(1.) On June 7, 2005 at around 12 noon the opposite party No. 2 herein Pradip Kumar Chatterjee, Assistant Engineer (E), S and L. P. Unit, Hooghly (D) Circle, W. B. S. E. B. Taldanga, Chinsurah being accompanied by other officers of W.B.S.E.B. had been to the business promises of the petitioner where the petitioner, was found running a husking mill by drawing electricity supplied by the W. B. S. E. B. through the service connection No, _- 58, against his Consumer No. 1240417. When upon inspection of his service connection installed at the aforesaid premises, in presence of the local independent witnesses and the representatives of the consumer theft of electricity by dishonestly tampering Metre and interference with the supply line was detected.

(2.) The details of tampering detected by W.B.S.E.B. Officers are as follows; (a) Tampering of manufacturing paper seals No. (L) 2341495 and (R) 2341495 having "VOID" marks on both sides of the Metre were detected. (b) On close inspection tampering of plastic seals was detected on Metre body and on optical port. (c) Tampered lead seal was detected on P. R. Box. (d) No seal in the Metre terminal cover. A. C. M. R. I. was used to download date from the Metre analysed through laptop at side. The Metre was then uninstalled and opened and internal inspection reveal reset soldering marks across city secondary leads of red and yellow phases and also in neutral lead inside the Metre body. The tampered evidence was photographed by S and L. P. Unit of Hooghly (D) Circle by Digital Camera. The tampered Metre with other incriminating articles were also seized under proper seizure list in present of the witnesses.

(3.) Following the discovery of the aforesaid theft of electricity by tampering the Electric Metre the opposite party No. 2 herein made a complaint in writing to the Officer-in-Charge, Gurap Police Station, Gurap, Hooghly, on the self-same day immediately after the inspection was over.

(4.) Upon receipt of the said complaint the police recorded a FIR and the Gurap Police Station Case No. 67, dated June 7, 2005 under Section 135 (i)(b)(c) of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003 read with Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code was registered and that gave rise to G. R. No. 604/2005 before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hooghly.

(5.) After completion of investigation of the above noted case on November 23, 2005 police submitted charge-sheet under Section 135 (i)(b)(c) of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003 read with Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, before the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hooghly and the learned Magistrate took cognizance thereupon.

(6.) Subsequently, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hooghly having found that the offence punishable under Section 135(i)(b)(c) of the Electricity Act, 2003 is exclusively triable by the Court of the learned Special Judge under Electricity Act, Hooghly, the learned Magistrate by his order dated February 8, 2007 directed the transfer of the case to the respective Special Court for trial.

(7.) That on 1 st March, 2007 the learned Special Judge under Electricity Act received the records relating to the above noted case, whereupon the Electricity Case No. 44/07 was registered.

(8.) The petitioner challenged the aforesaid proceedings on two-fold grounds, firstly, taking cognizance of any offence punishable under the Electricity Act, 2003 by any Court on a police report otherwise than on a complaint made to the Court by the authority specified in Section 151 of the Electricity Act, 2003 is legally prohibited and without jurisdiction and Secondly. all the offences committed under the said Act being exclusively triable by a Special Court constituted thereunder, no Court other than a Judge, Special Court under Electricity Act can take cognizance of offences punishable under the said Act. Thus, according to the learned Advocate of the petitioner the order of taking cognizance of an offence punishable under the Electricity Act, 2003 by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hooghly on a charge-sheet, i.e. police report is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction and cannot be the basis of the prosecution of the petitioner thereunder and the impugned prosecution is liable to be quashed.

(9.) It may be noted although in the instant criminal revisional application some more points were raised challenging the legality and validity of the said prosecution viz. the raid was held without following the guidelines provided by the West Bengal Electricity Board, no prior intimation was given to the consumer before the alleged inspection but those points were abandoned at the time of hearing before this Court.

(10.) To support his contention the learned Advocate of the petitioner relied on a decision of a Division Bench of our High Court in the case of Ranjit Kumar Bag, Additional District and Sessions Judge cum Special Court under Electricity Act, 2003, Tamluk, Purba Mednipore v. The State of West Bengal, reported In (2006)1 Cal HN 445 : (2006)1 C Cr LR (Cal) 334, where our High Court held since Section 151 of the Electricity Act, 2003 does not mention about police authority and as such taking cognizance of any offence punishable under the said Act on a police report is not valid and lawful.

