Untwalia, J.

(1) This application in revision has been filed against the order dated the 7th of October, 1961, of the 2nd Additional District Judge, Patna. One Sk. Abdul Latif, father of the petitioner and the opposite parties 2 to 7 and husband of opposite party No. 1, owned and possessed property in Mohalla Muradpur in the town of Patna. The property was acquired by the State of Bihar under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act 1 of 1894) hereinafter referred to as the Act. Under Section 11 of the Act, the Collector made an award determining a sum of Rs. 44012/- as compensation money payable to the said owner of the property. On objection by the awardee a reference under Section 18 of the Act was made to the District Judge of Patna. The said reference in Land Acquisition Case 58/52 of 1950/57 was decided by the Additional District Judge by his order dated the 29th September, 1951, and, the amount awarded by the Collector was increased by Rs. 22323/87- with future interest at 6 per cent. per annum. Abdul Latif filed First Appeal 311 of 1952 in this Court. The appeal was allowed in part by a Bench of this Court on the 5th of May, 1960. According to the decree of the High Court, the amount of extra compensation to be paid was further increased, costs were decreed and interest was also directed to be paid on the excess amount of compensation. It seems the total amount due under the High Court decree came to Rs. 83822/61 N.P. which was deposited by the State of Bihar by a cheque in the Court of the Additional District Judge on the 5th of September, 1961. The petitioner, who is a son of Abdul Latif from his first wife, however, before the deposit of the decree money, had filed an application in the court below on the 17th of July, 1961, stating therein that the petitioners father had made an oral gift of the entire amount in question on the 10th of November, 1960. He, therefore, prayed for payment to him of the money in question. On deposit of the amount in court by the State of Bihar, the court below recorded an order on 5-9-61, that the entire money had been deposited in pursuance of the award made on a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act as modified by the decree of the High Court; hence a full satisfaction was recorded. On the petition of the petitioner being moved by his lawyer, it was ordered that it was not necessary to proceed with the claim of the petitioner. On the 18th of September, 1961, Sk. Abdul Latif filed an affidavit and a petition stating therein that by registered sale deed dated the 10th July, 1961, he had assigned the amount payable to him under the High Court decree in favour of the opposite parties; that he had no concern with the decretal money; and that the whole of the amount payable under the decree should be paid to them. This petition was rejected by order dated 18-9-61 as no Vakalatnama had been filed nor had the assignees made any petition for payment of the money. On 22-9-61, the opposite parties filed an application in the court below for payment of the decretal amount to them stating therein that they had purchased the decree passed by the High Court in F.A. 311 of 1952 by a registered sale deed dated 10th of July, 1961 executed by the awardee, Sk. Abdul Latif. The sale deed was also filed along with the petition. Certain defects were pointed out by the order dated the 22nd of September, 1961, and it was directed that orders would be passed on the said application when Abdul Latif would present himself in court. The petitioner filed a rejoinder application on the 26th of September, 1961, stating that, after the oral gift of the decree in his favour, Abdul Latif could not assign it to the opposite parties by registered sale deed which was also attacked as invalid on certain grounds. By the rejoinder petition, it was ultimately prayed that the petition of the opposite parties be rejected and the amount be paid to the petitioner. By another petition filed on the same day, the petitioner stated that he had attacked the sale deed as being invalid on the ground that Abdul Latif had not executed it as he was not possessed of senses and was invalid on the date of execution of the sale deed. In this petition, a prayer was made by the petitioner in the following words :

"It is therefore respectfully prayed that your honour would be graciously pleased to direct Mosstt. Naiman alias Nammo and others to produce Sk. Abdul Lateef in court to establish the genuineness of the transfer deed and the affidavit....."

Both the petitions were directed to be placed when Abdul Latif presented himself in court. On 6-10-61 Abdul Latif filed hazri, and the petitioner filed a time petition which was rejected. On that day Abdul Latif also filed a petition supported by an affidavit objecting to the prayer of the petitioner for payment of the compensation money to him and supporting the case of the opposite parties. The evidence of Abdul Latif was also taken by the learned Additional District Judge on oath in which he categorically stated that he did not own the decretal money as he had assigned it to the opposite parties and the money in deposit should be paid to them. On his deposition, it has been noted by the learned Additional District Judge.

