S.K. PHAUJDAR, J.

(1) THE petitioner, Ajay Rai, has prayed for quashing an FIR dated 10-5-1994 lodged against him by the Senior Inspector of Police, as contained in Annexure 2 to the writ petition.

(2) AS per Annexure 2 to the writ petition, a case Crime No. 118 of 1994 under Section 3 (1) of the U. P. Gangster and Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (in short, as the Act) was initiated by FIR No. 79 dated 10-5-1994. Allegations were made therein against the present petitioner and one Umesh Yadav stating that the petitioner had formed a gang with others and were engaged in unlawful activities and in the commission of offences under Chapters 16 and 22 of the I. P. C. and were terrorising people being armed with unlawful weapons. People did not have the courage to speak against them. The FIR gave the details of 3 cases ranging from 1989 to 1994 for offences of criminal intimidation, murder, and attempted murder committed by the petitioner.

(3) IN the petition not only the involvement of the petitioner in the earlier cases were denied but also the very basis of the FIR in the present case has been challenged. It was stated that of the 3 earlier cases two were of 1989 and one was of 1994 and all were pending. It was contended that the cases of 1989 had become stale for the purpose of initiation of the present of FIR. It was urged that the petitioner had not been convicted in any of the offences till date. The writ petition went on to assert that the term "gang" as defied in the Act rests on the meaning of the term "indulges", and, according to the learned counsel, this term "indulges" would mean habitually doing some thing, and unless there was proof of commission of the earlier offence an FIR could not have been lodged for an offence earlier under the Act and, accordingly, according to the learned counsel, mere allegations made in the earlier FIRs may not be sufficient to infer that the petitioner "indulges" in any anti-social activities.

(4) THE State has not come up with any counter affidavit. There was, however, a short counter affidavit by the Jailor. This counter affidavit gives only dates of the detention of the petitioner and dates of his release on bail in the earlier cases.

(5) SHRI A. D. Giri, learned counsel for the peti tioner, urged that vires of the Act was certainly upheld in the case of Ashok Dixit (1987) All Cri C 164 : AIR 1987 All 235 [LQ/AllHC/1987/130 ;] ">1987 All 235 [LQ/AllHC/1987/130 ;] [LQ/AllHC/1987/130 ;] : 1987 All LJ 806 (FB) wherein the legislative competence of the State to create a new offence was also upheld, but, according to Shri Giri, the Full Bench, while discussing different aspects of the Act, did not dwell upon the meaning of the term "indulges". He laid stress only on the meaning as interpreted by him to conclude that initiation of the FIR before conviction of the petitioner in the earlier cases was bad in law.

(6) AS a law point alone was urged concerning interpretation of the term "indulges" as aforesaid, the State counsel was heard even without a counter affidavit on facts. It was urged by him that the FIR was a competent one as the ingredients of the term "gang" and "gangster" were made out therein.

(7) WE may confine ourselves to the point raised by Shri A. G. Giri to see if the term "indulges" could be given only the meaning as interpreted by him or it has a wider scope. Section 2 (b) of the Act defines what is "gang" and under this definition a group of persons who indulge in anti-social activity in any manner as enumerated in the 15 clauses under this Section will be deemed to be forming a "gang" whether they act singly or collectively, (1) if they indulge in such activity with violence or threat or show of violence or intimidation or coercion, and (2) if they do not with the object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage for himself or for any other person. The 15 clauses in Section 2 (b) of the Act describe different anti-social activities which are not confined only to substantive offences under the I. P. C. or any other Act.

(8) THE term "gangster" has also been defied in Section 2 (c) and it means a member or leader or organizer of a gang, and includes any person who in the activities of the gang enumerated in clause (b) whether before or after the commission of such activities or harbour any person who indulges in such activity. Section 3 (1) provides for the penalty for being a gangster.