(11.) In the said decision High Court further held that there was nothing in the said statute which prohibits the police from initiation of any investigation of any case disclosing a cognizable offence punishable under the said Act.

(12.) As regards to the question of registration of FIR in respect of an offence punishable under Section 135 of the said Act as well as the power of police to cause investigation in respect thereof is concerned, no challenge has been thrown in the instant criminial revision.

(13.) However, during the pendency of this criminal revisional application, in which the taking cognizance of commission of an offence punishable under the Electricity Act, 2003 on a charge-sheet by a Court of Judicial Magistrate is under challenged the Electricity (Amendment) Act, 2007 came into force with effect from June 15, 2007, an Act further to amend the Electricity Act, 2003.

(14.) The Electricity (Amendment) Act, 2007 amongst other amended Section 151 of the Principal Act i.e. the Electricity Act, 2003. By such amendment the following provisos have been inserted in Section 151 of the Principal Act, "Provided that the Court may also take cognizance of an offence punishable under this Act upon a report of a police officer filed under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973." "Provided further that a Spedial Court constituted under Section 153 shall be competent to take cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed to it for trial."

(15.) The Electricity (Amendment) Act, 2007 further inserted two more new sections viz. Section 151- A and Section 151-B after Section 151 of the Principal Act i.e. the Electricity Act, 2003. The Section 151- A and the Section 151-B of the Electricity (Amendment) Act, 2007 runs as follows, Section 151- A: - "For the purpose of investigation of an offence punishable under this Act the police officer shall have all the powers as provided in Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973." Section 151-B : - "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 an offence punishable under Sections 135 to 140 or Section 150 shall be cognizable and non-bailable."

(16.) Consequent upon the aforesaid amendment of Section 151 of the Principal Act i.e. the Electricity Act, 2003 by the Electricity (Amendment) Act, 2007 whereby the Court is now empowered to take cognizance of offences punishable under the Electricity Act i.e. the Principal Act also on a police report submitted under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a question arises for decision whether such amendment would be applicable in the instant case i.e. in a pending case operating retrospectively.

(17.) Mr. Kumar Jyoti Tewari, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner vehemently contended that the provisions of Section 151 of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003, as it was originally stood not only prescribes a mere procedure but at the same time creates a vested and substantive right and an accused thereby earns an immunity from the risk of being prosecuted for an offence punishable under Electricity Act, 2003 on the basis of a police report. According to Mr. Tewari the said provisions clearly protects the accused from being prosecuted under the Electricity Act, 2003 on a police report i.e. on the out come of police investigation. Thus, he submitted the amendment of Section 151 of the said Act; vide Electricity Amended Act, 2007 ought to be held prospective and shall not apply retrospectively in the pending cases. In this connection Mr. Tewari further submitted the Amendment Act in question no where indicates either expressly or by necessary intendment that the same would operate retrospectively and as such the said amendment would not affect the law as it was originally stood whereby taking of cognizance on police report was completely prohibited. Mr. Tewari in support of his contentions relied on the following decisions in the case of Shyam Sunder and Ors. v. Ram Kumar and Anr., reported in (2001) 8 SCC;24, Transmission Corporation of A. P. v. C. H. Prabhakar and Ors. reported in (2004)5 SCC 551 [LQ/SC/2004/714] , Bhajahari Mondal v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1959 SC 8 [LQ/SC/1958/100] and in the case of M. A. Kuttappan v. E. Krishnan Nayanar and Anr., reported in (2004)4 SCC 231 [LQ/SC/2021/2009 ;] ">4 SCC 231 [LQ/SC/2021/2009 ;] [LQ/SC/2021/2009 ;] : 2004 C Cr LR (SC) 759.

