M. RAMAKRISHNA RAO, J.

(1) SRI a. n. ananda kumar, petitioner herein, has sought to quash the endorsement, Annexure-G , issued by the secretary of the institute of chartered accountants of india, New Delhi, respondent-1 herein, on 25-2-1984, by writ of certiorari, and to direct by writ of mandamus respondent-1 to dispose of his complaint dated 7-10-1983 in accordance with law and to issue such other directions as this court deems fit in the circumstances of the case, for the reasons set out in the petition.

(2) THE petitioner is a post graduate in commerce faculty and a graduate in law. Respondent-1 is a body corporate established under Section 3 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (the act for short ). Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 9 of the Act, a council of the institute has been set up for the management of the affairs of the first respondent-institute and for discharging the functions assigned to it under the act. Amongst other things, the duties vested in the council under the act are - (i) the regulation of the engagement and training of articled and audit clerks; (ii) the granting or refusal of certificates of practice under the act; (iii) the maintenance and publication of a register of persons qualified to practise as chartered accountants and (iv) the exercise of disciplinary powers conferred by the act. Besides, as required by the, respondent 1 framed regulations called the chartered accountants regulations, 1964 (the regulations for short), which came to be repealed by the regulations of 1988, specifically to regulate the affairs of the chartered accountants (articled and audit clerks) as well as the allied matters,

(3) RESPONDENT-2, r.b. krishna is a chartered accountant by profession having registered his membership with respondent 1 at No. 15204. He has been carrying on his profession under the name and style m/s. R.b. krishna and co. , at Bangalore. The petitioner enrolled himself as articled clerk with respondent 2 in accordance with the Provisions of regulation 2 (iv-a) of the regulations. Thus during his pre-auditship training from 1-7-1977 to 31-7-1978 and training as audit clerk from 1-8-1978 to 31-7-1982 the petitioner served under respondent-2, his principal, successfully and respondent-2 thereupon issued a certificate of audit service in form-23 on 2-8-1982 in favour of the petitioner. A copy of the said certificate is enclosed to the petition at annexure-a. The above facts are not in dispute.

(4) THE grievance of the petitioner is that according to regulation 48-a (4)and (5) of the Regulation, 1964, the principal chartered accountant should pay a salary of Rs. 150/- per month to the audit clerk during the period of preauditship for one year and thereafter during the entire period of auditship, but respondent 2 failed to pay him his salary regularly every month during the period of auditship with him. According to the petitioner, a salary of Rs. 7,200/- was due to him by respondent-2 and as the latter failed to pay him the said amount, the petitioner sent a letter dated 29-8-1983 to his ex- principal requesting him to settle the dues payable to him. In response to the said letter, respondent 2 sent a letter to the petitioner on 3-8-1983 through his counsel stating, inter alia, that he has paid the entire amount to the petitioner and that even certain sum of money was paid in excess.

(5) NOT being satisfied with the stand taken by respondent-2, the petitioner made a complaint to respondent-1 as per Annexure-B dated 7-10-1983 addressed to the council of the institute of chartered accountants of India, respondent-1 herein, stating that respondent-2 failed to pay his salary as stated above and that therefore he sought legal action against him. Since there was no response immediately thereafter, the petitioner issued two reminders on 8-11-1983 and 8-12-1983 as per annexures-c and d. Thereafter, the executive officer of the first respondent, by his letter, Annexure-E , addressed to respondent 2, called for vouchers/receipts obtained from the petitioner for having paid him his salary. Subsequently, the petitioner also wrote a letter, Annexure-F, to respondent-1 to inform him the next course of action taken by it on his complaint. But to his dismay, he received an endorsement as per Annexure-G made by the secretary of respondent-1 stating that the matter had been considered carefully and that there was no merit in his complaint which had accordingly been filed. Thereupon, the petitioner made a representation as per Annexure-H addressed to the president of respondent-1 asking him to consider his allegations made in his complaint against respondent-2 and to pass an appropriate order thereon. But, there was no response to this representation by respondent-1. Being aggrieved by the inaction on the part of the president of respondent-1 and also the endorsement, Annexure-G , issued by its secretary, he has filed this petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for the aforesaid reliefs.

