(Prayer: Writ appeals preferred under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against the order of this Court dated 21.12.2012, made in W.P.No.3880 of 2012.)

M. Sathyanarayanan, J.

1. The appellants in W.A.No.368/2013 are the petitioners in W.P.No.3880/2012 and it was filed for issuance of a writ of certiorari to call for the records relating to the award in Award No.1/2003-2004 in SEC 929/98 dated 30.4.2003, and notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (Central Act 1/1894) in G.O.Ms.No.147, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 29.3.2000, and declaration under Section 6 of the said Act in G.O.Ms.No.272 of the same Department dated 16.5.2001, and quash the same. The writ petition after contest, was partly allowed on 21.12.2012, and the award dated 30.4.2003, passed by the second respondent viz. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neighbourhood Scheme, Salem, was quashed and the matter was remanded back to the authorities concerned to follow the procedures contemplated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (Central Act 1/1894), in passing the award, if the land in question covered in the said award, is required for public purpose and pass fresh orders and aggrieved by the same, the writ petitioners as well as the official respondents had filed W.A.Nos.368/2013 and 538/2014 respectively.

2. Since both the writ appeals arise out of the order dated 21.12.2012, made in W.P.No.3880/2012, they are disposed of by this common judgment.

3. The facts narrated in brief, necessary for the disposal of these writ appeals, are as follows:

3(i) The appellants in W.A.No.368/2013, who are the petitioners in W.P.No.3880/2012, claim to be the members of the joint family and joint owners of the land measuring to an extent of 0.98.5 hectares, comprised in Survey No.68/3B situated at No.64, Kottagoundampatty Village, Omalur Taluk, Salem District. The first respondent in this appeal/first appellant in W.A.No.538/2014 has issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (Central Act 1/1894) (hereinafter referred to as L.A. Act) in G.O.Ms.No.147, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 29.3.2000, to acquire vast extent of lands comprised in various Survey Numbers including the lands belonging to the appellants. The second respondent issued a notice dated 26.6.2000, under Section 5-A of the L.A. Act and after conducting an enquiry in accordance with law, has made a recommendation to drop the proceedings so far as the lands belonging to the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013, are concerned, and however, the first respondent has proceeded with the acquisition and issued a declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act in G.O.Ms.No.272, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 16.5.2001.

3(ii) The appellants in W.A.No.368/2013 viz. petitioners in W.P.No.3880/2012, filed W.P.No.16709/2001 challenging the acquisition proceedings and a Single Bench of this Court has granted interim stay of dispossession alone in respect of the lands belonging to the appellants herein, vide order dated 14.9.2001. The said writ petition was dismissed on 30.10.2008, and the interim order granted, was vacated consequent upon the dismissal of the writ petition. The appellants herein aggrieved by the same, filed W.A.No.2179/2011 and in the interregnum, award was passed on 30.4.2003. The writ appeal in W.A.No.2179/2011 filed by the appellants herein, was dismissed on 10.4.2012, granting them liberty to challenge the award dated 30.4.2003. The appellants herein aggrieved by the dismissal of W.A.No.2179/2011, filed a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.19404/2012 before the Honble Supreme Court of India and it was dismissed on 15.10.2012.

3(iii) The appellants herein pursuant to the liberty granted in W.A.No.2179/2011, filed the present writ petition in W.P.No.3880/2012, contending among other things, that in respect of one notification, two awards came to be passed on 30.4.2003 and 13.5.2003 respectively, and after the passing of the first award dated 30.4.2003, the jurisdictional Land Acquisition Officer became functus officio and therefore, he is not competent to pass the second award on 13.5.2003. It was further contended that prior approval as mandated under Section 11(1) of the L.A. Act, has not been followed and as per G.O.Ms.No.1027, Revenue Department, dated 25.9.1992, the power to approve the awards for payment of compensation not exceeding Rs.20 lakhs has been delegated to the Collector/Additional Collector/District Revenue Officers of the concerned District and if it exceeds Rs.20 lakhs, it shall be approved by the Commissioner of Land Administration and in the case on hand, though the compensation exceeded Rs.20 lakhs, it was approved by the Collector and therefore, the award is liable to be set aside.

3(iv) On behalf of the official respondents, it was contended that all procedural formalities have been complied with in letter and spirit and possession of the land could not be taken as the lands are in occupation of the land owners and necessary steps were taken under Section 47 of the L.A. Act and further contended that once the award is passed, it cannot be put to challenge by filing a writ petition and the remedy open to the claimants is to seek a reference for enhancement of compensation.

