M. Jagannadha Rao, J.This appeal raises the question of computation of damages upon the death of a housewife and mother of children, as also computation in the case of an injured housewife.
2. A large number of people died while travelling in a passenger bus to Srisailam on 12.4.1981. We are concerned here with claims arising in O.P. No. 57 of 1981. The claimants wife aged 34 years and three male children aged 12, 8 and 6 years respectively, died. The deceased (Sic. claimant) was aged 40 years at the time of accident. Unfortunately, the claim was made only for Rs. 40,000/ - though there have been four deaths involved in this O.P. The lower Tribunal awarded Rs. 11,000/ - towards pecuniary loss, Rs. 3,500/ - towards loss of consortium and Rs. 3,500/ - towards pain, suffering and loss of expectation of life, in all, Rs. 18,000/ - for all the four deaths. The husband has preferred this appeal.
3. The computation of damages consequent on the death of a housewife is based on certain special principles. If she is a mother of children, additional factors fall to be considered. I shall first refer to cases of fatal accidents and then to cases of injured women.
4. A wife and mother is generally not a bread-winner and her loss is a loss of the gratuitous services rendered by her. In Berry v. Humm (1915) 1 KB 627, it was held that such a loss was recoverable under the Fatal Accidents Act and the contention that absence of money contribution by the deceased required no compensation to be paid, was rejected. Scrutton, J. said:
I can see no reason in principle why such pecuniary loss should be limited to the value of money lost or the money value of things lost, as contributions of food or clothing, and why I should be bound to exclude the monetary loss incurred by replacing services rendered gratuitously by a relative, if there was a reasonable prospect of their being rendered freely in the future but for the death.
[Emphasis added]
On the facts of that case, the award of 35 by the jury was confirmed, dividing the same as 20 for loss of service or payment to a substituted housekeeper and 15 for extra expense of management by a housekeeper instead of by the wife. The above case was followed in Feay v. Barnwell (1938) 1 All ER 31, where the husband aged 73 years was completely blind and the wife (aged 71 years) had earlier done everything in the house for him, read to him and taken him out for walks. Singleton, J. observed:
... in order to get someone suitable, he will have to pay 25s. a week, and also to provide the keep of that person who comes in to look after him as housekeeper, and to some extent, as nurse, because he can do little for himself. It must be remembered that someone coming to a house in that way, in the ordinary sense, is not as economical as the wife, another bedroom is necessary. There is additional expense of one kind or another.
Taking the estimated cost of the upkeep of help which the Plaintiff would require as 1 a week, the court held that there was a loss of 2.5s. a week and computing for 5 years, awarded 625 as damages under the Fatal Accidents Act. The amount of loss consequent upon the death of the wife will often be calculated by the expense incurred in procuring for the husband, the services of a housekeeper or servant since his wifes death and in providing board and lodging for such housekeeper or servant as in Jeffrey v. Smith (1970) 114 Sol Jo 268. In that case, the Plaintiff was 51 years and there were three children aged 9, 6 and 3, the wife having died. His mother-in-law had looked after the children since the wifes death but her bad health prevented her from continuing to do so. The Plaintiff called evidence from an employment agency to the effect that a housekeeper to look after the children would cost atleast 10 per week. The Judge took a multiplier of 10 years and awarded 5,200. On appeal, the award was confirmed. The housekeeper employed may well be a relative as in Morris v. Rigby (1966) 110 Sol Jo 834. In that case, the husband, a medical officer, earning 2,820 a year, claimed damages for the death of his wife. He had five children aged two to fifteen years. He got his wifes sister to come and take care of them and do the domestic duties, paying her a gross wage of 20 a week. The judge awarded 8,000 and the award was confirmed In Regan v. Williamson 1977 ACJ 331 (QBD, England), also, the housekeeper employed was a relative. There, the wife was 37 years at her death and she left behind her, her husband and four sons aged 13, 10, 7 and 2 years. A relative came on daily (except weekends) to provide meals and to look after the boys. She was paid 16 per week and it cost the Plaintiff further 6.50 per week for her food, journeys to and from home and national insurance stamp. The Plaintiff estimated that his wifes loss had cost him 10 per week to clothe and feed. Watkins, J. held that though, according to precedents 22.50 ( 16+6.50) per week minus 10 per week, would be sufficient, justice required that the term services should be widely construed. Watkins, J. observed:
I am, with due respect to the other Judges to whom I have been referred, of the view that the word services has been too narrowly construed. It should, at least, include an acknowledgement that a wife and mother does not work to set hours and, still less, to rule. She is in constant attendance, save for those hours when she is, if that is a fact, at work. During some of those hours she may well give the children instructions on essential matters to do with their upbringing and, possibly, with such things as their home work. This sort of attention seems to be as much a service, and probably more valuable to them, than the other kinds of service conventionally so regarded.
