonexistent in the instant case.

[51] Reference of Halsburys laws of England, 4th Edition (supra) is to highlight the ingredients constituting promissory estoppel stands defined.

[52] Thus having discussed the principle of law and applied to the instant facts, we find the petitioners not to have made out any case entitling for any relief. As already discussed, members of the petitioners" association are in the trade. They were fully aware of the changes being made in the educational policy by the State. At no point in time, it is seen that the State had ever contracted with the petitioners for printing and publishing the books. There is no statutory or contractual obligation upon the petitioners to do so. Freely of their own accord, they published the books. In the year 2009 itself, they were informed of the possible change in the policy. They continued to publish the books at their own free will without any confirmation, corresponding obligation, statutory or otherwise on the part of the State.

[53] Reiteratedly, we point out that the State never ever made any assurance to any one much less the petitionerassociation. They have no right much less a legally enforceable one. Assuming hypothetically, one to be there in existence, even then based on the principles of administrative law of jurisprudence, is absolutely unenforceable, for we find larger public interest to be in existence and all pervading and the principles of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel, as culled out by the Apex Court in Monnet Ispat (supra), to be lacking in the instant case.

[54] As to whether without taking the matter to the Cabinet NITs could have been issued or not itself pales into significance, for the relevant department had already taken a decision in that regard and it is nobodys case that otherwise the department was not authorized, empowered or entitled to do so. It appears that only as a matter of abundant precaution, the same was placed before the Cabinet and in adopting such approach, Court does not find any fault.

As such, for all the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition being devoid of merit stands dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.