3(v) The learned Single Judge, on consideration of the rival submissions and upon perusal of the voluminous records, has found that since liberty has been granted while dismissing W.A.No.2179/2011, the present writ petition challenging the award, is maintainable. The learned Single Judge has also found that there is no delay or laches on the part of the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013 to make a challenge to the award and on the question of computation of the period under Section 11-A of the L.A. Act and also G.O.Ms.No.1027, Revenue Department, dated 25.9.1992, found that as per the information obtained under the Right To Information Act, the compensation determined under the award dated 30.4.2003, was Rs.42,05,621/- and it was also remitted before the jurisdictional Sub Court at Mettur and no enquiry was conducted by the successor, who passed the second award dated 13.5.2003. The learned Single Judge further found that since the compensation exceeded Rs.40 lakhs, G.O.Ms.No.2003, Revenue Department, dated 13.12.1984, has application and without prior approval, it was ordered to be paid and also found that the award was passed within two years from the date of Section 6 declaration. The learned Single judge on the above said grounds, had partly allowed the writ petition, set aside the award dated 30.4.2003, and remanded the matter back to the authorities for fresh consideration, in accordance with law, if the land in question is required for public purpose.

3(vi) After the entertainment of W.A.No.368/2013, the official respondents in W.P.No.3880/2012 filed a writ appeal challenging the very same order, with a delay of 326 days and after condonation, it was numbered as W.A.No.538/2014.

4. The appellants in W.A.No.368/2013 filed M.P.No.1/2014 praying for permission to raise the following additional grounds:

(a) As per Section 24(2) of the Act 2013, the impugned notification u/s. 4(1) and the impugned declaration U/s. 6 of the L.A. Act are lapsed since the same deemed to have lapsed on 01.01.2014.

(b) Admittedly the respondents passed the award on 13.05.2003 viz., 5 years before the commencement of Act 2013 and possession of the land has not been taken by the respondents till now even after interim stay of dispossession was vacated on 30.10.2008. Therefore the contingencies in Section 24(2) of Act 2013 squarely satisfied the petitioners case.

(c) The Honble Supreme Court has very recently construed Section 24(2) of the Act 2013 and very categorically held that in case award was passed 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the Act 2013 and physical possession of the land has not been taken, the Land Acquisition proceedings shall be lapsed as the same has been reported in 2014 (1) CTC 755. [LQ/SC/2014/83]

(d) The benefit granted in Section 24(2) of the Act 2013 should be extended to the petitioners in view of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court reported in 2014 (1) CTC 755 [LQ/SC/2014/83] and in view of Constitution Bench Judgment of Supreme Court reported in 2002 (2) CTC 55. [LQ/SC/2002/350]

5. Though the said miscellaneous petition was seriously opposed by the learned Advocate General, since a pure legal plea has been taken, this Court is inclined to entertain the said petition and hence M.P.No.1/2014 in W.A.No.368/2013 is ordered and the appellants are permitted to raise the said additional grounds.

6. Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013, would submit that the award dated 30.4.2003, covers the land in question situated in Survey No.68/3B and also other lands and the total compensation exceeds more than Rs.40 lakhs and without reference to the said award, another award came to be passed on 13.5.2003, in respect of the lands admeasuring 5.56.0 hectares, situated in various Survey Numbers, including the writ petitioners land admeasuring 0.98.5 hectares in Survey No.68/3B, and in respect of the appellants/writ petitioners, the compensation was fixed at Rs.4,52,997/- and it was also deposited on the file of the jurisdictional Court viz. Sub Court at Mettur, and since two awards came to be passed in respect of the very same subject matter, the award per se is unsustainable and further contended that though the learned Single Judge found that the compensation awarded, exceeds Rs.20 lakhs and therefore, the District Collector is not competent to approve the same and the power has been vested only with the Commissioner of Land Administration as it exceeds Rs.20 lakhs, as per G.O.Ms.No.1027, Revenue Department, dated 25.9.1992, the award should have been quashed straight-away considering the fact that the possession of the land is yet to be taken and there is no need to remand the matter.

7. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013, has drawn the attention of this Court to the additional grounds raised in M.P.No.1/2014 filed in W.A.No.368/2013, and would submit that though two awards came to be passed on 30.4.2003 and 13.5.2003 respectively, the possession of the land belonging to the appellants/writ petitioners in Survey No.68/3B is yet to be taken and as per Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, (Central Act 30 of 2013), where an award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act, 1894, (Central Act 1 of 1894), has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act, but physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid, the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of the new Central Act 30 of 2013 and though the compensation has been deposited, admittedly, the possession of the land has not been taken within five years from the date of the above said award and therefore, on that ground, the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Central Act 1/1894, became lapsed and hence, prays for appropriate orders.

8. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, in support of his submissions, placed reliance upon the decision reported in 2014 (1) CTC 755 (PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND ANOTHER V. HARAKCHAND MISIRIMAL SOLANKI AND OTHERS).

9. Per contra, Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents in W.A.No.368/2013 and the appellants in W.A.No.538/2014, would contend that G.O.Ms.No.1027, Revenue Department, dated 25.9.1992, has no application to the case on hand for the reason that as per the said Government Order, the power to approve both the pre-evaluation statement and awards for payment of compensation not exceeding Rs.20 lakhs has been delegated to the Collector/Additional Collector/District Revenue Officers and pre-evaluation statements and awards for payment of compensation in excess of Rs.20 lakhs, shall be approved by the Commissioner of Land Administration and in the light of the said Government Order, the Collector is competent to approve the pre-evaluation statement and also the awards as the total compensation in terms of award dated 13.5.2003, was Rs.16,85,200/- only.

10. It is further submitted by the learned Advocate General that from the date of passing of the award viz. 13.5.2003, the land vests with the Tamil Nadu Housing Board free of all encumbrances and the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013 made unsuccessful attempts to challenge the acquisition and having failed in their attempt, are not entitled to any indulgence and the learned Single Judge instead of remanding the matter, ought to have dismissed the writ petition.

11. As far as the additional grounds raised by the said appellants in M.P.No.1/2014 in W.A.No.368/2013 are concerned, the learned Advocate General has invited the attention of this Court to Section 24(2) of Central Act 30/2013 and would submit that as per the said provision, two alternate eventualities are contemplated viz. physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid within a period of five years in respect of the award passed under Section 11 of the Central Act 1/1894 and since the compensation has been deposited on the file of the jurisdictional Sub Court at Mettur, the proceedings initiated under the old L.A. Act cannot be taken as deemed to have lapsed and therefore, prays for dismissal of W.A.No.368/2013 and allowing of W.A.No.538/2014.

12. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants/writ petitioners in W.A.No.368/2013, in response to the said submission, has drawn the attention of this Court to the decisions reported in (1967) 1 SCR 836 [LQ/SC/1966/253] : AIR 1967 SC 643 [LQ/SC/1966/253] (BABU MANMOHAN DAS SHAH AND OTHERS V. BISHUN DAS) and in (2000) 1 SCC 426 [LQ/SC/1999/1188] (HYDERABAD ASBESTOS CEMENT PRODUCTS AND ANOTHER V. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS), wherein, the construction of words and and or came up for interpretation and it has been held that availability of one of the two alternatives would suffice and the legislature intended to provide for both the contingencies and where one or the other exists, it was intended to furnish a ground to the landlord to sue for eviction and would submit that the same principle has to be applied and since Section 24(2) says that after the passing of the award under Section 11 five years or more prior to the commencement of Central Act 30/2013, if the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings initiated under the old Act, shall be deemed to have lapsed and since in the case on hand, the possession of the land admittedly, has not been taken from the appellants, the land acquisition proceedings are deemed to have lapsed and on the sole ground, their appeal deserves to be allowed.

13. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions and also perused the materials available on record and also the judgments relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013.

14. As per G.O.Ms.No.1027, Revenue Department, dated 25.9.1992, the pre-evaluation statement and awards for payment of compensation exceeding Rs.20 lakhs, shall be approved by the Commissioner of Land Administration and if it is less than Rs.20 lakhs, the powers have been delegated to the Collector/Additional Collector/District Revenue Officers. The Land Acquisition Officer and Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Neighbourhood Scheme, Salem, has passed an award in Award No.1/2003-2004 dated 30.4.2003, in respect of the following lands:

S.No.ClassificationTotal extent in HectareExtent applied for acquisition of Hectare

