Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.

1. This judgment will dispose of 22 writ petitions. The common question that arises for consideration in all these writ petitions is whether the premises situated in Tibbia College compound, Ajmal Khan Road, New Delhi become public premises within the meaning of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the "PP Act") during the transient period when the Board of College is superseded . The private respondents in each of these petitions are occupants of quarters in the said Tibbia College compound. The petitioner in each of the writ petitions is the Administrator, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College and Allied Institutions, Karol Bagh, New Delhi.

2. If it is held that the premises situated in Tibbia College compound are public premises then, the Petitioner would be entitled to seek eviction of the respondents under the provisions of the PP Act. On the other hand, if the said premises are not held to be public premises then, the Petitioner cannot avail of the provisions of the PP Act. In all these cases, proceedings were initiated sometime in 1978-79 under the PP Act. Section 4 notices were issued by the estate officers which culminated in eviction orders under Section 5(1) of the PP Act. These eviction orders were mostly passed on or about July 1979. The private respondents who were the occupants of the quarters in question, being aggrieved by these eviction orders preferred separate and independent appeals under section 9 of the PP Act. The learned Additional District Judge passed a detailed judgment dated 5.8.1980 in PP Act case No 107 of 1979 entitled Daya Ram v. Estate Officer. The learned Additional District Judge held that the premises in question were not public premises as they did not belong to the central government and Therefore the provisions of the PP Act were inapplicable. He allowed the appeal and set aside the eviction order. The judgment in the case of Daya Ram v. Estate Officer was followed in all the other appeals and all the eviction orders passed by the Estate Officer were set aside. The Petitioner has filed the present writ petitions challenging these orders of the learned Additional District Judge.

. A résumé of the formation and status of the Petitioner would be necessary. Hakeem Mohammad Ajmal Khan was a famous physician of Unani medicine who lived in Delhi in the latter part of the 19th-century and in the beginning of the 20th. In 190 , he started a pharmaceutical Institute known as Hindustani Dawakhana. He also established the medical college known as the Tibbia College. He died in 1927. Before his death, in 1911, he, along with certain other persons formed a society called the Anjumani-Tibbia and had it registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. In 1915, the name of the society was changed and it came to be known as the Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College, Delhi. The Board of Trustees managed the Tibbia College and an attached hostel. The pharmaceutical Institute was also managed by it. Till 1948 things went on smoothly. Thereafter, a fight ensued between different groups of members for obtaining control of the Board and the College and for possession of the Hindustani Dawakhana. Criminal proceedings followed. A civil suit was filed. Joint receivers were appointed. At this stage, in view of the bitter battles amongst the members of the Board of Trustees, the Delhi State Legislature stepped in and passed an Act called the Tibbia College Act, 1952. This Act came into force on 10.10.1952. The constitutional validity of this Act of 1952 came to be challenged before the Supreme Court by way of a writ petition under Article 2 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court by virtue of its decision in the case of Board of Trustees v. State of Delhi: : AIR1962SC458 upheld the validity of the Tibbia College Act, 1952.

4. The preamble of the 1952 Act clearly indicated that it was "an Act to provide for transfer of the management of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College, Delhi, founded by the late Hakeem Ajmal Khan from its present Trustees to the Board". As will be indicated hereinbelow, by virtue of the 1952 Act the erstwhile Board of Trustees was dissolved and it was replaced by the new Board constituted under Section 4 of the said Act of 1952. The Board was re-constituted from time to time. The Board that was constituted on 1.5.1974 was unable to perform the duties imposed on it under the said Act of 1952. In fact, all the members of such Board had resigned and their resignations had been duly accepted by the Lieutenant Governor. Accordingly, the Lieutenant Governor in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 1 (2) of the said Act of 1952, superseded the board and appointed Shri M.W. K. Yusufzai, Financial Commissioner, Delhi as the Administrator of the Tibbia College and hospital and other institutions attached to it for a period of one year from the date of issue of the notification dated 28.4.1977 or until further orders to the contrary, whichever was earlier. The exact words of the operative portion of the notification dated 28.4.1977 reads as under:-

"Now, Therefore, the Lieutenant Governor, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the afore said Act hereby supersedes the Board and appoints Shri M. W. K. Yusufzai, Financial Commissioner, Delhi as administrator of the Tibbia College and hospital and other institutions attached to it for a period of one year from the date of issue of this notification or until further orders to the contrary, whichever is earlier."

