Dr. Anand, C.J.The doctrine of promissory estoppel is pressed into aid by the petitioners for asking this Court to issue a writ of certiorari quashing communication No. 537-38/C issued by Conservator of Forests, Srinagar, on 24-3-1986, directing the D.F.O., Fire Wood Division, Respondent No. 4, to issue a public notice inviting tenders for grant of contract for transportation of fire-wood and for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to allow the petitioners extension of their carriage contract for the year 1986-87 as also to pay to the petitioners a sum of Rs. 1,75,318/- on account of the balance outstanding for the carriage of firewood by the petitioners to Leh, Kargil and Dras.

2. Shorn of details, the case of the petitioners, as reflected in their writ petition is that they are carrying on the business of carriage contractors and are registered on with the Forest Department of the respondent State. In the year 1979, the respondents invited tenders for allotment of carriage contract of fire wood and the petitioners amongst others also submitted their tenders which turned out to be the lowest and the work of carriage contract of fire wood for the year 1979-80 was allotted to them. The carriage contracts for the subsequent years 1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84, 1984-85 and 1985-86 were also secured by the petitioners by obtaining extensions from year to year. During the year 1985-86, respondent No. 4 vide orders dt. 28-6-1986 and 10-8-1985 asked the petitioners to carry fire wood to Leh, Kargil and Dras, though the carriage of firewood to these areas was not covered by the original contract executed between the parties and extended from time to time. The petitioners accordingly carried firewood to Leh, Kargil and Dras and submitted two bills for the carriage charges totalling Rs. 6,50,315.69. These rates were disputed and were found to be excessive by the respondents. Against the bills submitted by the petitioners a sum of Rs. 4,75,000/- was paid by the respondents though the petitioners kept on insisting for the payment of the balance amount also. According to the petitioners a sum of Rs. 1,75,318/- has remained unpaid to the petitioners, which amount also they claim through this petition. In fairness to Mr. B. A. Khan, it may, however, be recorded that realising that a writ of mandamus is not a substitute for a civil suit of recovery of disputed outstanding amount, arising out of a contract, he did not press the prayer of the petitioners in that behalf may be to take because to civil proceedings.

3. The extension granted for the carriage of contract for the year 1985-86 was to expire by the end of Mar, 1986. The petitioners approached the authorities for further extension of carriage contract. The matter was referred to the firewood committee, who, in its meeting held on 3-3-1986, noted with approval the recommendation made by the D.F.O. Firewood Division in favour of the petitioners for grant of extension and agreed that extension be granted to them till ending Mar, 1987. The minutes of the meeting of the Firewood Committee were forwarded to the Chief Conservator of Forest as also to the Conservator of Forest and other Officials.

The Conservator of Forests, however, vide his impugned communication No. 537-38/C dt. 24-3-1986, informed the D.F.O. Firewood Division, that the carriage contract be advertised so as to invite public tenders. However, taking note of the fact that it was not feasible to have a new contract finalised with effect from Ist of April, 1986 because of the severe winter, the Conservator of Forests directed the extension of contract in favour of the petitioners till 31st of May, 1986 and directed that the new contract to be executed . with the successful party after tenders were invited from the public, should be effective from Ist June, 1986, and the term of the contract was to be from Ist June 1986 to 31st May, 1987. As a result of the aforesaid communication of the Conservator of Forests extension was granted in favour of the petitioners till the end of May, 1986 and steps were initiated for inviting public tenders which however, were put at a naught because of a stay order issued by this Court in this writ petition.

4. According to the petitioners, after they learnt that extension had been granted in their favour for the carriage contract, they invested a considerable amount of money for engaging trucks etc. for carrying out the contract "for the year 1986-87" and therefore they materially altered their position relying upon the assurances regarding extension of contract as emanating from the recommendation of the Firewood Committee reflected in the minutes of the meeting held on 3-3-1986 and as such they claim that the respondents should be bound down to extend the carriage contract in their favour for 1986-87 and that no tenders be invited for allotment of carriage contract for 1986-87 from the general public.

5. Notice was issued to the respondents to show cause as to why the petition be not admitted and as interim relief the following order was issued :

"Till further orders respondents shall not give effect to communication No. 537-38/C dt. 24-3-1986 (Annexure A) issued by respondent No. 3."