[Emphasis supplied]
and hastened to add:
am aware that there are good mothers and bad mothers. It so happens that I am concerned in the present case with a woman who was a good wife and mother.
On the basis, the figure for dependency was raised from 12.50 ( 22.50 -10.0) per week to 20 per week and a further sum of 1.50 was added for the deceaseds financial contribution to the home, had she eventually gone out to work again. A multiplier of 11 was applied as the Plaintiff was 43 years. The award under the Fatal Accidents Act, was 1238. In Mehmet v. Perry 1978 ACJ 112 (QBD, England), the husband had to look after five children aged 14, 11, 7, 6 and 3 years. The two youngest children suffered from a serious hereditary blood disease requiring medication and frequent visits to hospital. Consequently, the husband had to give up his employment after his wifes death and devoted full time to the care of the family. Between September, 1973 when his wife was killed and the trial in October, 1976, his net average loss of earnings were 1,500 a year. His future net loss would be at the rate of 2,000 a year. It was held by Brain Neill, QC (sitting as a deputy Judge) that, in view of the medical evidence, the giving up of the job was proper and that damages should be assessed not at the cost of employing a housekeeper but by reference to the Plaintiffs loss of wages since the loss of wages represented the cost of providing the services of a full time housekeeper in substitution for the wife. In addition, the children were entitled, on the basis of Regan v. Williamson 1977 ACJ 331 (QBD, England), to recover 1,500 as part of their damages, a sum of 1,000 for the loss of personal attention to them as a mother as distinct from her services as a housekeeper but that, that sum must be kept within modest limits as the Plaintiff was at home all the time. The Plaintiff was also held entitled to some damages for his loss as a husband, of the personal care and attention of the wife but that sum should be quite small to avoid any overlap with the damages awarded for housekeeping services. The last of the children required as per medical advice, support for 12 years. A multiplier of 8 was adopted for the family as a unit and 12 for the Plaintiff and a sum of 19,000 was arrived at
5. A claim for the loss of a mothers services, by children is not to be diminished because the grandmother has voluntarily taken over their care. Hay v. Hughes 1975 ACJ 477 (CA, England). If, of course, the wife was monetarily contributing to the family, the loss of such pecuniary contributions is also recoverable. They may be her earnings as in Grzelak v. Harefield and Northwood Hospital Management Committee (1968) 112 Sol Jo 195, or from her anticipated earnings, as in Regan v. Williamson 1977 ACJ 331 (QBD, England), or as in Feay v. Bamwell (1938) 1 All ER 31, from her old age pension, or they may be indirect, by her contributing equally to the joint living expenses of herself and her husband as in Burgess v. Florence Nightingale Hospital 1955 (1) QB 349. In that case Devlin J. held that "when a husband and wife, either with separate incomes or with a joint income to which they are both beneficially entitled, are living together and sharing their expenses, and in consequence of that fact their joint living expenses are less than twice the expenses of each one living separately, then each, by the fact of sharing, is conferring a benefit on the other."