5. It was urged on behalf of the respondents that there were no further orders to the contrary and as such, the supersession came to an end after a period of one year from the date of the said notification dated 28.4.1977. On the other hand, Ms Avnish Ahlawat, the learned counsel for the Petitioner, urged that the period of supersession continued till 198 . Since, the period of supersession of the Board might have a material bearing on the case it would be appropriate to deal with this question right away. The initial supersession was notified by the aforesaid notification dated 28.4.1977. This was followed by a notification dated 28.10.1977 whereby it was notified that Shri D. K. Das, Appellate Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Vikas Bhawan, New Delhi would exercise and perform all the powers and duties by or on behalf of Tibbia College Board in place of Shri M. W. K. Yusufzai. Thereafter, there was a spate of notifications dated 2.8.1978, 29.10.1980, 1.8.1981, 19.10.1981 and 14.10.1982 whereby different persons were named as administrators. By a notification dated 28.10.198 , in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 4(1) of the Tibbia College Act, 1952 and in supersession of the aforesaid notification dated 28.4.77, the Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi was pleased to nominate the members of the Tibbia College Board for the purpose of the said Act of 1952. According to Ms Avnish Ahlawat, the notifications make it clear that the Board was superseded in 1977 and was reconstituted the 198 . Thus, the supersession continued throughout this period. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents, led by Mr Ravinder Sethi (senior advocate) contended that the supersession was in fact for only one year. This was pursuant to the initial notification dated 28.4.1977 which clearly indicated that the supersession was for a period of one year from the date of issue or until further orders to the contrary, whichever was earlier. There being no orders to the contrary within the period of one year from the issuance of the said notification of 28.4.1977, the supersession automatically came to an end after a period of one year by efflux of time. The other notifications which followed this initial notification were only with regard to appointment of individuals in substitution of others for the post of administrator of the College. Without a formal order of extension of the initial period of supersession these notifications were of no consequence in law. Though, de facto the College was managed by such persons who were named from time to time, de jure they had no authority to do so. I am in agreement with this submission of the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents. This is so because Section 1 (1) of the said Act of 1952 clearly stipulates that the Board may be superseded by notification in the official gazette for "such period as may be specified in the notification". Clearly, the notification of supersession must itself specify the period of the supersession. The notification dated 28.4.1977 set a period of one year for the supersession subject to further orders within that period to the contrary. No such further order was issued within the period of one year whereby the period of supersession was altered or modified. That being the case, the supersession would clearly have come to an end on the expiry of the period of one year from the date of issue of the said notification dated 28.4.1977. Thus, the de jure supersession was from 28.4.1977 for a period of one year i.e., up to 28.4.1978 and not up to 198 as contended by the learned counsel for the Petitioner.

6. Having put the question of the period of supersession out of away, I can now focus on the main issue at hand. Section 1 (2) of theof 1952 provides that upon the issuance of a notification of supersession of the Board, all the members of the Board shall, from the date of supersession, vacate their offices as such members. It further provides that during the period of supersession, all the powers and duties of the Board under the said Act of 1952, shall be exercised and performed by such person or persons as the Chief Commissioner may direct. Clause (c) of Section 1 (2) of the said Act of 1952, which is the most material provision insofar as these writ petitions are concerned, reads as under:-

"(c) all property vested in the Board shall, during the period of supersession, vest in the central government."

It is, on the basis of this provision that the Petitioner contends that the premises in question would, during the period of supersession, belong to the central government and, Therefore, would become public premises within the meaning of the PP Act. Section 2(e) of the PP Act defines "public premises". This Section at the relevant time (prior to its amendment in 1984) was as under:-

"(e) "public premises" means any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the central government and includes --

(1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by all on behalf of-

(i) any company is defined in Section of the company that, 1956 in which not less than fifty-one percent, of the paid-up share capital is held by the central government; and

(ii) any Corporation (not being a company is defined in Section of the companies Act, 1956, or local authority) established by or under the Central Act and owned or controlled by the central government; and

(2) in relation to the union territory of Delhi --

(i) any premises belonging to the municipal Corporation of Delhi or any municipal committee or notified area committee and

(ii) any premises belonging to Delhi development authority whether such premises are in the position of, on lease out by, the said authority;"

It is obvious that section 2(e)(2) of the PP Act has no relevance inasmuch as the premises in question, admittedly, does not belong to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi or to any municipal committee or notified area committee or to the Delhi Development Authority. Although, the Board was constituted as a body corporate by the said 1952 Act (see: section (2) thereof), it would not fall within the meaning and ambit of "corporation" as referred to in section 2(e)(1)(ii) of the PP Act. This is so, because, the Board has not been "established by or under a Central Act". On the contrary, it has been established under the said Act of 1952 which has been enacted by the Delhi State Legislative Assembly. The Board is decidedly not a company. So, there is no question of section 2(e)(1)(i) having any application either. This leaves us with the main part of the definition.