As a consequence no tenders could be invited.

However, since the terms of the petitioners contract, as extended came to an end by 31st of Mar., 1986, the respondents, according to the learned Advocate General, with a view to meet their commitment to supply firewood at different places had to take recourse to asking the RTC to carry fire wood and the charges being paid to the RTC are exorbitant, causing a huge loss to the State, which has to subsidise the cost so as to be able to supply firewood to the consumers at different places.

6. The writ petition has been stoutly resisted. Objections, supported by the affidavit of Conservator of Forests, Srinagar, were filed in which it was categorically stated that there was neither any agreement nor any assurance was, at any time extended by the respondents to the petitioners that they would get extensions of contract for carriage of firewood, as had been done during the previous years. It is maintained in the objections that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was not even remotely attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case and that in any event, the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not be invoked against the bona fide action of the Government taken in public interest under executive necessity by making a change in the policy, in public interest, of which proper notice had been given to the petitioners when they were told that further extension was being granted in their favour only till the end of May, 1986. It is maintained that public largesse cannot be permitted to be squandered away and that it was in the public interest and in accordance with the mandate of the equality clause of the Constitution that the respondents took a conscious decision to shift to the open public tender system for allotment of carriage contract of firewood. It is asserted that the petitioners have, even otherwise, not laid down even the minimum of acceptable foundation on the basis of which they could possibly press into aid the doctrine of promissory estoppel in their petition. The respondents also maintain that the minutes of the Firewood Committee could not constitute the holding out of any assurance to the petitioners by any competent officer, with which they seek to bind the respondents.

It is further urged that since firewood is an alternate source of energy, necessary for the day to day living of the population of the State, the respondents are under a public obligation to make available fire wood extracted from its forests to the public at large at reasonable rates. After explaining, how the petitioners were securing the extension of the carriage contract year after year, without inviting public tenders the Conservator of Forests has stated that the suggestions of the Firewood Committee contained in the minutes of the meeting held on 3-3-1986 were not accepted and instead it was decided to allot contract after inviting public tenders to the successful party and that this shift in the policy was aimed at promoting healthy competition and saving revenue for the State. It is then stated that the Government had in 1978 set up a Firewood Committee vide Order No. 240-FST of 1978 dt. 29th Nov. 1978 with limited functions. It did not have any authority to accept or allot any contract for transportation of firewood. That though extensions in the carriage contracts were granted in favour of the petitioners from time to time on the reports of the Firewood Committee, that could not debar the Government from adopting the method of inviting open tenders from Public for grant of carriage contracts.

7. We have heard Mr. B. A. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. M. H. Beg, the learned Adv. General appearing on behalf of the respondents.

7A. Before we advert to the facts of the present case to determine the effect and value of the Minutes of the Firewood Committee as also the question whether the petitioners have laid the foundation in the writ petition for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel, we consider it desirable to, once again, point out as to what the doctrine is and what is its ambit, scope and amplitude.

8. The doctrine of "Promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel" is well established in the Administrative law of the country. To put it simple, the doctrine represents a principle evolved by enquiry to avoid injustice. The basis of the doctrine is that where any party has by his word or conduct made to the other party an unequivocal promise of representation by word or conduct, which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing as well as intending that the representation, assurance of the promise would be acted upon by the other party to whom it has been made and has in fact been so acted upon by the other party, the promise, assurance or representation should be binding on the party making it and that party should not be permitted to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings, which have taken place or are intended to take place between the parties.

9. It is now settled law that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government also in exercise of its Governmental, Public or executive functions where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. The doctrine within the aforesaid limitations, cannot be defeated on the plea of the executive necessity or freedom of future executive action. The doctrine cannot, however, be pressed into aid to compel the Government or the public authority "to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the Officer of the Government or of the public authority to make". The doctrine is an equitable one and it must yield when the equity so demands, if it can be shown that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or the public authority to the promise, assurance or representation. The doctrine would stand displaced in such a case. There can further be no promissory estoppel against the legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions nor the Government or the public authority can be debarred from enforcing statutory prohibition or carrying out statutory obligations by invoking this doctrine. "The Courts will only bind the Government by its promises to prevent manifest injustice or fraud and will not make the Government a slave of its policy for all times to come when the Government acts in its Governmental public or sovereign capacity". There appears also to be consensus of judicial opinion that for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel, clear, sound and positive foundations must be laid in the petition by the party seeking the applicability of the doctrine and that bald expressions, without supporting material, that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the party would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. The doctrine of promissory estoppel can also not be invoked in the abstract and the Courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the Courts have to do equity and the basic principles of equity must for ever be present in the mind of the Court.