6. In case the wife was living away from her husband due to family disputes, the validity of the claim depends on the chances of reconciliation. If there was no chance of reconciliation and no intention of returning, the other spouse had no claim as held by the House of Lords in Davies v. Taylor 1973 ACJ 124 (HL, England). In Gray v. Barr 1973 ACJ 278 (CA, England), where the chances of reconciliation were not nil, the court gave half the amount it would have given in case of a stable family. All the above cases are fatal accident cases.
7. I shall now refer, in this context, to the case of an injured housewife reported in Dally v. General Steam Navigation Co. (1980) 3 All ER 696. The injured housewife was 34 years of age, married, living with her two children. She did not, after the injury employ anybody to help her. It was a case where the incapacity would continue for her life. The trial was reached seven years after the accident. The question arose whether, while estimating damages, the cost of using a servant has to be awarded not only for the future from date of trial but also for past seven years before trial, when a servant was not, in fact, employed. It was held by Ormorod, Bridge and Templeman, JJ, in the Court of Appeal, that so far as the future, from date of trial is concerned, the cost of employing a servant could be awarded as damages-whether the Plaintiff-housewife was going to employ a servant in future or not or was going to spend the award amount for other luxuries. But, so far as the past before trial was concerned, she could not recover therefor, she not having employed a servant Past damages before trial being special damages-had to be proved as a fact At the same time, the court was to make an award, for the period upto date of trial, for the extent of difficulties which the Plaintiff had to contend with, in performing her household duties "without the wherewithal to employ a servant" and the award considerably increased by the amount otherwise payable towards past pain and suffering upto the trial. The trial Judge awarded 11,427 towards expense of employing a servant (before trial and after trial) and 8,000 for pain and suffering (past and future) in all 19,427. In the appellate court, a sum of 8,736 was awarded for future damages instead of 11,427 and the award for pain and suffering was increased from 8,000 by a sum of 2,691, in effect, maintaining the same figure of 19,427 awarded by the trial Judge.
8. In the United States of America too, similar principles have been laid down in Sea-Land Services Inc. v. Gaudet 414 US 573, it has been held as follows: Recovery in a wrongful death action for the monetary value of services which the deceased provided and would have continued to provide but for his (her) wrongful death includes recovery for such services as the nature, training, education and guidance that a child would have received had not the parent been wrongfully killed; services the decedent performed at home or for his (her) spouse are also compensable. In Michigan C.R Co. v. Vree Land 227 US 59, also it has been held that the word services cannot be construed narrowly but include, when the beneficiary is a child, the loss of that care, counsel, training and education, which it might, under the evidence, have reasonably received from the parent and which can only be supplied by the services of another.
9. Several High Courts in India have, no doubt considered the basic principles of estimating the loss of services of the housewife. But the concept of giving a wider meaning to the word services has not been considered in the manner in which the same has come to be considered in England. For that matter, the love and affection or care bestowed by an Indian housewife to the children and husband, is definitely not inferior to that of her English counterpart There is no reason as to why the wider meaning given to the word services in England should not be adapted in India.
10. In Abdulkadar Ebrahim Sura v. Kashinath Moreshwar Chandani 1968 ACJ 78 (Bombay), the learned Judges referred to Berry v. Hutnm (1915) 1 KB 627, while awarding compensation to the husband for loss of consortium: In Khodabhai Bhagwanbhai and Others Vs. Hirji Tapu and Another, , B.K. Mehta and S.B. Majmudar JJ. considered the case of a death of a housewife aged 50 years who was helping the husband in agricultural operations. The claimants were the husband and eight children. The monthly loss to the dependency was assessed at Rs. 75/ - and a multiplier of 8 was adopted, arriving at Rs. 7,200/ - and a sum of Rs. 5,000/ - was awarded towards loss of expectation of life, pain and suffering; total Rs. 12,200/ -. Reference was made to Berry v. Humm (1915) 1 KB 627. It was observed by the Division Bench:
even if she was not earning, the gratuitous services rendered by her would now be required to be substituted by other modes which will have their own economic importance and value and that the pecuniary benefit from these services in the domestic front as well as in the agricultural operation of the husband ... will have to be assessed....