(18.) On the other hand, Mr. Joymalya Bagchi, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 2, The West Bengal State Electricity Board, at the very outset, strenuously urged that it is highly preposterous to suggest that, the Section 151 of the Principal Act creates a substantive and vested right in favour of an accused. According to Mr. Bagchi the said provisions has merely prescribed the procedure as to how a prosecution for an offence punishable under the provisions of the said Act be initiated before a Court of law upon collection of the prima facie materials against an accused and by no stretch of imagination it can be said that an accused has acquired any right far less any substantive or vested thereunder. Mr. Bagchi further submitted that the offences punishable under the Electricity Act, 2003 are undoubtedly cognizable, which means that the legislative intention was to permit the police to investigate into any complaint made on the allegation of commission of such offences and as such there cannot be any valid and justifiable reason for not to empower a Court to initiate a prosecution on such a police report and to try the offender for such offences. He submitted that non-mentioning of police report in Section 151 of the said Act was a mere an omission due to draftsman mistake, which being subsequently noticed by the legislature and to overcome such anomalous situation, by Electricity (Amendment) Act, 2007 certain provisos have been inserted in Section 151 of the said Act. According to Mr. Bagchi that the amendment apart from being procedural is purely declaratory and curative statute, brought into effect to clear up an obvious error and to clear up doubts about legislative intention. He further submitted that the amendment not only relates to a procedural law, the same being declaratory or curative statute would operate retrospectively i.e. would apply in respect of all pending cases. Mr. Bagchi in support of his contentions relied upon the following decisions; Union of India and Anr. v. Major Bahadur Singh, reported in (2006)1 SCC 368 [LQ/SC/2021/2803 ;] ">1 SCC 368 [LQ/SC/2021/2803 ;] [LQ/SC/2021/2803 ;] , Sudhir G. Angur and Ors. v. M. Sanjeev and Ors. reported in (2006) 1 SCC 141 [LQ/SC/2005/1117] , American Home Products Corporation v. MAC Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., reported in (1986) 1 SCC 465 [LQ/SC/1985/319] , Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh and Ors., reported in AIR 1990 SC 209 [LQ/SC/1989/483] , Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay and Ors. v. Podar Cement Private Limited and Ors., reported in (1997) 5 SCC 482 [LQ/SC/1997/883] , Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors., reported in (2004) 8 SCC 1 [LQ/SC/2004/1181 ;] ">(2004) 8 SCC 1 [LQ/SC/2004/1181 ;] [LQ/SC/2004/1181 ;] .

(19.) The learned Advocate of the State Mr. Joy Sengupta virtually, adopted the submission of Mr. Bagchi appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 2. According to Mr. Sengupta the amendment of Section 151 of the Principal Act i.e. the Electricity Act, ;2003 by way of Electricity (Amendment) Act, 2007 and insertion of provisos, whereby the Court is empowered to take cognizance of offence punishable under the said Act on a charge-sheet, only altered the form of procedure and thus such amendment being clearly procedural in nature will operate retrospectively.

(20.) Heard, Mr. Tewari appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Joymalya Bagchi appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 2, as well as Mr. Joy Sengupta appearing on behalf of the State. Considered their rival submissions.

(21.) The Electricity Act, 2003 consolidated the laws relating to generation, transmission, distribution, trading and use of electricity and generally for taking measures conducive to development: of electricity industry, promoting competition therein, protecting interest of consumers and supply of electricity to all areas, rationalisation of electricity tariff, ensuring transparent policies regarding subsidies, promotion of efficient and environmentally benign policies, constitution of Central Electricity Authority, Regulatory Commissions and establishment of Appellate Tribunal and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto and made penal provisions against theft of electricity.

(22.) The Part XIV of the said Act deals with the offences, penalties, cognizance and compounding of offences. The Section 151 of the said Act specify to the procedure in the matter of taking cognizance of offences punishable under the said Act by any Court.

(23.) To appreciate the controversy now arises in this case it is necessary to refer the provisions of Section 151 of the said Act, which runs as follows; 151. Cognizance of Offences : - "No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under this Act except upon a complaint in the writing made by Appropriate Government or Appropriate Commission or any of their officer authorized by them or a Chief Electricity Inspector or an Electrical Inspector or licensee or the generating company, as the case may be, for this purpose.".