Are the premises in question, "premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the central government"

7. The Tibbia College compound has certainly not been taken on lease or requisitioned by the Central Government. Hence, the key question is- does the Tibbia College compound "belong to" the Central Government Ms Avnish Ahlawat contended-Yes. And, that on the strength of the provision of section 1(2)(c) of the said Act of 1952 which says that "all property vested in the Board shall, during the period of supersession, vest in the central government". The Board was superseded. Accordingly, she contends, all property of the Board vested in the Central Government during the period of supersession and, consequently, during that period the Tibbia College compound "belonged to" the Central Government. Ergo, the said premises were "public premises" and the provisions of the PP Act were rightly applied by and the eviction orders passed by the Estate Officer ought not to have been set aside by the learned Additional District Judge.

8. Mr Sethi, the learned senior counsel who appeared for the respondents in some of the writ petitions as well as the other learned advocates who appeared on behalf of the respondents in the other writ petitions, contended that the words "vested" and "vest", as used in section 1 (2)(c) of the said Act of 1952, were not synonyms of the expression "belonged to" as appearing in section 2(e) of the PP Act. They contended that what was vested was only the right to manage. "Vesting", as used in the said Act of 1952 was only qua management and was not used in the sense indicating ownership.

9. It would, Therefore, be necessary to understand what is the true meaning and purport of the word "vest". The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, considered this. I shall deal with these decisions in chronological fashion.

10. In Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust: : [1957]1SCR1 the Supreme Court analysed the meaning of the word "vest" as under:-

"If title really vested in the Trust, it would be entitled to receive from Government the price of the property and not merely required to be reimbursed in respect of the actual expenditure on the scheme. Particular reliance was placed upon the words "and such property shall thereupon vest in the Chief Commissioner". It was argued that unless the property previously vested in the Trust it could not upon the transfer contemplated by sub-section (2) vest in the Chief Commissioner. This argument assumes that the word "vest" necessarily signifies that title to the property resides in the Trust. But the word "vest" has several meanings with reference to the context in which it is used. In this connection reference may be made to the following observations of Lord Cranworth in Richardson v. Robertson:

"...the word vest is a word, at least, of ambiguous import. Prima facie vesting in possession is the more natural meaning. The expressions investiture-clothing - and whatever else be the Explanation as to the origin of the word, point prima facie rather to the enjoyment than to the obtaining of a right. But I am willing to accede to the argument that was pressed at the bar, that by long usage vesting ordinarily means the having obtained an absolute and indefeasible right, as contra-distinguished from the not having so obtained it. But it cannot be disputed that the word vesting may mean, and often does mean, that which is its primary etymological signification, namely, vesting in possession."

15. Similarly with reference to the provisions of a local Act (5 Geo. 4, c. Ixiv), it was held that the word "vest" did not convey a freehold title but only a right in the nature of an easement. The following words of Willes, J. in Hinde v. Chorlton are relevant:

"...there is a whole series of authorities in which words, which in terms vested the freehold in persons appointed to perform some public duties, such as canal companies and boards of health, have been held satisfied by giving to such persons the control over the soil which was necessary to the carrying out the objects of the act without giving them the freehold".

16. In the case of Coverdale v. Charlton, the Court of appeal on a consideration of the provisions of the Public Health Act, 1875 ( 8 & 9 Vict. c. 55) with particular reference to Section 149, has made the following observations at p. 116:

"What then is the meaning of the word vest in this section The legislature might have used the expression transferred or conveyed, but they have used the word vest. The meaning I should like to put upon it is, that the street vests in the local board qua street; not that any soil or any right to the soil or surface vests, but that it vests qua street."