(Emphasis added)
The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Manohar Lal Sobha Ram Gupta v. M.P. Electricity Board 1975 ACJ 494 (MP), considered the case of the death of a housewife aged 32 years and in the claim by the husband and two minor sons, estimated the value of the services at Rs. 500/ - per annum and applying a multiplier of 16, awarded Rs. 8,000/ -. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in C. Venkatesham v. G.M. A.P.S.R.T.C. 1977 ACJ 536 (AP), considered the case of death of a housewife aged 21 years. The claimants were the husband and two minor children. After deducting the savings for the husband consequent upon the death of his wife, from the value of the loss of services, the net loss was assessed at Rs. 1,200/ - per annum and applying a multiplier of 15, a sum of Rs. 18,000/ - was awarded. Sheth and Jeevan Reddy, JJ. observed:
Therefore, we have to evaluate her services rendered to her family and to her household. The first head under which compensation should be awarded to the claimant is loss of domestic services. This would include the service which she rendered by cooking the food for the family, by maintaining the household and by bringing up the children. .... Out of this amount we have to deduct what the claimant used to spend on the deceased and what he has been saving now on account of her death.
and while assessing for pain and suffering, and loss of consortium the court awarded a further sum of Rs. 6,000/ -, stating that the said sum includes the loss of love and affection to the young children who, during their infancy, had been deprived of the motherly affection.
11. Thus, except in the last mentioned case, where the loss of love and affection was considered along with loss of consortium, the Indian courts have not chosen to consider the loss of love and affection to the children and to the husband as part of the pecuniary loss awardable together with loss for services. As pointed out, however, in the several rulings quoted earlier, the value of the loss of love and affection to the children and to the husband has also to be estimated as part of the loss of services of the deceased housewife.
12. From the aforesaid rulings, the following principles can be summarised:
(1) The loss to the husband and children consequent upon the death of the housewife or mother has to be computed by estimating the loss of services to the family, if there was reasonable prospect of such services being rendered freely in the future but for the death. It must be remembered that any substitute to be so employed is not likely to be as economical as the housewife. Apart from the value of obtaining substituted services, the expense of giving accommodation or food to the substitute must also be computed. From this total must be deducted the expense the family would have otherwise been spending for the deceased housewife.
(2) While estimating the services of the housewife, a narrow meaning should not be given to the meaning of the word services but should be construed broadly and one has to take into account the loss of constant love and affection as also of personal care and attention by the deceased to her children, as a mother and to her husband, as a wife. The award is not diminished merely because some close relation like a grandmother is prepared to render voluntary services.
(3) In case the husband is compelled to give up his job to attend constantly to children who are extremely sickly, the loss of the husbands job can also be treated as loss to the family. If the deceased was contributing from her earnings to the family, that should also be treated as loss.
(4) If the wife was totally living away and there were no chances of reconciliation, the loss of services cannot be treated as a loss. But if there were reasonable chances of reconciliation, 50 per cent of the loss of services could be awarded.
(5) In the case of an injured housewife, the award from the date of trial on the above basis of loss of services has to be made irrespective of whether she is in fact, going to employ a substitute or not. Even for the period before trial, if she had not engaged a substitute, the award need not be diminished because the extra burden she had borne could be considered as part of the award for the "pain and suffering" and the said burden could be treated as equivalent to that of engaging a substitute.
