1. This special appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned single judge dismissing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

2. The appellant was assessed to Income Tax and super-tax under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 by orders dated November 21, 1960, and March 30, 1961, respectively. The Income Tax Officer issued a notice under Section 35 of the Act for each assessment year pointing out that there was an error apparent on the record which called for rectification. It appears that having regard to the amount of dividend distributed by the assessee in the respective previous years, the super-tax rebate should have been reduced. As that had not been done, the super-tax payable by the assessee had been under-charged. The appellant objected to the rectification proceedings. But, on July 17, 1962, the Income Tax Officer made two separate orders under Section 35 of the Act for the two assessment years purporting to rectify the mistake apparent from the record. In the result, an amount of Rs. 24,173 was withdrawn from the super-tax rebate for the assessment year 1958-59 and an amount of Rs. 10,737 was withdrawn from the super-tax rebate for the assessment year 1959-60. Against these the appellant applied for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition was dismissed by honble Manchanda J., and now this special appeal is before us.

3. Two contentions have been urged before us by learned counsel appearing for the appellant. The first contention is that in regard to the case of the assessment year 1959-60, the order under Section 35 of the Act was made after the assessment order had been modified in appeal and it was not open to the Income Tax Officer to rectify an assessment order after it had been disturbed in appeal. No such ground has been taken either in the writ petition or in special appeal before us nor has a copy of the appellate order been filed along with the writ petition.

4. The other contention is that the Income Tax Officer acted outside the scope of Section 35 of the Act inasmuch as there was no mistake apparent from the record. There was, it is said, a debatable question whether the Finance Act, 1958, and the Finance Act, 1959, warranted "the reduction of super-tax rebate. It appears that in the rectification proceedings before the Income Tax Officer it was contended that the relevant provisions of the two Finance Acts were in pari materia with the provisions of Clause (ii) of the proviso to Paragraph B of Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 1951, and that, as that provision had been held invalid by the Bombay High Court in Khatau Makhanji Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax : [1956]30 I.T.R. 841 (Bom) which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Khatau Makhanji Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. : [1960]40 I.T.R. 189 : [1960] 3 S.C.R. 873 (S.C) the relevant provisions of the Finance Acts of 1958 and 1959 were also invalid and there was no case for applying those provisions. The contention was rejected by the Income Tax Officer and, in our opinion, rightly. It seems clear to us that the provision of the Finance Act, 1951, which was declared invalid, is wholly different from the provisions in the Finance Acts of 1958 and 1959 no comparison whatever is possible between the two.

5. This is a case where the Income Tax Officer omitted to apply the relevant provisions of the Finance Acts of 1958 and 1959, and we are satisfied that the omission constitutes a mistake apparent from the record. It has not been shown to us by the appellant that the omission or failure of the Income Tax Officer to give effect to the provisions of the Finance Acts of 1958 and 1959 has to be traced to material outside the record.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon T. S. Balaram, Income Tax Officer v. Volkart Brothers : [1971]82 I.T.R. 50 (S.C.) but, in our opinion, that case cannot help the appellant. It merely lays down that a mistake apparent from the record must be an obvious mistake and not a debatable point of law.

7. We hold that the learned single judge was right in dismissing the petition and, accordingly, we dismiss this appeal with costs.

Appeal dismissed.