17. Referring to the provisions of Section 14 of the Lunacy Act, 1890 (5 & 54 Vict. c. 5) in the case of In re Brown (A lunatic)[4] it has been laid down by Lindley, L.J. that the word "vested" in that section included the right to obtain and deal with, without being actual owner of, the lunatics personal estate.

18. In the case of Finchley Electric Light Company v. Finchley Urban District Council, adverting to the provisions of Section 149 of the Public Health Act, 1875 Romer, L.J. has made the following observations at pp. 44 -44:

"Now that section has received by this time an authoritative interpretation by a long series of cases. It was not by that section intended to vest in the urban authority what I may call the full rights in fee over the street, as if that street was owned by an ordinary owner in fee having the fullest rights both as to the soil below and as to the air above. It is settled that the section in question was only intended to vest in the urban authority so much of the actual soil of the street as might be necessary for the control, protection, and maintenance of the street as a highway for public use. For that proposition it is sufficient to refer to what was said by Lord Halsbury L.C. and by Lord Herschell in Tunbridge Wells Corporation v. Baird.... That section has nothing to do with title; it is not considering a question of title. No matter what the title is of the person who owns the street, the section is only considering how much of the street shall vest in the urban authority ...."

19. That the word "vest" is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, Section 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further provides that "such property shall thereupon vest in such receiver". The property vests in the receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts after Realizing his assets. The property of the insolvent vests in the receiver not for all purposes but only for the purpose of the Insolvency Act and the receiver has no interest of his own in the property. On the other hand, Sections 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of 1894), provide that the property so acquired, upon the happening of certain events, shall "vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances". In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration. It would thus appear that the word "vest" has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly Sections 45 to 49 and 54 and 54-A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them."

11. The meaning of the words "vesting", "vested" and "vest" again came up for consideration of the Supreme Court in the case of Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P. : [1977]1SCR1072 . In that case, provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act 1 of 1951), in particular, sections 4 and 117 thereof were up for interpretation. Section 4 read as follows:-

"4. Vesting of estates in the State.-(1) As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the State Government may, by notification, declare that, as from a date to be specified, all estates situate in Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State and as from the beginning of the date so specified (hereinafter called the date of vesting), all such estates shall stand transferred to and vest except as hereinafter provided, in the State free from all encumbrances.

(2) It shall be lawful for the State Government, if it so considers necessary, to issue, from time to time, the notification referred to in sub-section (1) in respect only of such area or areas as may be specified and all the provisions of sub-section (1), shall be applicable to and in the case of every such notification."

Thus, by virtue of this section all estates situate in Uttar Pradesh vested in the State "free from all encumbrances". Clearly, vesting denoted ownership. There was no difficulty with this. What created a problem was whether "vesting" as employed in section 117 also meant "vesting" in the plenary sense or in some other limited sense. To fully appreciate the conclusions and observations of the Supreme Court, it would be instructive to also have a look at section 117(1) which, so much as is relevant, is as under:-

"117. Vesting of certain lands etc., in Gaon Sabhas and other local authorities.-(1) At any time after the publication of the notification referred to in Section 4, the State Government may, by general or special order to be published in the manner prescribed, declare that as from a date to be specified in this behalf, all or any of the following, things, namely--

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

(v) hats, bazars and melas except hats, bazars and melas held on land to which the provisions of clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 18 apply or on sites and areas referred to in Section 9, and

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

which had vested in the State under this Act shall vest in the Gaon Sabhas or/and other local authority established for the whole or part of the village in which the said things are situate, or partly in one such local authority (including a Gaon Sabha) and partly in another:

Provided that it shall be lawful for the State Government to make the declaration aforesaid subject to such exceptions and conditions as may be specified in the notification."

(Italics and underlining added)

What had "vested in the State" under section 4 was the full ownership of the estates. Did it, then, mean that what would "vest in the Gaon Sabha" by virtue of section 117(1) would also be the full ownership free from encumbrances This is what the Supreme Court had to say in this regard:-

