Ajit Singh
v.
State Of Punjab
(Supreme Court Of India)
Review Petition (Civil) No. 1504-1506 Of 1999 | 08-12-1999
Dr. A.S. Anand, CJI.
Delay condoned.
We are of the view that there are no merits in the review applications.
2. In Ajit Singh II v. State of Punjab, 1997(7) SCC 209 : 1997(1) SCT 822 (P&H), it was stated (at PP. 229-230) relying upon earlier judgments starting from 1963, that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision and did not impose any constitutional duty nor confer any fundamental right for reservation. The observations at page 691 by Jeevan Reddy, J. in Indira Sawhney relied upon in the review applications do not deal with the above issue. It was the view of two Constitution Bench judgments of this Court one of 1963 in M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, 1963 (Supp.) (1) SCR 439 and another in 1968 in C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India, 1968(1) SCR 721 and also two three judgments of this Court in P & T Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees Welfare Association (Regd.) v. Union of India, 1998(4) SCC 147 and State Bank of India v. Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees Welfare Association, 1996(4) SCC 119 : 1996(3) SCT 347 (SC) that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision. The view was nowhere dissented in Indira Sawheney much less at page 691 by Jeevan Reddy, J.
3. It appears to us that all the nine Judges in Indira Sawhney were of the same view that Article 16(4) was not in the nature of a fundamental right and was only an enabling provision. In this connection, reference may be made with advantage to the view of Jeevan Reddy, J. (at pages 667-735) referring to Subba Rao, J. that Article 16(4) was a provision conferring a `power and referring to Article 16(1) alone as a guarantee and not to Article 16(4); to the view of Sawant, J. [at page 517, para 43(4)] Pandian J. (at page 407, para 168). Thommen, J. (at page 449, para 284), Sahai, J. (at page 580) with whom Kuldip Singh, J. agreed, - all expressly stating that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision. Thus, majority of the learned Judges expressly stated that Article 16(4) was an "enabling provision". Merely because the reservation for backward classes was created as a reasonable classification and justified at page 691, that does not detract from the view that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision.
4. For the aforesaid reasons, we find there is no merit in these review petitions which are dismissed.
Petitions dismissed.
Delay condoned.
We are of the view that there are no merits in the review applications.
2. In Ajit Singh II v. State of Punjab, 1997(7) SCC 209 : 1997(1) SCT 822 (P&H), it was stated (at PP. 229-230) relying upon earlier judgments starting from 1963, that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision and did not impose any constitutional duty nor confer any fundamental right for reservation. The observations at page 691 by Jeevan Reddy, J. in Indira Sawhney relied upon in the review applications do not deal with the above issue. It was the view of two Constitution Bench judgments of this Court one of 1963 in M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, 1963 (Supp.) (1) SCR 439 and another in 1968 in C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India, 1968(1) SCR 721 and also two three judgments of this Court in P & T Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees Welfare Association (Regd.) v. Union of India, 1998(4) SCC 147 and State Bank of India v. Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees Welfare Association, 1996(4) SCC 119 : 1996(3) SCT 347 (SC) that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision. The view was nowhere dissented in Indira Sawheney much less at page 691 by Jeevan Reddy, J.
3. It appears to us that all the nine Judges in Indira Sawhney were of the same view that Article 16(4) was not in the nature of a fundamental right and was only an enabling provision. In this connection, reference may be made with advantage to the view of Jeevan Reddy, J. (at pages 667-735) referring to Subba Rao, J. that Article 16(4) was a provision conferring a `power and referring to Article 16(1) alone as a guarantee and not to Article 16(4); to the view of Sawant, J. [at page 517, para 43(4)] Pandian J. (at page 407, para 168). Thommen, J. (at page 449, para 284), Sahai, J. (at page 580) with whom Kuldip Singh, J. agreed, - all expressly stating that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision. Thus, majority of the learned Judges expressly stated that Article 16(4) was an "enabling provision". Merely because the reservation for backward classes was created as a reasonable classification and justified at page 691, that does not detract from the view that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision.
4. For the aforesaid reasons, we find there is no merit in these review petitions which are dismissed.
Petitions dismissed.
Advocates List
FOR
For Petitioner
- Shekhar Naphade
- Mahesh Agrawal
- Tarun Dua
For Respondent
- S. Vani
- B. Sunita Rao
- Sushil Kumar Pathak
Bench List
HON'BLE CHIEF JUSTICE DR. A.S. ANAND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.B. MAJMUDAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.B. PATTANAIK
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.P. KURDUKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. JAGANADHA RAO
Eq Citation
(2000) 1 SCC 430
2000 (1) SCT 1 (SC)
(2000) 1 UPLBEC 435
[1999] (SUPPL.) 5 SCR 195
JT 1999 (9) SC 542
1999 (7) SCALE 395
LQ/SC/1999/1199
HeadNote
Constitution of India — Arts. 137 and 32 — Review — Delay condoned
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