(24.) It is manifest from a plain reading of Section 151 of the Electricity Act, 2003 that the same has merely prescribed the procedure that too the very first step, rather, the initial step, in the process of obtaining an adjudication from a Court of law against any person, in respect of whom prima facie materials of commission of offences under the Electricity Act, 2003 have been found during investigation. This provision only prescribes the eligibility of the complainant and the conditions requisite for initiation of a proceeding under the said Act in a Court against, an accused. I have no hesitation to hold that the provisions relating to Section 151 of the Electricity Act, 2003 is a part of the procedural law and by way of inserting the aforesaid provisos under the Amending Act of 2007 only the form of procedure has been altered. The submission of Mr. Tewari that provisions created a vested and substantive right in favour of an accused is not only unsound but also without any substance. No person has any vested right in course of procedure that too in respect of a provision which prescribes as to how am accused be prosecuted in Court of law.

(25.) (a) In the case of Union of India v. Sukumar Pyne, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1206 [LQ/SC/1965/243] , the Supreme Court held as follows ; "In our opinion, there is force in the contention of the learned Solicitor General. As observed by this Court in 1953 SCR 1188 [LQ/SC/1953/67] : AIR 1953 SC 394 [LQ/SC/1953/67] , a person accused of commission of an offence has no vested right to be tried by a particular Court or a particular procedure except in so far as there is any constitutional objection by way of discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right is involved. It is well recognized that no person has a vested right in any course of procedure (Vide Maxwell 11th Edition, P. 216), and we see no reason why this ordinary rule should not prevail in the present case. There is no principle underlying Article 20 of the Constitution which makes a right to any course of procedure a vested right. Mr. Chatterjee complains that there is no indication in the amending Act that the new procedure would be retrospective and he further says that this effects his right of appeal under the Criminal Procedure. But if this is a matter of procedure, then it is not necessary that there should be a special provision to indicate that the new procedural law is retrospective. No right of appeal under the Criminal Procedure Code is affected because no proceeding had been started under the Criminal Procedure Code." (b) In the case of Anant Gopal Sheorey v. The State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1958 SC 915 [LQ/SC/1958/81] , it was held ; "The question that arises for decision is whether to a pending prosecution the provisions of the amended Code have become applicable. There is no controversy on the general principles applicable to the case. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by any Act of parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to procedure according to the altered mode. (See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes on P. 225): Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369. In other words, a change in the law of procedure operate retrospectively and unlike the law relating to the vested right is not only prospective." (c) In the case of K. S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala and Ors., reported in AIR 1995 SC 1012 [LQ/SC/1994/859] , the Apex Court held as follows ; "A statute dealing with substantive rights differs from a statute which relates to procedure or evidence or is declaratory in nature inasmuch as while a statute dealing with substantive rights is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implicafion made to have retrospective effect, a statute concerned mainly with matters of procedure or evidence or which is declaratory in nature has to be construed as retrospective unless there is a clear indication that such was not the intention of the legislature. A statute is regarded as retrospective if it operates on cases or facts coming into existence before its commencement in the sense that it affects, even if for the future only, the character or consequences of transactions previously entered into or of other past conduct. By virtue of the presumption against retrospective applicability or laws dealing with substantive rights transactions are neither invalidated by reason of their failure comply with formal requirements subsequently imposed, nor open to attack under powers of avoidance subsequently conferred. They are also not rendered valid by subsequent relaxation of the law. Whether relating to form or to substance. Similarly, provisions in which a contrary intention does not appear neither impose new liabilities in respect of events taking place before their commencement, nor relieve persons from liabilities then existing, and the view that existing obligations were not intended to be affected has been taken in varying degrees even of provisions expressly prohibiting proceedings."

(26.) Since the amendment of Section 151 of the Electricity Act, 2003, i.e. the Principal Act by the Electricity (Amendment) Act, 2007 is purely a procedural in nature which has merely altered the form of procedure, in absence of anything to the contrary would apply retrospectively to all pending cases, in the sense that such amended provisions shall apply to all actions, even though such action may have began earlier and when not reached to its logical conclusion. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Sukumar Pyne (supra) since the amendment in question is merely a matter of procedure such amendment should operate retrospectively without even any indication the same would operate retrospectively. Thus, the amended provision would be applicable to all pending cases where charge-sheet has been submitted by the police in respect of an offence punishable under the Electricity Act even before such amendment came into force:

(27.) Consequently, in the instant case there is no impediment for the Court to take cognizance in respect of the offence punishable under Section 135 of the Electricity Act on the charge-sheet submitted by the police and to proceed in accordance with law against an accused.