(6) RESPONDENT-1 filed statement of objections to the petition, denying the allegations found in the writ petition. It is stated therein that the writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner failed to deposit one hundred rupees along with the petition as contemplated under the regulations. As regards the powers of the secretary, it is stated therein that the secretary has powers to hold a preliminary enquiry without referring the complaint to the council and that therefore, in the instant case since the secretary found primafacie no case in the complaint of the petitioner, he issued an endorsement accordingly as per Annexure-G which being valid in law cannot be interfered with. Therefore, this is not a case in which a writ of mandamus can be issued.

(7) ALTHOUGH respondent-2 was represented by the counsel, no separate statement of objections was filed on his behalf. He has perhaps adopted the defence taken by respondent-1 to oppose the writ petition on his behalf.

(8) AGAIN on 27-11-1986 additional statement of objections has been presented on behalf of respondent-1 contending that as there are no grounds in the writ petition and the allegations of the petitioner against respondent-1 are unreasonable, it does not deserve issuance of a writ as prayed for. In general, the stand taken by respondent-1 is that the writ petition is not maintainable as there is no merit in it.

(9) I have heard learned counsel on both sides.

(10) SRI k. Suryanarayana Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, who took me through the relevant Provisions of the act and the regulations, argued that the stand taken by the secretary of respondent 1 in the counter that he has necessary powers under regulations 178 and 203 of the regulations to make an enquiry and dispose of a complaint without it being referred to the council of respondent-1, is unsustainable, as, according to him, such a power is neither conferred upon him nor delegated to him by the council. He contended that on the other hand, such a power is vested in the council and the disciplinary committee constituted under the act and the secretary ought to have referred the complaint to this competent body and without doing so, the endorsement issued by him at annexure-g that there was no merit in the complaint and hence it was filed, cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be quashed. As to the stand taken by respondent-1 that the writ petition was not maintainable for want of compliance of regulation 12 (4) which stipulates that every complaint other than a complaint made by or on behalf of the central or any state government, shall be accompanied by a deposit of one hundred rupees, Sri Suryanarayana Rao contended that from the tenor of the endorsement, Annexure-G , it could be gathered that the complaint of the petitioner was not filed on the ground of non-compliance of regulation 12 (4 ). On the other hand, the endorsement shows that the secretary having gone through the complaint found no prima facie case made out by the petitioner and hence it was filed. Therefore, the learned counsel contended that when the writ petition has been filed questioning the propriety of the secretary to issue such an endorsement, the stand now taken by respondent 1 that the petition is not maintainable for want compliance of regulation 12 (4) cannot be entertained. He argued that even though the complaint was not in the prescribed form and it was filed without deposit of the prescribed fee of Rs. 100/-, it cannot be rejected merely on the technical ground and, in fact, it was not the ground on which the complaint came to be filed. On the other hand, according to him, the ground on which the complaint was filed was that there was no prima facie case made out by the petitioner against respondent 2. He submits that the secretary has no power to consider the complaint and to form an opinion either way as it is the council constituted under the act that has the power to do so and not the secretary whose duty was simply to refer the complaint to the council and that therefore the action on the part of the secretary cannot be sustained and the endorsement, Annexure-G , made by him accordingly is liable to be quashed. Sri suryanarayana rao placed strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in krishna kumar mediratta v phulchand agarwala and other, AIR 1977 SC 984 [LQ/SC/1977/45] . Relying upon regulation 32 (b) (1) of the regulations, 1964, Sri suryanarayana rao submits that respondent 2 failed to pay the petitioner his salary of Rs. 150/- every month thereby he has committed misconduct. To drive home this point, he has placed reliance upon the decision of the Orissa High Court in the institute of chartered accountants of India v b. Mohanty, AIR 1985 Orissa 46.

(11) PER contra, learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 argued that the rewas no case made out by the petitioner for issuance of a writ of mandamus as prayed for. It is contended for respondent-1 that having regard to the Provisions of regulations 178 and 203 of the regulations, which are in pari malaria with regulations, 1964, the secretary of respondent 1 is competent to make a preliminary enquiry and dispose of the complaint if there is no prima facie case made out and that therefore a complaint as brought by the petitioner herein need not be referred to the council or the disciplinary committee. Another contention taken for the respondents is that the vouchers and other documents produced by respondent 2 in reply to the notice issued by respondent-1 having been perused by the secretary, he, on being satisfied that respondent-2 has paid the entire salary payable to the petitioner, issued the endorsement, Annexure-G , stating that there was no prima facie case made out and that therefore the complaint was filed. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is misconduct on the part of the secretary in considering the complaint of the petitioner and issuing him the endorsement under challenge. In other words, the submission is that there is no substance in the writ petition, therefore this court cannot take a serious view to issue a writ of mandamus. The last contention taken for the respondents is that the allegations of misconduct on the part of respondent-2 relate to the years 1977 and 1982, that the writ petition has been filed in the year 1985, that there is a delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching this court and that therefore at this length of time, a writ need not be issue even though a case is made out for the purpose of argument. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that this was not a fit case for granting the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.