"The deponents voice has been impaired and his hands are also trembling perhaps due to some illness. The witness is old and feeble in body but he has got the full power of understanding and he answered the questions intelligently which I put to him before taking down his statement,"

The Additional District Judge, by his order in question, has held that Abdul Latif had validly transferred the decree by the deed of assignment to the opposite parties who are entitled to withdraw the amount of compensation deposited in court. The petitioner has filed this application in revision against that order.

(2) The Stamp Reporter took an objection that the order in question had the force of a decree and a regular first appeal ought to have been filed under Section 54 of the Act and that a civil revision was not maintainable. The Civil revision came up for admission before me sitting singly on the 10th of February, 1962. I admitted the application as a civil revision subject to the right of the other side to contest its maintainability at the time of the final hearing. As the points involved were not free from difficulty, I directed the civil revision to be placed for final hearing before a Division Bench along with the stamp report. The case came up for final hearing before this Bench.

(3) No objection was raised on behalf of the opposite parties as to the maintainability of the civil revision. We, therefore, proceeded to hear it as such. Having considered the stamp report, I am of the view that the order in question has not the force of a decree as it is a mere direction by the court below after the deposit of the decree money for its payment to the assignees of the decree.

(4) The argument put forward by the learned Government Advocate on behalf of the petitioner is that the dispute had arisen between the two rival claimants in regard to the compensation money and the court below was not competent to dispose of this dispute in a summary manner and direct payment of the deposited money to the opposite parties. He further submitted that, after the award, the court was functus officio, there was no execution case pending and no direction, therefore, could be given by it for the payment of the money. On behalf of the opposite parties, Mr. S.N. Datta, their learned counsel, submitted that the award of the court below had the force of a decree under Section 26 of the Act. The said decree had merged in the decree of the High Court. It could not be transferred or assigned except by the execution of an instrument in writing signed by the transferor. The alleged oral gift could not confer any right on the petitioner to claim the money. The application of the opposite parties was in substance an application in execution under Order 21, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whereby the transferees, who have obtained an assignment of the decree in writing, are entitled to execute it. The learned Government Advocate, in reply, submitted firstly that an award of the District Judge on a reference under the Act is not an executable decree and it is not so even if it merges in the decree, of the High Court. He further submitted that the court below has not followed the procedure provided in Rule 16 of Order 21 of the Code and has not given any notice to the transferor or to the Judgment-debtor as required by the said proviso. His last submission was that, in any view of the matter, there was no question of executing the decree as it had been satisfied on the deposit being made in the court below on the 5th of September, 1961.

(5) In my opinion, the petitioner, by the alleged oral gift, has not acquired any right, title or interest in the decree money in question. In Ambica Prasad Singh v. Ram Charitar Singh, AIR 1951 Pat 415 [LQ/PatHC/1949/131] , Sinha and Reuben JJ., as they then were, have held that a decrertal debt is an actionable claim within the meaning of Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act. Chapter VII of the Act (Sections 122 to 129) deals with the law of gifts. Section 129 provides :

"Nothing in this Chapter relates to gifts of moveable property made in contemplation of death or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Mohammadan Law."

It is well known that under the rule of Mohammadan Law gift of property can be made orally. But it is clear that only the provisions in Chapter VII of the Transfer of Property Act are not to affect the said rule of Mohammadan Law. Section 130 is in Chapter VIII and applies to Mohammadans also. Order 21, Rule 16 also provides for a, right of a transferee to execute the decree provided there is an assignment in writing or by operation of law, as for example, succession to the decree on death of the decree-holder or the like. It is enacted in Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act :

"(1) The transfer of an actionable claim whether with or without consideration shall be effected only by the execution of an instrument in writing signed by the transferor or his duly authorised agent, shall be complete and effectual upon the execution of such instrument, and thereupon all the rights arid remedies of the transferor, whether by way of damages or otherwise, shall, vest in the transferee whether such notice of the transfer as is hereinafter provided be given or not. (2) The transferee of an actionable claim may, upon the execution of such instrument of transfer as aforesaid, sue or institute proceedings for the same in his own name without obtaining the transferors consent to such suit or proceedings, and without making him a party thereto".

(6) In view of the said provision, it is clear that the petitioner has no locus standi either to make any claim for payment of the money to himself or to object to its payment to the opposite parties who being the transferees, under Section 130 (2), may sue to enforce the actionable claim or institute proceedings for the same. The latter expression, in my opinion, would include a procecding in execution as was observed in the Bench decision of this Court referred to above or a proceeding for payment of the decretal money after deposit in Court.

