Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J.

(1) Respondent-landlord instituted a petition under Section 13-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 for causing eviction of the petitioner-tenant from one residential room on the ground of non payment of rent and personal necessity. Admittedly, application for leave to defend was filed after expiry of statutory period of 15 days. This Court in civil Revision Nos.5210 and 5211 of 2010 had passed the following order:- "By this common order, both the revision petitions viz. Civil Revision No. 5210 of 2010 titled as "Vinod Kumar Mittal and Another v. Jagandeep Singh Rana" and No. 5211 of 2010 titled as "Narinder Kumar Mittal and Another v. Jagandeep Singh Rana", shall be decided together. The only question of significant importance, which this Court has to determine, is as to whether, after the expiry of 15 days period, as prescribed for leave to defend, the Rent Controller can condone the delay or not. In the present case, admittedly, there was a delay of two days in filing the application for leave to defend.

(2) Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "1963 Act"), are not ousted and sufficient cause can be made out, a ground to seek condonation of the delay. Prima facie, this Court is also of the view that inherent powers of the Court and the provisions of the 1963 Act are not ousted. But this view of the Court necessarily has to yield the mandate of law laid down by Honble the Apex Court in Prithipal Singh v. Satpal Singh (death) through its L.Rs 2010(1) Recent Civil Reports 608. It is not disputed that the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as "1949 Act") are pari materia with Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, to seek eviction of the tenant, after the retirement of the landlord or as a Non Resident Indian. In Prithipal Singhs case (supra) their Lordships relied upon Parkash H. Jain v. Ms. Marie Fernandes 2003(2) Rent Control Reporter 559 wherein it was specifically stated that "there is no such thing as any inherent power of the Court to condone delay in filing the proceedings before the Court/Authority concerned, unless the law warrants and permits it". In para Nos.14 and 15, their Lordships have held as under:-

"...14. From a careful perusal of sub-section (4) of Section 25B of the Rent Act, it would be clearly evident that the tenant shall not be permitted to contest the prayer for eviction unless he files an affidavit before the Controller stating the ground on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Controller. This Section also cleanly indicates that in default of his appearance in compliance with the summons or his obtaining such leave, the statement made by the landlord in the eviction proceedings shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground mentioned in the eviction petition. At this stage, we may also note that in sub-section (4) of Section 25B of the Rent Act read with Third Schedule, it has been made clear by the legislature that if the summons of the proceeding is received by the tenant, he has to appear and ask for leave to contest the eviction proceeding within 15 days from the date of service of notice upon the tenant and if he fails to do so, automatically, an order of eviction in favour of the landlord on the ground of bona fide requirement shall be made".

(3) Mr. Chetan Mittal, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Mohinder S. Nain, Advocate, appearing for the petitioners has made valiant efforts to distinguish the above said two judgments. It is submitted that in Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, for the special provision, to cause eviction of the tenant, the powers have been vested in a competent authority, which is not a Court. Therefore, the competent authority cannot invoke the 1963 Act. Learned counsel further submits that whereas in the present case, the Rent Controller, Chandigarh, is a Court and therefore, has a power vested under the 1963 Act to condone the delay. Mr. Mittal further submits that in Prithipal Singhs case (supra) the question of delay was considered in the context of Order 9 Rule 13 read with Order 37 Rule 4 CPC and not in relation as to whether the delay can be condoned in filing of an application for leave to defend.

(4) Having perused the judgments in Prithipal Singhs case and Parkash H. Jains case (supra), this Court is of the view that the arguments advanced by Mr. Mittal are not tenable and the same are to be rejected especially when learned Single Judge of this Court in Babu Ram v. Naresh Kumar 2006(3) Recent Civil Reports 789 has held that the Rent Controller has no power to condone the delay. This view is further reiterated by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Harnek Singh v. Paramjit Singh 2009(4) Recent Civil Reports 42. Another leaned Single Judge of this Court in Rajpal v. Gurdev Singh 200794) Recent Civil Reports 161 held in the categoric terms that Section 5 of the 1963 Act is not applicable as the Rent Controller is an Authority, deemed to be a Court, only for the limited and specific purposes. Furthermore, a Division Bench of this Court on a reference in Ashwani Kumar Gupta v. Shri Siri Pal Jain Vol. CXX-(1998-3) The Punjab Law Reporter 171 has held that the Rent Controller has no power to condone the delay after expiry of a period of 15 days. Therefore, I am bound by the consistent view taken by this Court and will not record a divergent note.

(5) Learned counsel for the petitioners has insisted that this Court should take note of a judgment rendered in State of Madhya Pradesh and Another v. Anshuman Shukla (2008) 7 Supreme Court Cases 487 [LQ/SC/2008/1176] . This judgment is not applicable on the facts of the present case as it has not noticed the ratio of law enunciated in Parkash H. Jains case (supra). Hence, there is no merit in both the revision petitions and the same are hereby dismissed."

(6) Since, this Court has held that the Rent Controller has no power to condone the delay after the expiry of statutory period of 15 days, this petition is liable to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.