13. Coming to the facts of the present case, the deceased was aged 34 years and she died in the accident on 2.4.1981 along with her three male children aged 12, 8 and 6 years. The husband-claimant who is the Appellant before me was aged 40 years at the time. The total claim, unfortunately, is only in a sum of Rs. 40,000/ - for all the four deaths, the Tribunal awarding a shockingly low sum of Rs. 18,000/ - for four deaths. The deceased housewife was not employed. Her special services to the family have then to be estimated as including the love and affection as also the personal care and attention, she would have given, as a mother to her children and as a wife to her husband. But as in this case, the children are all dead, that special loss to the children need not be taken into account, especially when the compensation claim includes the claim due to loss of children in the same accident. The expense that would have been incurred on the wife, if living, has to be deducted. Before me, it was admitted that even putting these at the lowest, the claim made in the case will be exceeded. Taking the special loss to the family even at Rs. 150/ - p.m., the annual loss will be at least Rs. 1,800/ -.
13-A The husband being the claimant and naturally older to the wife, a multiplier suitable to the age of the husband has to be selected because those services would have lasted only for the lifetime of the husband. The appropriate multiplier from Bhagwandas Vs. Mohd. Arif, , to a person aged 40 years is 12.79. As the Table in that case was for those retiring at 60 years and that is not the case here, a slightly higher multiplier is applied, namely, 13.80. The present value of the future loss to the husband towards services by his wife are thus about Rs. 15,000/ -. The loss to the estate consequent on the death of the wife is then to be arrived at. In view of my judgment in Y. Varalakshmi and Others Vs. M. Nageswara Rao and Others, , Rs. 7,500/ - is payable towards pain and suffering and loss of amenities and Rs. 7,500/ - towards loss of expectation of life, i.e., Rs. 15,000/ -. The court below awarded Rs. 3,500/ - as loss of consortium. The total loss consequent to the death of the wife comes to Rs. 33,500/ -.
14. The claim includes the loss due to the death of three male children also. In Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corpn. v. G. Ramanaiah 1988 ACJ 223 (AP), I have considered the estimation of loss to the parents on the death of children in various age-groups. In the present case, there is no need to go into them for even the loss to the estate consequent to the death of each of the children comes to Rs. 15,000/ - (Rs. 7,500 + 7,500), in all Rs. 45,000/ -. The total loss consequent to the death of the wife and children Rs. 33,500/ - + 45,000/ - itself exceeds the total claim of Rs. 40,000/ -. Hence, the claim has to succeed in full with interest at 6 per cent per annum on the sum of Rs. 18,000/ - already awarded and at Rs. 12 per cent per annum on the enhancement of Rs. 22,000/ -. Interest is awarded from the date of petition.
15. At the relevant time in 1981, the extent of liability of the insurance company was only Rs. 5,000/ - per passenger subject to an overall maximum of Rs. 75,000/ -
16. For the reasons given by me in Panjala Rajaiah and Others Vs. Mamidi Manikya Reddy and Another, , the contention of Mr. Narayana Rao, the learned Counsel for the owner of the vehicle as also Mr. Mallikarjuna Sastry, the learned Counsel for the claimant, to the effect that the insurance company is to be made liable for the entire sum of Rs. 40,000/ - with interest is liable to be rejected. I am also not prepared to accept the contention that the amendment of 1982 is retrospective. As in the present case, the accident occurred on 12.4.1981, the law enforced prior to 1982 amendment alone applies.
17. In the result, the appeal, is allowed and the compensation is fixed at Rs. 40,000/ - the maximum claimed. The insurance company will be liable only for a sum of Rs. 20,000/ - with interest at 12 per cent per annum from the date of the petition, subject, however, to the overall liability of Rs. 75,000/ -. In regard to the claim for compensation which arose in the accident dated 12.4.1981 in relation to this particular vehicle, it may be noted that while several O. Ps. were filed before the lower Tribunal, only few cases have been carried in appeal to this Court. The liability of the insurance company upto Rs. 75,000/ - is to be considered in respect of the context of the claims in respect of the same vehicle. The apportionment already made by the lower court will stand. The C.M.A. is accordingly allowed in the manner mentioned above. There shall be no order as to costs.