Biswanath Somadder, J. - By consent of the parties, the appeal is treated as on days list and taken up for consideration along with the application for stay.

2. The instant appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated 13th September, 2018, passed by a learned Single Judge in W. P. 15000 (W) of 2017 (Ajit Kumar Bhattacharjee Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.).

3. By the impugned judgment and order, the learned Single Judge has proceeded to dismiss the writ petition for reasons stated therein.

4. The instant appeal has been preferred by the writ petitioners who had initially approached the writ Court challenging a notice dated 26th December, 2014, issued by the Estate Manager & Ex-Officio Assistant Secretary, Government of West Bengal, Urban Development Department, Kalyani, Nadia, whereby the said authority had refused to mutate the plot-in-question in the name of the appellants/writ petitioners. The learned Single Judge, upon taking into consideration the materials on record, found that a land measuring 5 cottahs 1 chattak 16 sq. feet in Plot No.153, Block - B-9, Kalyani Town, District - Nadia, had been allotted to one Dinesh Chandra Chakraborty by the State of West Bengal on 14th December, 1951. The learned Single Judge, thereafter, took note of a significant fact that Dinesh Chandra Chakraborty did not take any step for getting a lease deed executed in his favour by the State right from the year 1951 to 1986. Ultimately, on 7th October 1987, a lease deed was executed between Dinesh Chandra Chakraborty and the State of West Bengal in connection with the plot-in-question on the basis of the terms and conditions as incorporated in the said lease deed. The learned Single Judge also recorded the contentions made on behalf of the appellants/writ petitioners that Dinesh Chandra Chakraborty died on 15th February, 1989 and his wife died on 6th August, 1989. The appellants/writ petitioners claimed to be the legal heirs of the original lessee, namely Dinesh Chandra Chakraborty. Submissions made on behalf of the appellants/writ petitioners were duly noted by the learned Single Judge and thereafter, the Court proceeded to observe as follows:-

"Admittedly, Dinesh Chandra Chakraborty, predecessor-ininterest of the petitioners, acquired leasehold interest in the land in question on the basis of the lease deed dated October, 07, 1987. It appears from the terms incorporated in paragraph 2 (iii) of the lease deed that the lessee will construct the house on the land in question within a period of two years from the date of execution of the lease deed. It further appears from the terms incorporated in paragraph 5(i) of the lease deed that the lessor can terminate the lease agreement and re-enter into the possession of the land if the lessee violates any condition of the lease deed. Admittedly, no house is constructed by the original lessee within a period of two years from the date of execution of the lease deed. Nor has the lessee submitted any application before the respondent no.2 for extension of the period of two years for the purpose of constructing house on the land before expiry of the period of two years from the date of execution of the lease deed.

It appears from the document annexed to the writ application as annexure P-4 that the respondent no.2 issued show-cause notice to the erstwhile lessee in the address available on office record on September 12, 2000, February 24, 2003, November 25, 2009 and November 22, 2011.

In view of the fact that the petitioners being the legal heirs of the original lessee did not come forward to give reply to the show-cause notices, I am unable to accept the contention made on behalf of the petitioners that the petitioners were not given any opportunity of hearing before termination of the lease agreement. The submission of the representation by the petitioners through their learned advocate on December 04, 2014 for the purpose of mutation of their names in the record of the respondent no.2 has been rightly rejected by the respondent no.2 as the said representation was submitted after almost three decades from the date of execution of the lease deed and after termination of lease agreement and after re-entering into the possession of the land by the respondent no.2 by virtue of the order dated September 24, 2012 (annexure P-4 to the writ application).

Since the lease agreement was terminated for violation of the terms of the lease deed by the original lessee and since the respondent no.2 has re-entered into the possession of the land for violation of the terms of the lease deed by the original lessee, I am of the view that the respondent no.2 has rightly refused to mutate the names of the petitioners in the record of the respondent no.2. Accordingly, there is no merit in the present writ application."

5. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed.

6. It is not in dispute that the appellants resided in the same premises where the original lessee, namely, Dinesh Chandra Chakraborty, resided till his death. It is preposterous even to assume that the appellants - as legal heirs - were ignorant about their legal right of being the heirs of their deceased parents for years (i.e., till they finally put in their application for mutation sometime in the year, 2014) and chose to sleep over their right. When a person approaches the writ Court, that person is required to demonstrate promptness and exercise of due diligence. This is not only to keep alive his/her legal right but also to assert it forthwith. A litigant, who chooses to sleep over his/her legal right for years together, cannot avail the extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, especially in a fact situation as unfolded in the instant case where the plot-in-question has already been resumed by the State way back in the year, 2012 (24th September, 2012). Even here, one glaring fact that is noticeable is that the writ petition was filed in the year, 2017, that is, after five years after the leased property - which was originally leased out to late Dinesh Chandra Chakraborty by the State - was resumed by the State.

7. In an Intra-Court Mandamus Appeal, interference is usually warranted only when palpable infirmities or perversities are noticed on a plain reading of the impugned judgment and order. In the facts of the instant case, we do not notice any palpable infirmity or perversity on a plain reading of the impugned judgment and order. That apart and in any event, the impugned order is supported with cogent and justifiable reasons. Its correctness, as such, cannot be doubted or questioned in the present appeal.

8. For such reasons as stated above, the appeal and the application for stay are liable to be dismissed and stand accordingly dismissed.

I agree.

(Arindam Mukherjee, J.)