(12) IN view of the foregoing, the following points arise for my consideration in this writ petition: (1) whether respondent-2 is liable to pay stipend or salary to the petitioner every month as contemplated in regulation 32 (b) (1). (2) whether respondent-2 is competent to issue the endorsement, Annexure-G , stating that there was no prima facie case made out by the petitioner and hence his complaint was filed. (3) whether the petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandamus or certiorari in the given case as prayed for.

(13) POINT No. 1: in support of the contention that respondent 2 was statutorily required to pay regularly every month salary or stipend to the petitioner working under him, in paragraph-3 of the writ petition regulations 48-a (4) and 48-a (5) are extracted. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not made available the regulations of 1964, which were in force till June 1, 1988 when the chartered accountants regulations, 1988 came into force repealing the regulations, 1964. I do not know whether regulations 48-a (4) and 48-a (5) extracted in the writ petition in paragraph-3 are of 1964 regulations to satisfy myself whether those regulations were in fact therein 1964 regulations and for considering the contention taken in this behalf with reference to those regulations. But, the regulation of 1988 have been produced and on verification of it, it does not contain regulations 48 (a) (4) and 48-a (5) though it contains almost similar regulation at regulation 48. This regulation 48 of the regulations 1988 cannot be applied to the present case in view of the fact that the periods in which the petitioner worked as pre-audit clerk or audit clerk as the case may be are earlier to 1988. e. , from 1-7-1977 to 31-7-1978 and 1-8-1978 to 31-7-1982, already referred to above. But, one thing is clear that the Orissa High Court in b. Mohantys case, cited above, while considering the point similar to one involved here, extract regulation 32 (b) ( 1 ). It reads: "every member engaging an articled clerk on or after 1st July, 1973 shall pay to such clerk a minimum monthly stipend at the rates specified in sub-regulation (2) or in sub-regulation (3) hereof, as the case may be."

(14) THE above regulation does not fix the rate of stipend to be paid to an articled clerk. Therefore, regulations 48 (a) (4) and 48 (a) (5) fixing the rate of remuneration to an audit clerk may be of the regulations of 1964 so as to clear the doubt of rate of stipend in regulation 32 (b) (1 ). Hence i think it necessary to extract those regulations. "48 (a) (4 ). A member shall be entitled to engage a person as an audit clerk only if such a person had been in service as a salaried employee on a monthly remuneration of not less than Rs. 150/-for a minimum period of one year either under him or in the firm of chartered accountants in practice wherein he is a partner. 48 (a) (5). Any member registering under these regulations, the service of the person referred to under sub-regulation (4) of this regulation shall pay a monthly remuneration of not less than Rs. 150/- to the clerk during the period he is in service with him in accordance with these regulations. "

(15) APPLYING the above Provisions to the case on hand, i proceed to consider the contention with regard to the competency of the secretary to make a preliminary enquiry into the complaint such as the one filed by the petitioner. First, let us see the interpretation of regulation 32 (b) (1) made by the Orissa High Court in b. Mohantys case. Their lordships of the Orissa High Court in the above case in paragraph-6 have held as follows:"the contention that regulation 32b (1) provides for accrual of liability for payment of stipend on the basis of monthly calculation but it does not require payment of stipend every month, cannot be accepted. If such a construction of the provision is accepted, it would mean that the stipend could be paid on a quarterly basis, half-yearly basis or annual basis or at any time when the principal chooses to make the payment, may be even after the completion of the articleship. Regulation 32b (1) does not contemplate such uncertainties as regards the due date of payment. The only reasonable and proper construction of the provision is that the monthly stipend must be paid every month. "(emphasis supplied)

(16) KEEPING the said interpretation of their lordships of the Orissa High Court in view, let me now see whether the payments made by respondent-2 are in accordance with the said regulations.

