SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.

1. This is a statutory appeal against the decision of the Customs Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (for short CEGAT). The appellant Company had filed a classification list under Rule 173-B of the Central Excise Rules stating that they intended to clear PPRF yarn, on which duty had already been paid.

2. According to the appellant, the PPRF yarn consists of two varieties of yarn on which duty has already been paid, namely, two plies of Polyester Spun yarn - PP and one ply of Rayon Filament yarn - RF, which are doubled together and the resultant yarn is referred to as PPRF yarn. The aforesaid classification list filed by the appellant was rejected and it was directed to file to file a fresh classification list showing PPRF yarn under tariff item 68 of the Central Excise Rules. The case of the appellant is that since it was not permitted to clear PPRF yarn without further payment of duty under tariff item 68 of the said Rules, on or from April 27, 1976, they started making clearance on payment of duty on PPRF yarn under protest.

3. Thereafter, in October 1978, the appellant filed refund claim for the period from April to September 1978 for a sum of Rs. 84, 651.77 collected by the revenue as duty on PPRF yarn under tariff items 68. The appellant Company, thereafter, received a show cause notice requiring it to show cause as to why the refund claim should not be rejected. The appellant Company filed its reply stating therein that the duty had already been paid on Polyester Spun Yarn, which was manufactured by it in its factory (under tariff item 18-E of the First Schedule of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, hereinafter called the Act) and further that the appellant was purchasing Rayon Filament yarn, on which duty had already been paid (under tariff item 18-II) and that the appellant was only doubling two plies of duty paid Polyester Spun yarn with one ply of Rayon Filament yarn and no process of manufacture was carried out and further no new product came into being.

4. On or about July 3, 1979, the Assistant Collector of Central Excise rejected, the refund claim of the appellant despite the fact that a representation was pending before the Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Jaipur, against the action of the Inspector, Central Excise, in rejecting the classification list dated April 10, 1978 and demanding duty of excise on the PPRF yarn, on which duty has already been paid. In February 1980, the appeal filed before the Revisional Authority against the order of the Appellate Collector was transferred to the CEGAT under Section 35-P of the Act.

5. By the judgment in appeal, the Tribunal held that the goods in question, namely, PPRF yarn was taxable under tariff item 68 and there was no question of any refund being due to the appellant.

6. Hence, the short question involved in this appeal, is : whether the goods in question, namely, a special type of yarn marked as a finished product known as PPRF yarn, should be treated as such and taxed on that basis. Excise duty is a duty on the manufacture of goods and not on sale. Manufacture is complete as soon as by the application of one or more process, the raw material undergoes some change. If a new substance is brought into existence or if a new or different articles having a distinct name, character or us results from particular process or processes, such process or activity would amount to manufacture. The moment there is transformation into a new commodity commercially known as a separate and distinct commodity having its own character and use, manufacture takes place. See the observations of this Court in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills, Union of India v. HUF Business known as Ramlal Mansukhrai, Rewari, Allenburry Engineers P. Ltd. v. Ramakrishna Dalmia, Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax (Law) Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Pio Food Packers, Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and the cases referred to in the decision of this Court in Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India.

7. In our opinion, the Tribunal was justified in the view it took. The Tribunals view is corroborated by its own view as expressed in its decision in Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products Ltd. v. Union of India. Our attention was, however, drawn to the observations of the Bombay High Court in the case of Piramal Spg. & Wvg. Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, where the facts were slightly different but the learned Single Judge of the High Court held that merely by intertwining strings of cotton yarn and nylon yarn, no new product comes into being. Whether by a certain process a new product comes into being or not, is a question of fact. There is no particular definition of yarn in the Act or the Rules or the notifications. According to the oxford Dictionary yarn means any spun thread specially of kinds prepared by waving, knitting or rope-making. According to the Websters New World Dictionary, it is defined as any fiber, as wool, silk, flax, cotton, nylon, etc., spun into strands for weaving, knitting or making thread.

8. This Court in CST v. Sarin Textile Mills held that the fibre in order to answer the description of yarn must have two characteristics, firstly, it should be a spun strand and secondly such strand should be primarily meant for use in weaving, knitting or rope-making. The question is not whether it is a mixture of two yarns where as a process of mixing a separate and distinct goods known in the market as such, comes into being. For ascertaining the correct meaning of a fiscal entry reference to a dictionary is apt to be a somewhat delusive guides, as it gives all the different shades of meaning. The correct guide is the context and the trade meaning. The trade meaning is always to be given preference. See in this connection the observations in the famous Canadian case of King v. Planters.

9. The Tribunal has found that indisputably a new yarn has come into being which is known in the market on the evidence adduced before the Tribunal, and that PPRF is treated differently from Polyester Spun yarn and Rayon Filament yarn. We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal rightly came to the conclusion that this is a separate and distinct item. If having borne the correct legal principles in mind and in the light of the facts and without ignoring any relevant or material fact, the Tribunal comes to a conclusion on a question of classification of an item for tariff purpose, in our opinion, that finding cannot and should not be interfered with in appeal before this Court. In that view of the matter the appeal cannot be entertained and is, therefore, dismissed.