1234

25/5Govt. dry0.20.00.20.0

26/40.58.00.58.0

27/2A10.43.50.43.5

27/2C0.39.50.39.5

32/1B10.68.00.68.0

32/1B1B10.05.50.05.5

32/1B1B20.01.50.01.5

32/70.01.50.01.5

32/80.01.50.01.5

32/90.02.00.02.0

32/100.04.50.04.5

67/1A0.74.50.74.5

67/1B0.03.00.03.0

67/1C0.54.00.54.0

67/20.48.00.48.0

67/30.81.50.81.5

68/10.67.50.65.0

68/3A0.97.00.97.0

68/3B0.98.50.98.5

68/50.67.00.56.0

69/1A0.42.50.42.5

69/1B0.28.50.27.5

69/2A1.66.51.66.5

69/5C0.90.00.90.0

-

15. The land belonging to the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013, admeasuring to an extent of 0.98.5 hectares, was also included and the total compensation of more than Rs.40 lakhs was awarded. However, the successor to the very same office has passed another award dated 13.5.2003, in respect of the lands admeasuring 5.56.0 hectares, in respect of the following Survey Numbers:

Survey No.Extent in Hec.Name of the Registered holder or OccupierBoundaries

NorthEastSouthWest

26/40.58.0Rakkianna Gounder and Selvakumar69/5C67/166/126/3B

27/2C20.32.5Venkatesan27/2D27/2D32/1B1A227/2C1

32/1B1A20.56.5Venkatesan27/2D32/1B1B1 & 32/9 to 1132/432/1B1A, 32/7 & 8

67/1C0.54.0Ponnusamy and Others67/1A67/1A66/1126/4

68/3B0.98.5Chinnapaiyan and Others68/1B & 468/5B67/1A68/3A

69/2A1.66.5Venugopal and Others69/1A & 1B69/669/3A25/5

69/5C0.90.0Rakkianna Gounder and Selvakumar69/469/3A26/4 & 369/5A & 5B

16. In the second award also, the land of the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013 was once again included and a sum of Rs.4,52,997/- was deposited on the file of the Sub Court at Mettur. In the inner page No.26 of the award dated 30.4.2003, in respect of the very same land, a sum of Rs.4,53,052/- was awarded, whereas in the award dated 13.5.2003, Rs.4,52,997/- was awarded. The counter affidavit of the second respondent in W.A.No.368/2013 and the second appellant in W.A.No.538/2014, filed in W.P.No.3880/2012 did not state reasons as to why two awards came to be passed on different dates.

17. Be that as it may, the fixation of amount directed in G.O.Ms.No.1027, Revenue Department, dated 25.9.1992, was amended in terms of Revenue Department Notification No.II (2)/REV/T152/84 dated 13.12.1984, wherein, in respect of item (i) for the expression ten lakhs, the expression twenty lakhs has been substituted and in respect of item (ii), for the expression ten lakhs, the expression twenty lakhs has been substituted and by virtue of the said amendment, the District Collector/Additional Collector/District Revenue Officers have been delegated powers to approve the pre-evaluation statement and the awards for compensation not exceeding Rs.20 lakhs and since in terms of the award dated 13.5.2003, the total compensation is not exceeding Rs.20 lakhs and further the compensation fixed in respect of the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013, is Rs.4,52,997/-, the stand taken by the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013 that the award is vitiated in terms of G.O.Ms.No.1027, Revenue Department, dated 25.9.1992, deserves to be rejected.

18. However, this Court finds considerable force in respect of the additional grounds raised by the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013 in M.P.No.1/2014. It is relevant to extract Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, (Central Act 30 of 2013) as follows:

"24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases:

(1) .....

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:

Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act."

19. The interpretation of the said provision was considered by the Honble Supreme Court of India in the decision reported in 2014 (1) CTC 755 (cited supra), wherein the issue that arose was as to the non-deposit of compensation within a period of five years from the date of award passed under the L.A. Act, 1894, and it is relevant to extract the following paragraph:

11. Section 24(2) also begins with non-obstante clause. This provision has overriding effect over Section 24(1). Section 24(2) enacts that in relation to the Land Acquisition proceedings initiated under 1894 Act, where an Award has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and either of the two contingencies is satisfied, viz; (i) physical possession of the land has not been taken or (ii) the Compensation has not been paid, such Acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. On the lapse of such Acquisition proceedings, if the appropriate Government still chooses to acquire the land which was the subject matter of acquisition under the 1894 Act then it has to initiate the proceedings afresh under the 2013 Act. The Proviso appended to Section 24(2) deals with a situation where in respect of the acquisition initiated under the 1894 Act an award has been made and Compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries then all the beneficiaries specified in Section 4-Notification become entitled to Compensation under 2013 Act.