(17) RESPONDENT-1 has produced copies of the correspondence including vouchers produced by respondent-2 when he was called upon to furnish his explanation on the complaint by the petitioner. Annexure-r1 and annexures-a to f annexed to the statement of objections by respondent 1 are such documents. Annexure-rl is the reply by respondent 2 to respondent-1 and Annexure-A is the letter by the petitioner to respondent 2 stating that an amount of Rs. 7,2007- is due to him by the latter and requesting him to settle it. Annexure-B is the receipt issued by the petitioner for having received Rs. 2,0807- being salary for the period from 1 -7-1977 to 31 -7-1978 (13 months) at Rs. 160/- per month. Annexure-C is the certificate issued by the manager, the Karnataka state co-operative apex bank limited, Bangalore, showing that the following amounts have been drawn by the petitioner on the dates mentioned against them on the cheques issued by respondent 2.

Date of encashment

Rs.

1.

29-11-1978

150/-

2.

03-01-1979

151/-

3.

01-02-1979

151/-

4.

02-03-1979

151/-

5.

03-04-1979

151/-

6.

26-04-1979

151/-

7.

26-04-1979

151/-

8.

26-06-1979

151/-

9.

28-07-1979

181/-

10.

22-08-1979

151/-

11.

02-12-1980

1000/-

12

06-02-1981

2100/-

13

25-06-1979

350/-

14.

22-08-1979

250/-

15.

25-10-1979

507-

16.

31-10-1979

450/-

17.

03-06-1980

300/-

18.

22-01-1981

100/-

19.

27-11-1981

302/-

20.

27-12-1981

100/-

21.

05-02-1982

104/-

22.

16-04-1982

500/-

Annexure-E is a copy of the cheque issued in favour of the petitioner by respondent-2 for Rs. 2,000/- and it bears the seal of the bank showing that the amount was paid. And Annexure-F is also a certificate issued by the very bank supra showing the following amounts as having been encashed by the petitioner on the dates mentioned against them on the cheques issued by respondent-2. Date of encashment

Date of encashment

Cheque Nos.

Rs.

1.

28-10-1978

139303

100/-

2.

12-09-1980

19833

419/-

3.

01-03-1982

006443. 5

302/-

4.

29-05-1982

20743

200a

now on a perusal of the above anneuxres, I am satisfied that the petitioner was paid the entire amount of Rs. 7,200/- due to him by respondent-2. But the question is whether the payments are regular as contemplated in regulation 32 (b) (1 ). Regulation 32b (1) clearly stipulates that every member engaging an articled clerk shall pay a monthly stipend to such clerk. Interpreting this provision, the Orissa High Court has made it very clear that such stipend must be paid every month. Following the ruling of the division bench of the Orissa High Court and regard being had to the mandatory provision of regulation 32b (1), I have to hold that respondent-2 should have made payments to the petitioner every month; but failed and that to that extent there is non-compliance of the regulation 32b (1 ). Thus, i answer point 1 in the affirmative and against respondent-2. (emphasis supplied)

(18) POINT No. 2. this relates to the competency of the secretary of respondent-1 to issue the endorsement, Annexure-G. The stand taken by the first respondent in the counter is that the secretary has the power to find out prima facie case in the complaint and to issue an endorsement like the one impugned herein on being satisfied that there was no case made out in the complaint. According to respondent-1, such a power is conferred on the secretary by regulation 178 read with regulation 203 of the regulations, 1988. Regulation 178 deals with the Constitution of sub-committee and its members by the council or any standing committee for which we are not concerned in this petition. Of course, regulation 203 deals with the powers and duties of the secretary. This regulation is contained in the regulations, 1988. To find out what are all the powers and duties of the secretary under the regulations, 1964, it is not produced. Therefore, I proceed to consider regulation 203 of 1988 regulations on the ground that there is no difference between the two regulations particularly in respect of the powers and duties conferred on the secretary. It reads:

"203. Powers and duties of the secretary. subject to the general supervision of the president and/or the relevant standing committee, the secretary shall exercise and perform, in addition to the powers and duties specified by the act and/or these regulations in this behalf, the following powers and duties, viz. , (1) being in charge of the office of the institute as its executive head; (2) enrolling associates, admitting fellow, removing from the membership owing to death or non-payment of any prescribed fees or at a members request and restoring to membership and issuing notifications therefor; (3) sanctioning and restoring of certificate of practice for associates and fellows; (4) cancelling of certificates of practice of associates and fellow in accordance with the Provisions of regulation 10; (5) granting of permission to members to be engaged in other occupations besides the practice of the profession of accountancy within the categories permitted by the council; (6) exempting any chartered accountant in practice or a firm of such chartered accountants from the operation of sub-section (1) of Section 27 for a period not exceeding six months, where the infringement is of a technical nature; (7) maintaining registers, documents and forms as required by the act and these regulations; (8) being in charge of all the property of the institute; (9) making necessary arrangements for receiving moneys due to the council and also issuing receipts therefor; (10) incurring revenue expenditure within the limits sanctioned by the council or the committees and incurring capital expenditure for the purpose of purchasing books for the library of the institute within the limits sanctioned by the council/or the committees; (11) causing proper accounts to be maintained and delivering of account books, information etc. To the auditors appointed by the council for the purpose of audit of the accounts of the institute; (12) making all other payments as sanctioned by the council, committees and/or the president; (13) paying salary and allowances to the members of the staff, granting of leave etc. , to them, and sanctioning their increments in accordance with the approved scales; (14) exercising disciplinary control over the staff except dismissal in respect of which the sanction of the president be necessary; (15) admitting candidates to the examinations held under these regulations and making all necessary arrangements for the conduct of the examinations; (16) refunding or transferring lees received under these regulations for the examinations, enrolment, issue of certificates of practice and allied matters; (17) registration and noting suspension/cancellation/termination of articles and/or audit service and permitting an articled clerk in cases covered by categories (a), (b) or (c) of sub-regulation (1) of regulation 57 to be trained as an additional articled clerk by a member entitled to engage and train articled clerks notwithstanding anything contained in regulation 43; (18) permitting articled clerks and/or audit clerks to engage in other occupation as approved by the council and/or the committees and granting reduction in the period of articles and/or audit service in accordance with these regulations;

(19) condoning any break in the service of articled clerks and audit clerks upto a maximum period of six months in his discretion; (20) signing and issuing all notifications on behalf of the council; (21) signing vakalatnamas on behalf of the council, appointing solicitors or advocates on behalf of the council, and filing papers in courts, etc. , on behalf of the council, subject to the approval of the president; (22) calling such further information and particulars as he considers necessary in furtherance of the above duties; and (23) performing such other duties and functions as are incidental and ancillary to and may be required for the performance of the above duties and exercising such other powers as may be delegated by the council and/or committees or the president from time to time.

(19) BY a careful consideration of these powers conferred on the secretary, it is seen that a power to deal with a complaint referred to in Section 21 of the act is not conferred upon him. On the other hand, such a power is conferred upon the council under sub-regulation (1 l) (i) and (ii) of regulation 12 of the regulations, 1988. It reads:" (11 ) (i) if on a perusal of the complaint, the written statement, if any, the complainants rejoinder to the written statement, if any, and the respondents comments on the complainants rejoinder, if any, and other relevant documents, the council is prima facie of opinion that the respondent is guilty of professional and/or other misconduct, the council shall cause and enquiry to be made in the matter by the disciplinary committee. (ii) if, on the other hand, the council is prima facie of opinion that the respondent is not guilty of any professional or other misconduct, the complaint shall be filed and the complainant and the respondent shall be informed accordingly. "from the above Provisions, it is clear that on the complaint under Section 21 of the Act, it is the council constituted under the act that has power to find out whether a prima facie case is made out or not and if it is of the opinion that there is prima fade case made out by the complainant, it has to cause the matter to be enquired into by the disciplinary committee and if not, the complaint shall be filed and the complainant and the respondent shall be informed accordingly, and that such a power is not at all conferred on, or delegated to the secretary. Therefore, the contention taken on behalf of the first respondent that the secretary has power to consider the complaint and to file it if no prima facie case is made out, cannot be accepted on the ground that such a power is not conferred upon him either under the act or the regulations. Therefore, the endorsement, Annexure-G , issued by the secretary stating that on consideration of the complaint, no prima facie case was made out and hence it was filed, cannot be sustained and is therefore liable to be quashed. My answer on point No. 2 is in the negative.

(20) IN this context itself, I may mention another contention taken by respondents 1 and 2. It is that the complaint presented by the petitioner was neither in the prescribed form nor accompanied by a deposit of Rs. 100/- as provided under sub-regulations (2), (3) and (4) of regulation 12. In other words, the argument is that since the petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of the aforesaid regulations, no action can be taken on such a complaint, in accordance with law.