"16. It is reasonable to harmonize the statutory provisions to reach a solution which will be least incongruous with legal rights we are cognisant of in current jurisprudence. Novelty is not a favored child of the law. So it is right to fix the estate created by Section 117 into familiar moulds, if any. Such an approach leads to the position that the vesting in the State was absolute but the vesting in the sabha was limited to possession and management subject to divestiture by Government. Is such a construction of vesting in two different senses in the same section, sound Yes. It is, because vesting is a word of slippery import and has many meanings. The context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. That is why even definition clauses allow themselves to be modified by contextual compulsions. So the sense of the situation suggests that in Section 117(1) of thevested in the State carries a plenary connotation, while shall vest in the Gaon Sabha imports a qualified disposition confined to the right to full possession and enjoyment so long as it lasts. Lexicographic support is forthcoming, for this meaning. Blacks Law Dictionary gives as the sense of to vest as to give an immediate fixed right of present or future enjoyment, to clothe with possession, to deliver full possession of land or of an estate, to give season. Websters Third International Dictionary gives the meaning as to give to a person a. legally fixed immediate right of present or future enjoyment.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **

18. There is thus authority for the position that the expression vest is of fluid or flexible content and can, if the context so dictates, bear the limited sense of being in possession and enjoyment. Indeed, to postulate vesting of absolute title in the Gaon Sabha by virtue of the declaration under Section 117(1) of theis to stultify Section 117(6). Not that the legislature cannot create a right to divest what has been completely vested but that an Explanation of the term vesting which will rationalise and integrate the initial vesting and the subsequent resumption is preferable, more plausible and better fulfills the purpose of the. We hold that the State has title to sustain the action in ejectment."

12. In this context, reverting to the facts of the present writ petitions, it is to be seen as to what is "vested" in the Board under the said Act and what vests in the Central Government during the period of supersession of the Board. Section 9 of the said Act of 1952 deals with the dissolution of the Board of Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College, Delhi and the transfer of its property to the Board under the said Act. Section 9 is as under:-

"9. (1) As from the appointed day, the Board of Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, a society registered under the provisions of the Registration of Societies Act, 1860, on the 12th day of August, 1911, by the name Anjumani-Tibbia whose purpose, constitution and name was amended on 25th November, 1915, shall stand dissolved and all property, movable and immovable, and all rights, powers and privileges of the said society which immediately before the appointed day belonged to or were vested in the said society shall vest in the Board and shall be applied for the purposes for which the Board is constituted.

(2) As from the appointed day all debts and liabilities of the said society shall stand transferred and attached to the Board and thereafter be discharged and satisfied by the Board.

( ) Any will, deed or other document whether made or executed before or after the commencement of this Act, which contains any bequests, gifts, or trust in favor, of the said society shall, as from the appointed day, be construed as if the Board were therein named instead of the said society."

The idiom used in section 9 (1) is of great importance. It reads - "all property, movable and immovable, and all rights, powers and privileges of the said society which immediately before the appointed day belonged to or were vested in the said society shall vest in the Board". Both expressions "belonged to" and "vested in" are used in the same sentence but they have different meaning and relate to different "things". The words "belonged to" have reference to the expression "all property, movable and immovable". On the other hand, "vested in" bears relation to "all rights, powers and privileges". So, section 9 (1) paraphrased could very well read as under:-

".......and all property, movable and immovable which immediately before the appointed day belonged to the said society, and all rights, powers and privileges of the said society which immediately before the appointed day were vested in the said society shall vest in the Board and shall be applied for the purposes for which the Board is constituted."

This is the meaning to be ascribed to the expressions "belonged to" and "vested in" used in the said section 9 (1). The word "vest", however, has been used in the plenary sense. Thus, what ultimately vests in the Board are (a) "all property, movable and immovable" which belonged to the Society, and (b) "all rights, powers and privileges" vested in the Society. Clearly, in this section itself, the words "vested in" and "vest" have been used differently.

It is, Therefore, to be examined as to in which sense or senses the expressions "vested in the Board" and "vest in the central Government" have been used in section 1 (2)(c) of the said Act of 1952. But, before that is done, it would be apposite to refer to the remaining decisions of the Supreme Court which deal with the meaning of the word "vest".

1 . In Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad v. P.N. Murthy: (1987) 1 SCC 568 [LQ/SC/1987/105] ( at page 572) the Supreme Court held:-

"6. For the aforesaid reasons we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge was right in taking the view that the buildings and lands vesting unto the Corporation not only in title but also in possession (as polarized from those vesting in title only but not in possession) were exempted from the obligation imposed by the legislature to levy the property taxes. Buildings and lands which were merely owned by the Corporation but were in actual possession or under the actual use and occupation of someone else, that is to say persons or bodies other than the Corporation itself are not exempted. In order to attract Section 202(l)(c) it must be established that a property must satisfy a dual test. The property must not only be owned by the Corporation, it must also be in the occupation of the Corporation itself. It is in this sense that the word vesting has been used. And the proposition that the expression vest is capable of being used in this sense, depending on the context in which it is employed, is supported by the observations made by this Court in Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust. It has been observed therein that the word vest "is a word of variable import" and a property "may vest in title or may vest in possession or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation". Reliance has been placed in this context on a passage from Richardson v. Robertson wherein it is stressed that the vesting often means vesting in possession.