(7) In am not inclined to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner that the Court is functus officio. The award of the Additional District Judge on reference under the Act is a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure as provided in Section 26 of the Act. Under Section 27 cost can be awarded against the Collector or a private party contesting the proceeding on reference in such a reference and under Section 28 the Collector can be directed to pay interest on the excess amount of compensation decreed by the Court. As a matter of fact under Section 54 of the Act a regular appeal had to be and was filed by the aggrieved party in this Court and the decree of the Court below merged in the High Court decree, which, as I have said above, clearly directed the payment of cost and interest besides the excess compensation money. I may in this connection refer to the following passage in the decision of the Privy Council in Narsingh Das v. Secy. of State, AIR 1925 PC 91 [LQ/PC/1924/99] at p. 92 (column 1):

"The first comment to be made upon the appeal is this: that before 1921 such an appeal would have been incompetent as was decided in Rangoon Botatoung Co., Ltd. v. Collector, Rangoon, ILR 40 Cal 21 (PC), but the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was amended in 1921 in the following way: - Section 2 -- Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), shall be re-numbered 26 (1), and to the said section the following sub-section shall be added namely:-- (2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of Section 2, Clause (2) and Section 2, Clause (9), respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. and it is under this section that the present appeal is maintained. The matter, therefore, must he considered and determined in the same manner as if it were a judgment from a decree in an ordinary suit....."

(8) With the aid of Section 31 of the Act, it was argued that on an award being made either by the Court below or under the decree of the appellate Court the collector is obliged to make the payment and hence such an award or a decree is not executable. I am not at all impressed by this argument. Section 31 (1) provides that the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation, awarded by him to the person interested or entitled thereto according to the award. Under Subsection (2) the Collector is obliged to deposit the amount of compensation as awarded by him in Court to which a reference under Section 18 is to be submitted. The said provision, in my opinion, is not comprehensive enough to cast a statutory duty on the collector to pay the amounts of excess compensation money, cost or interest awarded on a reference to the District Judge. It is, no doubt, true that generally and ordinarily the collector would obey the award made on such reference but, if he does not obey, the award (which is a decree under Section 26 of the Act) would be clearly executable and the provisions of Order 21 Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure would also be equally attracted to such an execution. That being so, it is clear to me that the petitioner, when he presented his application in the Court below on the 27th (sic) of July, 1951, had no right to present it and on that date, it is to be noticed, the decree had not been satisfied. His application, therefore, was rightly rejected on the 5th of September, 1961.

(9) The application of the opposite parties, however, was made after the deposit of the decretal money. Order 21 Rule 1 provides :-

"(i) All money payable under a decree shall be paid as follows, namely: - (a) into the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree;"

It is obvious that the money was deposited under this provision of law in the Court whose duty it was to execute the decree. It is also manifest that the decree was satisfied on such deposit being made and there was no question of executing the decree any further. Strictly speaking, therefore, the provisions of Order 21 Rule 16 of the Code would not, in terms, apply to the applications filed by the opposite parties on 22nd September, 1961. I may, however, state here that even if this application could be treated as one under the said provision of law, in view of the Patna amendment of the proviso to Rule 16 a notice to the judgment-debtor is not necessary nor is one necessary to the transferor if he has filed an affidavit admitting the transfer. In this particular case, I have mentioned above that Abdul Latif filed a petition supported by an affidavit on 6-10-61 and also examined himself on oath admitting the transfer. The Court below in this summary proceeding was satisfied about his capacity to transfer and its validity.

(10) A question, however, arises that, if the provisions of Order 21 Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not attracted and no regular execution petition was filed by the opposite parties in accordance with the said provision whether the Court below had a right to direct the payment of the decree money deposited by the State of Bihar to the opposite parties or whether the Court was functus officio and powerless to give such a direction. There can be no doubt that on such deposit being made the Court could direct the payment of money to the awardee or the decree-holder, Abdul Latif. If that be so, I see no reason why a direction could not be given for payment of the money to the transferees in accordance with the provisions of Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act.

(11) Some argument was advanced before us on behalf of the opposite parties to show that the case of the alleged oral gift set up by the petitioner is false and frivolous. But I do not think it necessary to go into and decide this question as, even assuming that the case of oral gift, in fact, is correct, in law, the petitioner derived no right or title to the money in question and he had no locus standi to object to its payment to the opposite parties. At the instance of such a person to interfere with the order of the Court below in exercise of the revisional powers of this Court will not be in aid of justice.

(12) In the result, the application fails and is dismissed, but I would make no order as to costs.