(21) AS an answer to this, Sri suryanarayana rao relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in krishna kumar mediratta v phulchand agarwala and others, AIR 1977 SC 984 [LQ/SC/1977/45] . In that decision, the Supreme Court was interpreting the Provisions of Section 19 of the mines and minerals (regulation and development) Act, 1957 read with rules 9 (2) and 19 of the mineral concessions rules, 1960. One of the contentions taken there was that since the appellant therein failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of depositing the requisite fee along with the application for grant of a licence, the application was void ab initio. While construing the word "shall" used in Rule 9 (2), the Supreme Court held: "there is no Rule whatsoever which says that failure to submit the correct fee at the time of the filing of the application will make the application void or invalid. Rule 9 (2) no doubt uses the word "shall". But use of the word "shall" in imposing a duty is not conclusive on the question whether the duty imposed is mandatory or directory. It is not the breach of every mandatory duty in performing a prescribed act that could make an action totally ineffective or void ab initio. The filing of the application is one thing and completion of some annexed duty, which is legally separable, is another unless a statute or a Rule provides otherwise, (please see paragraphs 5-10 of the judgment ). " therefore, the submission on behalf of the petitioner is that the deposit of Rs. 100/- along with the complaint is only the requirement of procedure prescribed for the purpose of taking action on the complaint, that therefore even though the word "shall" is used in regulation 12 (4), the provision cannot be construed to contain mandatory requirement and that non-compliance of the procedural requirement amounts to technicality which cannot take away the substantial right conferred on the petitioner under the Provisions of the act. In other words, the submission is that even though the prescribed fee is not deposited along with the complaint, there is neither provision for rejecting the complaint on that ground nor is it possible for the court to hold that a substantial right arising in favour of the petitioner in a case of this kind could be taken away for non-compliance of the Provisions of regulation 12 (4).

(22) IN the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in krishna kumars case supra, in the absence of any provision making the complaint void or invalid for want of deposit of Rs. 100/-, it is not possible to hold that there is breach of mandatory requirement or duty. Merely because regulation 12 (4) contains the word "shall", it cannot be said that the said provision has a mandatory requirement. The presenting of the complaint is one thing and payment of Rs. 100/- as required by that regulation is another which is legally separable. Therefore, unless there is a statutory requirement making it mandatory for payment of Rs. 100/- along with the complaint, it is not possible to consider that the complaint is liable to be rejected for want of non-compliance of the said requirement. Indeed, the stand taken by respondent-1 is not that the complaint was liable to be rejected for want of deposit of rs. 100/ -. In that view of the matter and in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court, it is not possible to concede to the contention advanced on behalf of respondent-1.

(23) POINT No. 3. now the question is whether the petitioner is entitled to writs as prayed for by him, in view of my findings on points 1 and 2 above. I have held on point No. 1 that respondent-2 though being liable to pay stipend to the petitioner every month failed to pay the same to him and on point No. 2 I have held that the secretary has no power to find out prima facie case in the complaint against a member and to issue an endorsement like the one impugned herein. I have also held in one of the paragraphs foregoing that respondent-2 had paid the entire amounts due to the petitioner though not regularly every month but ultimately. It is also contended for the respondents that as there is a delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching this court, which is not explained by him, the petition has to be dismissed as barred by time. Admittedly, the petitioner was under training under respondent-2 for the periods from 1-7-1977 to 31-7-1978 and 1-8-1978 to 31-7-1982, whereas he had filed this petition in the year 1985 alleging non-payment of salary against respondent-2. There is a delay in approaching this court by the petitioner who failed to explain the same. That apart, the Orissa High Court in b. Mohantys case supra has held in paragraph-10 as follows:

"held, that in view of the fact that the complainant had withdrawn his complaint before the enquiry commenced and there was some possibility of misunderstanding in the mind of the respondent and further that more than five years had passed since disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the respondent, ends of Justice would be served by directing that the proceeding be filed. " (emphasis supplied)

(24) IN the present case also, more than five years have passed since disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the second respondent. Added to this, respondent-2 has paid entire dues to the petitioner. Therefore, no purpose would be served by issuing the writs as prayed for by the petitioner, and the proceedings may be dropped. However, I am of the opinion that respondent-2 deserves to be reprimanded for non-compliance of regulation 32-b (l ).

(25) IN the result, I make the following: order this writ petition stands disposed of. Respondent-2 is reprimanded not to give room for such things, viz., non-compliance of regulation 32~b (1), in future, ordered accordingly. No costs.