(9) AS to meaning of the term "indulges", the learned counsel relied on the dictionary meaning as given by the Webstar Dictionary and one of such meaning, according to the learned counsel, is to yield to the desire of or to get pleasure in doing etc. The Chambers English Dictionary interprets the term "indulge" as a transitive verb "to yield to the wishes of", "to favour or gratify" and "not to restrain" and this term is also an intransitive verb meaning "permit oneself in action or expression. This meaning is to be given when the term is used with proposition "in". The definition, as per Section 2, not only uses the term "indulges", the term is immediately followed by the word "in" and we may, therefore, safely take the term to mean to permit oneself in action or expression. Thus, we may say that the terms "indulge in" in the definition of "gang" would carry the same meaning as "does" or "commits". These two common terms have been avoided by the legislature apparently for the reason that the terms "indulge in" are followed by two words "anti-social activities. " Moreover, there are certain actions detailed in the next 15 sub-clauses the doing of which may not strictly come within the term "commits". Ws may look to the paragraphs 10 to 13 and 15 of the clauses in Section 2 (b) in appreciating this view.

(10) IF the legislature had the intention that the Act would be applicable only to past proven acts, there was no bar for the legislature to have used the word "habitually" within the definition of gang. We may look to the preamble of the Act for interpreting this definition. This Act was enacted to make special provisions for the prevention of and for coping with gangster and anti-social activities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

(11) IT is clear from the preamble of the Act that the ordinary law was not sufficient to cope up with the mounting anti-social activities and gangsterism.

(12) THE vires of the Act was challenged in a writ petition. A Full Bench of this Court (Ashok Kumar Dixit v. State, 1987 All Cri C 164) : AIR 1987 All 235 [LQ/AllHC/1987/130 ;] ">1987 All 235 [LQ/AllHC/1987/130 ;] [LQ/AllHC/1987/130 ;] : 1987 All LJ 806 (FB), not only upheld the constitutional validity of the Act but also opined that it was within the legislative competence of the State to legislate to create, new offences and to lay down the procedure and punishment. We are, therefore, unable to hold that we can take the liberty to interpret the word "indulges" as meaning "habitually commits". It is true that the Act is a penal statute and had to be interpreted strictly but that does not encourage us to make an interpretation by giving the word a meaning that is not even given in ordinary parlance as per the accepted dictionaries. As a sequel to his argument that the Act requires habitual commission of offences or habitually doing certain acts, the learned counsel for the petitioner had further submitted that once the substantive cases started against the petitioners are tried and in case they are acquitted, further trial on the same allegation shall be barred. Section 300 of the Cr. P. C. provides that a person once convicted or acquitted is not to be tried again for the same offence. The text of the Section says that a person who had once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence, shall, while conviction or acquittal remains in force, not to be liable to be tried again for the same offence nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charges from the one made against him might have been under Sub-Section (1) and Section 221 or for which he might have been convicted under Sub-Section (2) thereof. Sub-Section (4) of this Section, however, states that a person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by an act may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with and tried for any other offence constituted by the same facts which he may have committed if the court, by which he was first tried, was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged.

(13) WE may now look to the procedure prescribed for the trial of an offence under the Act. Under Section 5 of the Act Special Court can be constituted for the speedy trial of offences under this Act and Section 7 says that notwithstanding anything con tained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, where a special court has been constituted for any local area, every offence under any provision of this Act or any Rule made therein shall be tried only by the special Court. The Act further says in Section 8 that when trying any offence punishable under this Act, Special Court may also try any other offence which the accused may under other law for the time being in force, be charged on the same facts. It is, thus, clear that for trial of the substantive offence under the I. P. C. the ordinary courts may take cognizance while for an offence under the Act only special Courts can hold the trial. Even if there be a trial of the petitioner for substantive offences under the Indian Penal Code, in an ordinary Criminal Court, he could be tried for a distinct offence under this Act by the Special Court as provided for under Section 300 (4), Cr. P. C. The legislature, in our view, had in mind that an accused may not be harassed twice over and, accordingly, the provisions of Section 8 of the Act have been made. While taking up the trial for an offence under the Act, it would be competent for the Special Judge to take up the charges of offences under other Acts also in the same trial.

(14) FOR all these reasons, we are unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. Petition dismissed.