20. It is the submission of the learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents in W.A.No.368/2013, who are the appellants in W.A.No.538/2014, that if either of the contingencies contemplated under Section 24(2) of the Central Act 30/2013, is satisfied, it cannot be held that the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the old L.A. Act, are deemed to have lapsed and he would further add that since compensation has been deposited within a period of five years from the date of award on 13.5.2003, the proceedings cannot be held lapsed. In the considered opinion of the Court, the point urged by the learned Advocate General, is liable to be rejected for the following reasons.

21. The interpretation of the word or came up for consideration in the decision reported in (1967) 1 SCR 836 (cited supra) and the facts of the said decision would disclose that the appellants therein are the owners of the building, which consisted of two shops, and the respondent was the tenant of one of the shops and the other shop was let out to some other person and he has vacated the premises and after necessary sanction, it was let out to the respondent, who executed a rent note agreeing that he would not have any right to make any alterations, additions or Tor phor of any sort in the said shop and he came into possession of two shops and he has also started making alterations without the consent of the landlords and after issuing telegram and letters calling upon him to refrain from making any alteration, the tenancy was terminated and they filed a suit for ejectment. The trial Court as well as the appellate forum found that the tenant had carried out alterations and he did so without obtaining the consent of the landlords and the tenant aggrieved by the same, filed second appeal before the Allahabad High Court and it was allowed and the suit filed by the landlords, was dismissed. The landlords/appellants before the Honble Supreme Court of India, contended among other things, that the interpretation of the High Court regarding Section 3(1)(c) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Evictioin Act, 1947, is erroneous as the High Court has failed to appreciate that Clause (c) was disjunctive and that it would apply either where the alterations are material alterations or, even if, they are not, they are likely to diminish substantially the value of the accommodation and it was the submission made on behalf of the respondent/tenant, that the word or in Clause (c), shall be read as and and unless the landlords established that the alterations had diminished or were likely to substantially diminish the value of the accommodation, eviction cannot be ordered. The Honble Supreme Court of India after taking into consideration the rival submissions, allowed the appeal filed by the landlords, and ordered eviction and in paragraph No.8, it has been held as follows:

8.In our view clause (c) of Section 3 (1) cannot bear the construction suggested by Mr Desai. The clause is couched in simple and unambiguous language and in its plain meaning provides that it would be a good ground enabling a landlord to sue for eviction without the permission of the District Magistrate if the tenant has made or has permitted to be made without the landlords consent in writing such construction which materially alters the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value. The language of the clause makes it clear that the legislature wanted to lay down two alternatives which would furnish a ground to the landlord to sue without the District Magistrates permission, that is, where the tenant has made such construction which would materially alter the accommodation or which would be likely to substantially diminish its value. The ordinary rule of construction is that a provision of a statute must be construed in accordance with the language used therein unless there are compelling reasons, such as where a literal construction would reduce the provision to absurdity or prevent the manifest intention of the legislature from being carried out. There is no reason why the word "or" should be construed otherwise than in its ordinary meaning. If the construction suggested by Mr Desai were to be accepted and the word "or" were to be construed as meaning "and" it would mean that the construction should not only be such as materially alters the accommodation but is also such that it would substantially diminish its value. Such an interpretation is not warranted for the simple reason that there may conceivably be material alterations which do not, however, diminish the value of the accommodation and on the other hand there may equally conceivably be alterations which are not material alterations but nevertheless would substantially diminish the value of the premises. It seems to us that the legislature intended to provide for both the contingencies and where one or the other exists it was intended to furnish a ground to the landlord to sue his tenant without having to obtain the previous permission of the District Magistrate. The construction of clause (c) placed by the High Court is therefore not correct.