(28.) The other submissions of Mr. Bagchi that the amendment in question is purely declaratory and curative in nature and thus would operate retrospectively is quite logical and in my opinion has sufficient force. In support of his submission Mr. Bagchi heavily relied in the case of Zile Singh v. State of Haryana (supra). From the aforesaid decision the legal principles that emerges are this. "It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing, rights, it is deemed to be prospective only - "nova constitution futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis" - a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past. It is not necessary that an express provision be made to make a statute retrospective and the presumption against retrospectively may be rebutted by necessary implication especially in a case where the new law is made to cure an acknowledged evil for the benefit of the community as a whole." (Para 13) "The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes.... In determining, therefore, the nature of the, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is "to explain" an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospectively. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended.... An amending Act may be purely declaratory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect." (Para 14) "Though retrospectively is not to be presumed and rather there is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies (Statute Law, 7th Edn.), it is open for the legislature to enact laws having retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express enactment or by necessary implication from the language employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, the Courts will give it such an operation. In the absence of a retrospective operation having been expressly given, the Courts may be called upon to construe the provisions and answer the question whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention giving the statute retrospectivity. Four factors are suggested as relevant : (i) general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law ; and (iv) what it was the legislature contemplated, (p. 388). The rule against retrospectivity does not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to accrued right, (p. 392)" (para 15) "Where a statute is passed fcr the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute or to "explain" a former statute, the subsequent, statute has relation back to the time when the prior Act was passed. The rule against retrospectivity is inapplicable! to such legislations as are explanatory and declaratory in nature." (para 16)

(29.) In the case of Sudhir G. Angur and Ors. v. M. Sanjeev and Ors. (supra), the Apex Court further observed, "In our view, Mr. G. L. Sanghi is also right in submitting that it is the law on the date of trial of the suit which is to be applied. In support of this submission, Mr. Sanghi relied upon the judgment in Shiv Bhagwan Moti Ram Saraoji v. Onkarmal Ishar Dass wherein it has tceen held that no party has a vested right to a particular proceeding or to a particular forum. It has been held that it is well settled that all procedural laws are retrospective unless the legislature expressly states to the contrary. It has been held that the procedural laws in force must be applied at the date when the suit or proceeding comes on for trial or disposal. It has been held that a Court is bound to take notice of the change in the law and is bound to administer the law as it was when the suit came up for hearing. It has been held that if a Court has jurisdiction to try the suit, when it comes on for disposal, it then cannot refuse to assume jurisdiction by reason of the fact that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it at the date when it was instituted. We are in complete agreement with these observations. As stated above, the Mysore Act now stands repealed. It could not be denied that now the Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit." (Para 11)

(30.) This Court has found that in the case of Shri Chaman Singh and Anr. v. Srimathi Jaikaur, reported in (1969) 2 SCC 429 [LQ/SC/1969/265] , the Apex Court observed it is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declare the previous law retroactive operation would be more rightly scribed to it than the legislation which may prejudicially affect past right and transaction.

(31.) Undoubtedly, without specifying in the Electricity Act, 2003, when the offence under Section 135 of the Electricity Act was made punishable with imprisonment upto 3 years, the true intention of the legislature was nothing but, to make the same cognizable in terms of Part II of the First schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to classification of offences against other laws. Thus, when the legislature intended to make such offences cognizable thereby empowering the police to investigate into the case without the Courts order there cannot be any justifiable cogent reason for the legislature at the same time to render the result of such investigation nugatory and otiose by restricting the Court from taking cognizance of commission of such offences, on police report i.e. on charge-sheet and initiation of proceedings thereupon. In my opinion, non-inclusion in Section 151 of the Act, a police report or charge-sheet as one of the foundation on which cognizance may be taken and a proceeding can be initiated before a Court of law against any accused person for commission of an offence punishable under the said Act, was an obvious omission and never really intended by the legislature and the legislature having noticed such error or mistake stepped in by inserting the amended proviso and removed the absurdity between the real legislative intention and what actually enacted, and brought the act in conformity with what legislature had really intended to provide and such amendment has been passed for the purpose of rectifying an obvious omission in the former statute. By this amendment the obvious error has been explained, and removed and clarifies what law always was and shall remain to be. No vested right has been taken away or curtailed. The amendment in question is not only procedural in nature but at the same time is curative and declaratory.