7. The scheme of the relevant sections has to be read and construed in a meaningful, purposeful and rational manner. The expression vest employed in Section 202(l)(c), under the circumstances must of necessity be construed as vesting both in title as well as in possession."

14. The Supreme Court in the case of M. Ismail Faruqui (Dr) v. Union of Indi: (1994) 6 SCC 60 clearly observed that:-

"It is well-settled that the meaning of vest takes colour from the context in which it is used and it is not necessarily the same in every provision or in every context."

It reiterated the conclusions of its earlier decisions that the meaning of vest "can vary in different parts of the statute or even the same section, depending on the context of its use".

The Supreme Court further clarified this at page 406 of the said report as under:-

"41. The meaning of the word vest as earlier stated has different shades taking colour from the context in which it is used. It does not necessarily mean absolute vesting in every situation and is capable of bearing the meaning of a limited vesting, being limited, in title as well as duration. Thus the meaning of vest used in Section has to be determined in the light of the text of the statute and the purpose of its use. If the vesting be absolute being unlimited in any manner, there can be no limitation on the right to transfer or manage the acquired property. In the event of absolute vesting, there is no need for a provision enabling the making of transfer after acquisition of the property, right to transfer being a necessary incident of absolute title. Enactment of Section 6 in the same statute as a part of the scheme of acquisition of the property vesting it in the Central Government is, Therefore, contraindication of the vesting under Section in the Central Government being as an absolute owner without any particular purpose in view. The right to manage and deal with the property in any manner of an absolute owner being unrestricted, enactment of Section 7 which introduces an express limitation on the power of management and administration of property comprising the disputed area till the transfer is effected in the manner indicated in Section 6, is a clear indication of the acquisition of only a limited and not an absolute title in the disputed property by the Central Government. Sections 6 and 7 read together give a clear indication that the acquisition of the disputed property by this Act is for a particular purpose and when the purpose is achieved the property has to be transferred in the manner provided in Section 6; and the Central Government is obliged to maintain the status quo as in existence on 7-1-199 at the site where the disputed structure stood, till the time of that transfer."

15. The last decision of the Supreme Court on the meaning of the word "vest" that needs to be referred to is the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation: (2001) 8 SCC 14 . In that case the question before the Supreme Court court was as under (at page 147):-

"8. It is no doubt true that Section 220 provides that any drain which vests in the Corporation is a municipal drain and shall be under the control of the Corporation. In this context, the question arises as to what meaning is required to assign to the word "vest" occurring in Section 220 of the"

After considering Richardson v. Robertson (supra,) Hinde v. Chorlton (supra), Coverdale v. Charlton (supra), In re Brown (a lunatic) (supra), Finchley Electric Light Co. v. Finchley Urban District Council (supra), Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust (supra), the Supreme Court concluded thus:-

"15. We are, Therefore, of the view that the word "vest" means vesting in title, vesting in possession or vesting in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it is used in a particular provision of the.

16. It appears that when the was originally enacted, all the drains which belonged to the Corporation were municipal drains under the control of the Municipal Commissioner. By amending Act 5 of 1905, the words "vesting in or" were inserted in Section 220 of the. Simultaneously, by the said amending Act, Section 220- A was added in the which provides the method of vesting of the government drains in the Corporation. The legislative history of the shows that the expressions "vesting in" or "belonging" occurring in Section 220 of theare not synonyms. In fact the said expressions convey two different meanings. What is vested in the Corporation necessarily may not be owned by the Corporation...."

16. Thus, the principles deducible from the aforementioned Supreme Court decisions are these: The word "vest" is of variable import; it could mean vesting in the plenary sense - vesting of all rights, title and interest; it could also mean vesting in possession only or vesting in some limited sense. Thus, the expressions "vests in" or "vesting in" do not, ipso facto, imply and mean "belong to" or "belonging to". "Vesting" does not necessarily connote ownership. The meaning of vest takes colour from the context in which it is used and it is not necessarily the same in every provision or in every context. As noted above, the meaning of vest can vary in different parts of the statute or even the same section, depending on the context of its use.