10. The ambit, scope and amplitude of the doctrine as discussed by us above has been evolved in this country over the last two decades through successive decisions of the apex Court starting with the judgment in Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies AIR 1968 SC 718 , and the latest in the point of time being Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., . (See also with advantage Turner Morrison and Co. Ltd. Vs. Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd., , : AIR 1973 SC 2734 :AIR 1973 SC 2641 , Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, and Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. and Another Vs. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and Another, .

11. In Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., their Lordships have held that : --

"We may also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires, if it can be shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or Public authority to the promise of representation made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or Public authority. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would not require that the Government or Public authority should be bound by the promise or representation made by it."

12. In Malhotra and Sons v. Union of India AIR 1976 J&K 41 which judgment has also received the seal approval by the Supreme Court it was categorically laid down that the doctrine of promissory estoppel "cannot operate against the State to the detriment of the public at large so as to benefit only a few. in the society. After considering a catena of authorities and noticing the development of the doctrine in this country in the aforesaid judgment, this Court observed that the Court would bind the Government and the public authorities by the doctrine, when it is necessary to prevent "fraud or manifest injustice" keeping in view the need of the people and the State generally and that" the Government cannot be made a prisoner of its own policy statement for all times to come. The view expressed in that judgment is in consonance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, .

13. We shall, in the light of the above discussion now consider the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to the facts and circumstances of the present case.

14. The foundation for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel is contained in paras 12 to 15 of the writ petition which read thus : --

"13. That meanwhile respondent No. 4 vide order No. 1759-61 extended the period of the carriage contract of the petitioners up to 31st May, 1986. A copy of the order is annexed as Annexure P-B.

14. That after the petitioners learnt that extension had been granted in their carriage contract for the year 1986-87 they invested a considerable amount of money by engaging the trucks from various agencies to carry out the contract for the year 1986-87.

15. That while the petitioners were busy in making arrangements for carrying out the contract for the year 1986-87 pursuant to the sanction of the Firewood Committee and had materially altered their position respondent No. 3 addressed a communication to respondent No. 4 vide his No. 537-38/C dt. 24-3-1986, asking respondent No. 4 to arrange for inviting tenders for the carriage contract for the year 1986-87....."

These paragraphs, individually or collectively, in our opinion, do not lay down even the minimum accepatable foundation on the basis of which the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be invoked. Apart from the fact that the Fire-wood Committee was not the competent authority to either sanction the contract or hold our any promise or assurance on behalf of the respondent for the allotment/extension of the carriage contract, because the Government Order constituting the Firewood Committee in 1978 had limited the jurisdiction and scope of the committee to inter alia negotiate rates for transportation of firewood besides other incidental matters and had not authorised the committee to take any decision, regarding the allotment/extension of the carrige contract, it could not execute the contract nor even enter into an agreement in relation thereto. It was specifically stated in the Government Order No. 240-FST of 1978 that the piece rates prescribed by the Committee would be notified to general public well in advance and also that it shall be jhe duty of the department concerned to ensure that the rates as determined by the Firewood Committee are not higher than the market rates. These embargoes contained in the Govt. Order unmistakably show that the Fire-wood Committee was only a negotiating Committee and not an authority authorised by the Government to either allot the contracts or even to hold out promises or representations to any body that contract would necessarily be allotted in favour of the party by the department. Even if the suggestion of the Firewood Committee to grant extension be treated in a loose sense as an "assurance", it cannot bind the respondents because the assurance was outside the authority or power of the Firewood Committee and the Courts cannot compel the respondents to honour such an "assurance". That apart, the minutes of .the Firewood Committee dt. 3-3-1986 on which reliance is placed to urge that the carriage contract of the petitioners "stood extended for 1986-87." were minutes of a departmental Committee which were not communicated. These could not even otherwise create any legal relationship between the parties, nor was it intended to create such a relationship. The respondents in their objections have categorically asserted that the minutes of the meeting were "never communicated to the petitioners". The only communication addressed to the petitioners with regard to the grant of extension in their favour was contained in order No, 1759-61 dt. 31-3-1986 whereby the period of carriage contract of the petitioners had been extended up to 31-5-1986. By no stretch of imagination can this communication be construed as holding out any promise, assurance or representation that they had been granted an extension for the entire year 1986-87. If the petitioner chose to misread the order, it was their own sweet will. Even if we were to assume that some members of the Firewood Committee had provided the petitioners information regarding deliberation of the Firewood Committee, the same cannot be considered to be any assurance, promise, or agreement, held out to the petitioners for extension of contract by any competent authority so as to bind the respondents to extend the contract for one year. The petitioners very well knew that the competent authority for allotment of contracts from the forest department was D.F.O., who had hithertofore been granting extensions of the carriage contract in their favour. Even the last extension granted till 31-5-1986 vide communication dt. 31-3-1986 was from the D.F.O., Firewood Division. The petitioners have not even alleged let alone provided any material to show that any assurance or promise was held out to them by any competent authority and that by itself would show that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not attracted to the facts of the present case.

15. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Apart from making a bald assertion in the petition that after they "learnt" that the extension shall be granted to them for the year 1986-87, they made huge investments, the petitioners have remained singularly silent to show as to what investment, if any, was made by them. Even though there was no justification for the petitioners to take steps as alleged by them, for carrying out their obligations "during the year 1986-87", we find that the petitioners had been categorically told that extension of carriage contract had been granted in their favour only for a period of two months i.e. till ending May, 1986, and it was, therefore, neither expected nor anticipated from a reasonable or prudent man that they would make investments assuming that they have to carry out the obligations for the entire year. The petitioners have, thus, miserably failed to lay down even the bare minimum of the acceptable foundation on the basis on which they invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

16. We have perused the averments in the petition carefully and we find that there is no allegation of any fraud being practised by the State in deciding to invite public tenders for allotment of carriage contract vide impugned communication. We also do not find any manifest injustice to have been done to the petitioners by inviting public tenders, in which the petitioners can also participate and compete. The petitioners, had of course been managing to secure extension of work contracts year after year without allowing public tenders to be invited and by filing this petition their aim appear to have been to keep on getting the benefit without any healthy competition. It is an obligation of the State when dealing with public largesse to be fair, equitable and just. It has no right to squander away the public finances. It must act bona fide and in the interest of the general public at large. Equity demands from the State a fair, equal and just treatment for all which also is the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India which frowns at favouritism in the matter of dealing with public largesse. The action of the respondents in deciding to invite public tenders by issuing public notice for allotment of carriage contracts is, in our opinion, a fair and accepted healthy practice so as to avoid any accusing finger being pointed at the bona fides of the Government. The grant of contracts, allotments etc. by any Government through the back door methods, or by surreptitious negotiations, without isuing public notice, has never been accepted as a healthy practice. By deciding to issue public notice and inviting public tenders, the respondents are encouraging healthy competition which is also aimed at saving the revenue of the State, otherwise so badly required to meet the commitments of the State for developmental works. The individual interest must yield in favour of the larger interest of the public. The change of the policy of the Government to resort to public auction system instead of continuing with the behind the door dealings in the matter of grant of public contracts is healthy and laudable and the petitioners cannot be heard to make a grievance of it particularly when they have not been nonsuited to compete with the others when public tenders are invited. No right of the petitioners, much less any fundamental right, can be said to have been violated by the decision of the respondents to hence-forth allot carriage contracts by inviting public tenders, which system has universally been accepted as a fair and a just system. In our opinion, neither on facts not in equity, is the doctrine of promissory estoppel available to the petitioners because we find that it would be inequitable to prohibit the respondents from acting in a fair and just manner in the larger public interest.

17. Thus, for what has been said above, we find that there is no merit in this petition at all. The same is hereby dismissed. The interim directions of the Court shall stand vacated. The petitioners shall pay Rs. 500/-as costs which when realised shall be deposited by the respondents with the Dy. Registrar to be credited to the "Advocates Welfare Revolving Fund."