(32.) Accordingly, amendment would operate retrospectively from the date when the Electricity Act, 2003 was enacted i.e. from the time relates back to the time when the Principal Act was enacted and for such retrospective operation there would be no violation of any mandate of law.

(33.) Last but not least, in a case involving commission of offences of theft of Electricity, very recently the Apex Court in the case of Jagarnodhan Mehatahsing Gujral and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2007)1 C Cr LR (SC) 10, observed as follows ; "Large scale theft of electricity is a very alarming problem faced by all the State Electricity Boards in our country, which is causing loss to the State revenue running into hundreds of crores every year. In our considered view, after proper adjudication of the cases of all those who are found to be guilty of the offence of committing theft of electricity, apart from the sentence of conviction, the Court should invariably impose heavy fine making theft of electricity a wholly non-profitable venture. The most effective step to curb this tendency perhaps could be to discontinue supply of electricity to those consumers for temporarily or permanently who have been caught abstracting electricity in a clandestine manner on more than one occasion. The legislature may consider incorporating this suggestion as a form of punishment by amending Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act of 1910."

(34.) I am of the further opinion where in a case during police investigation a person is found to have committed any offence made punishable by law and he is liable to face a trial for the same why his liability be come to an end due to some obvious error committed in. a legislative enactment even when such mistake or error has been cured and removed by way of amendment of procedural law.

(35.) In the result, I hold that the Electricity Amendment Act, 2007 being retrospective in operation this will permit the Court to take cognizance of offences punishable under the said Act on report submitted under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by the police in respect of all the pending cases where charge-sheet has been filed but the case has not come to its logical conclusion before the amendment in question came into force and it must be held that all charge-sheet submitted by the police in Court before the Amendment Act came into force were! filed validly and the respective Courts being always empowered to take cognisance of offence on the basis of such charge-sheet took cognizance lawfully.

(36.) The only other ground on which the petitioner sought for quashing of the proceeding that the learned Magistrate was not empowered to take cognizance of the offence punishable under the Electricity Act, 2003 which is exclusively triable by a Special Court; in my opinion, is not at all tenable in view of the specific provisions of sub-section (e) of Section 460 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Even if, the cognizance is taken erroneously by the learned Magistrate, without being so empowered, merely on that ground, the proceeding cannot be said to have been vitiated and is not thus liable to be quashed.

(37.) It would not be out of place to mention that in the instant criminal revisional application the petitioner prays for quashing of the proceedings challenging the order of taking cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 135 of the Electricity Act on a charge-sheet submitted by the police. However, it appears from the perusal of the records the said order of taking cognizance was passed on November 23, 2005, but this criminal revisional application has been filed on July 2, 2007 i.e. nearly 2 years after the passing of such order which is hopelessly time barred and there was no application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

(38.) In the instant case, already charge-sheet has been submitted and Magistrate after having taken cognizance of the offences, as found the offences are triable by a Special Court constituted Hinder the said Act, transferred the case to the Court of learned Judge, Special Court, under Electricity Act, in terms of Section 154 (2) of the Electricity Act, 2003. I direct the learned Special Court, under Electricity Act, Hooghly to proceed with the trial of the petitioner in accordance with law forthwith. It is further directed such trial be completed as early as possible as the main object df constitution of Special Court is to provide speedy trial for the offences punishable under the said Act and shall conclude such trial within six months from the date of communication of this order. I further direct such trial shall be proceeded on day to day basis and no unnecessary adjournment shall be granted to either of the parties unless the Trial Court feels the same would be expedient in the interest of justice. The instant criminal revisional application thus accordingly disposed of.