17. Reverting to section 1 (2)(c) of the 1952 Act, it is to be examined as to in which sense or senses the words "vested" and "vest" have been used in the phrase - "all property vested in the Board shall, during the period of supersession, vest in the central government". To my mind both these words have been used with reference to possession and that too for the limited period of supersession. They are not used in the plenary sense. What alters during the period of supersession is only the management, control and possession over the properties. During supersession the central government does not "acquire" the title to the properties belonging to the Board. If that were to be so then the Central Government would be permitted to do something indirectly which it could not do directly.

18. One of the challenges to the of 1952 was on account of the provisions of Article 1(2) of the Constitution. In this context the Supreme Court in Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi v. State of Delhi (Now Delhi Administration) and Anr. : AIR1962SC458 (supra) clearly held that the said provision had no application. It held (at page 471) as under:-

"The impugned legislation does not relate to nor does it provide for, compulsory acquisition of property for a public purpose. The impugned legislation provided for the transfer of the management of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, from the old Board to a new Board and for that purpose the old Board was dissolved and a new Board was created with certain rights, powers and privileges to be applied for the exercise of powers and performance of duties as laid down in S. 7 of the. Such legislation does not fall under Art. 1(2) and cannot be judged by the tests laid down therein."

The Board had been superseded in terms of Section 1 of 1952 Act. But, this was temporary. It cannot be said that during this period of suppression the Central Government acquired the property of the Board. It is only management which is transferred. Accordingly, all property "vested in" the Board, during the period of supersession vests in the Central Government only in the possessory sense and not in the plenary sense. In other words, during the period of suppression the Central Government takes control over the properties of the Board which is superseded and has possession over the same. However, the ownership and title to the same does not change hands. It does not belong to the Central Government. Suppression is a temporary and transient phase and vesting and divesting are not the temporary matters.

19. It is also relevant to note that subsequent to the period in question, the Legislature of National Capital Territory of Delhi passed an Act called Delhi Tibbia College (Takeover) Act, 1997. By virtue of Section of this 1997 Act, on and from the appointed day, the Management of the College stood transferred to and vested absolutely in the Lt. Governor of National Capital Territory of Delhi. The constitutionality of this Act was called in question in Mahboob Alam Khan v. UOI and Ors. (CW 57 6/2002) before this Court. By a judgment and order dated 16.9.2002 a Division Bench of this Court upheld the validity of the 1997 Act. The Division Bench with reference to Section of the 1997 Act and to the 1952 Act had this to say:-

" The charging section contained in Section states that the management of the college shall stand transferred to vest in the Delhi Government. By reason of Section of the said Act, Therefore, the right title interest of the society in respect of movable an immovable properties has not vested in the State. In other words, it will be a repetition to state that what is vested therein in the management of the college which hitherto before was announced the statutory power constituted under 1952Act. The said Act, Therefore, is not Act by reason whereof and the immovable properties of the society had been acquired."

x x x x x x x x x x xx x x x x x x x x x xx x x x x x x x x x xx

"However, having regard to the fact that provisions of the said statute for all intent and purport is merely an extension of 1952 Act by reason whereof the management of the college vests in the Central Government which had since remain vested in a statutory Board, we are of the opinion that the nature of the enactment has not been changed."

It is also interesting to note that in the case before the Division Bench the contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents therein and the petitioners herein was as under:-

"Ms. Avinash Ahlawat, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand, would contend that the said act has been enacted only for the purpose of taking over the management of the college and not for any other purpose."

20. From the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court and the Division Bench decision of this Court, it is clear that neither the 1952 Act nor the 1997 Act transferred any ownership of the properties of the Board to the Central Government. Therefore, when substantively the 1952 Act did not provide for a transfer of ownership in favor of the Central Government, a temporary transitory provision cannot be construed as conveying/transferring property from the Board to the Central Government during the period of supersession. That being the case, it is clear that the premises in question did not fall within the definition of public premises as applicable at the relevant time and, Therefore, the entire proceedings under the provisions of the P.P. Act were without jurisdiction. The orders passed by the learned Additional District Judge in all the matters have to be upheld and the writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.