22. In yet another decision reported in (2000) 1 SCC 426 [LQ/SC/1999/1188] (cited supra), the interpretation of the words and and or came up for consideration. The facts of the case would disclose that the appellants therein manufactured asbestos cement products by using duty-paid cement and asbestos fibre as raw materials and it had fallen under the relevant items of the Central Excise Act. The appellant claimed the benefit of pro forma credit procedure by seeking credit for the payment of duty paid on the inputs as against the duty payable on the finished products and sought for permission of the Assistant Collector under Rule 56-A (as it stood prior to 1.8.1983) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, and the Assistant Collector refused to grant such permission and the appeal as well as the writ petition preferred by them, ended in dismissal and therefore, the matter reached the Honble Supreme Court of India by way of Civil Appeals. The Honble Supreme Court of India considered the interpretation and scope of proviso (ii)(b) of Rule 56-A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, as it stood prior to 1.8.1983, and held as follows:

8.The language of the rule is plain and simple. It does not admit of any doubt in interpretation. Provisos (i) and (ii) are separated by the use of the conjunction and. They have to be read conjointly. The requirement of both the provisos has to be satisfied to avail the benefit. Clauses (a) and (b) of proviso (ii) are separated by the use of an or and there the availability of one of the two alternatives would suffice. Inasmuch as cement and asbestos fibre used by the appellants in the manufacture of their finished excisable goods are liable to duty under different tariff items, the benefit of pro forma credit extended by Rule 56-A cannot be availed of by the appellants and has been rightly denied by the authorities of the Department.

The Honble Supreme Court has ultimately dismissed appeal filed by the assessee.

23. As per the above said decisions, if the relevant words are separated by the use of word or, the availability of one of the two alternatives would suffice. In the case on hand, though the award came to be passed on 13.5.2003, admittedly, the possession of the land in Survey No.68/3B situated in Kottagoundampatty Village, Omalur Taluk, Salem District, admeasuing to an extent of 0.98.5 hectares, has not been taken possession from the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013. A reading of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Central Act 30/2013) would lead to the only interpretation that if an award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act (Central Act 1/1894) has been passed five years or more prior to the commencement of Central Act 30/2013, which came into effect from 1.1.2014, but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid, the land acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government is at liberty to initiate proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of the old L.A. Act. In the case on hand, though the compensation has been deposited, the possession of the land is yet to be taken. The learned Advocate General made a valiant effort by submitting that challenging Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration, the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013 filed W.P.No.16709/2001 and obtained interim stay of dispossession on 14.9.2001, and it came to be dismissed on 30.10.2008, which also resulted in vacating the interim order, and it was further challenged in W.A.No.2179/2011 and on account of pendency of the writ appeal, the official respondents have not taken any action to get the possession of the land and consequently, the possession of the land could not be taken. No doubt, interim stay of dispossession was in force between 14.9.2001 and 30.10.2008, and thereafter, the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013 viz. landowners, did not have the benefit of any interim orders restraining the official respondents from taking possession. In the counter affidavit filed in W.P.No.3880/2012, no plausible explanation has been offered as to why possession has not been taken though the interim order was vacated on 30.10.2008, consequent upon the dismissal of W.P.No.16709/2001.

24. Even for the sake of arguments, this Court assumes that two awards came to be passed on 30.4.2003 and 13.5.2003 respectively and even then, the possession of the lands from the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013 have not been taken within five years from the date of passing of the said awards and in terms of Section 24(2) of Central Act 30/2013, the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the old L.A. Act, 1894, are deemed to have lapsed and hence on the sole ground, the appellants in W.A.No.368/2013 have to succeed and W.A.No.368/2013 deserves to be allowed.

25. In the result, W.A.No.368/2013 is allowed and the order dated 21.12.2012, made in W.P.No.3880/2012, is set aside and it is declared that by virtue of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Central Act 30/2013), the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondents/appellants in W.A.No.538/2014, insofar as the lands in Survey No.68/3B admeasuring to an extent of 0.98.5 hectares situated in No.64, Kottagoundampatty Village, Omalur Taluk, Salem District are concerned, shall be deemed to have lapsed. As a result of allowing W.A.No.368/2013, W.A.No.538/2014 filed by the official respondents in W.P.No.3880/2012, is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, M.P.No.1/2013 in W.A.No.368/2013 and M.P.No.1/2014 in W.A.No.538/2014 are closed.

26. If the respondents in W.A.No.368/2013 viz. Appellants in W.A.No.538/2014 are of the opinion that the lands in Survey No.68/3B admeasuring to an extent of 0.98.5 hectare situated in No.64, Kottagoundampatty Village, Omalur Taluk, Salem District, are still required for public purpose, they are at liberty to initiate proceedings afresh in accordance with the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Central Act 30/2013).