Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.

1. These appeals arise from a common order dismissing two claim petitions filed invoking Order XX1 Rule 58 of CPC. They were filed in relation to execution proceedings in two different suits. The judgment debtor in both the suits is one Mr.Balakrishnan. In OS No.297/03, a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale, he suffered a decree for return of advance. In OS No.205/01, he suffered a decree for recovery of money based on a commercial transaction. The decrees were put in execution and the judgment debtors property involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, OS No.297/03, was brought to sale. The appellant filed claim petitions in both the proceedings on the footing that Balakrishnan had executed a contract for sale in his favour, had obtained Rs.2,50,000/- as part of sale consideration and had put the appellant in possession of the property in part performance of that, on 14.09.1998. According to him, on 19.08.2001, a further amount was also received by Balakrishnan and the period for performance of that agreement was extended till 14.01.2002. He pleaded that on account of Balakrishnans failure to perform his part of that contract for sale, he instituted OS NO.146/03 and obtained Ext.A2 decree, of which, Ext.A1 is the judgment. Following Exts.A1 and A2, Ext.A3 is the document executed with the intervention of court, in favour of the appellant, on 26.03.2005. This is the foundation for the claim petitions filed by the appellant in both the execution proceedings. The court below, for different reasons, dismissed the claim petitions. Hence these execution first appeals.

2. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the court below ought to have adjudicated the question of title as pleaded by the appellant rather than leave the matter by holding that the applications are not sustainable. We are of the view that the question of title as projected by the appellant can be examined by this court itself, having regard to the materials on record.

3. The contract for sale, which was the subject matter of OS No.297/03, is dated 01.10.2000 and the decree in that suit is dated 30.11.2005. In that suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, the trial court granted the buyer a charge decree for the advance paid. That was essentially one, recognising the charge that the buyer had in terms of Section 55(6)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act. That is a charge that the buyer had from the date of the contract for sale, which was the subject matter of that suit. Order XXI Rule 58 of CPC applies only to cases of attachment. There cannot be a claim petition in relation to a charge. Be that as it may, we will decide the question of title also, on merits, with reference to the plea of title raised by the appellant.

4. In the money suit, OS No.205/01, an order of attachment was effected on 14.06.2001, that is, before the appellant got Ext.A3 sale deed executed through court on 26.03.2005. That was also long after the charge that the plaintiff in OS No.297/03 had, by virtue of the contract for sale in that case i.e., dated 01.10.2000. With these situations, we need only to answer as to when did the transfer of title occur in favour of the appellant. Does it attain precedence over the afore-noted charge and attachment

5. In so far as OS No.146/03, the appellants suit against the judgment debtor is concerned, the plea, as already noticed, is that the contract for sale was on 14.09.1998. Following the decree for specific performance, he got Ext.A3 sale deed executed through court only on 26.3.2005.

6. In terms of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, Sale is a transfer of ownership. Such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. In its true sense, a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of land is a suit for enforcement of terms of that contract. The title to the land as such is not the subject matter of such a suit. - See Adcon Electronics pvt. Ltd. v. Daulat and Another [(2001) 7 SCC 698] [LQ/SC/2001/2043] . The Apex Court emphasised in Radhakisan Lakshmi Narayan Toshniwan v. Shridhar Ramachandra Alshi [(1961) 1 SCR 248] [LQ/SC/1960/136] that under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, a contract for sale does not by itself create any interest in or charge on immovable property and consequentially a contract for sale creates no interest in favour of the vendee and the proprietary title does not validly pass from the vendor to the vendee. In Hakim Enayat Ullah v. Khalil Ullah Khan and Another [AIR 1938 All. 432 [LQ/AllHC/1938/50] ] it was laid down that decree for specific performance of a contract for sale of property merely declares the rights of the decree holder to have a transfer of the property executed in his favour and that such a decree, by itself is not effective to transfer title. Following that, in Shewantibai & Others v. Vishwasrao [(1952) (XXXV) NLJ 406], it was stated that so long as the sale deed is not executed in favour of the successful party, either by the defendant himself or by the Court, the title to the property continues where it was before the passing of such a decree. The Apex Court in Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur and Co. [AIR 1954 SC 44 [LQ/SC/1953/100] ] laid down that according to the Indian Law, which is embodied in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, a contract for sale of land does not of itself create any interest in the property which is the subject matter of the contract and the obligations of the parties to a contract for sale of land are, therefore, the same as in other ordinary contracts. In T.V.Kochuvareed and another v. P.Mariapa Gounder and Others [AIR 1954 TC 10], it was noted that in contrast to the English law, under the Indian law, a party who has a contract for the sale of immovable property in his favour gets only a right to compel the other party to execute a sale deed in respect of the property and unless and until such a sale deed is actually brought into existence by act of parties or under a decree of court, the party who has contracted for the purchase cannot be said to have acquired the ownership over the property. Following that, a Division Bench of this Court held in Sankaran Vishnu Nambudhiri v. Neelakanta Iyer Venkitachalam Iyer [1955 KLT 134] that the last clause of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act which defines a contract for sale clarifies that such a contract does not by itself create any interest in or charge of such property. Unless and until the agreement for sale in favour of the vendee fructifies into a sale deed, he cannot claim to have acquired any title to the property. This position is unaffected by the mere fact of the vendee having instituted the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale and of having obtained a decree in his favour. Such a decree is only a creature of the agreement between the parties to the contract for sale and as such, it has no greater force or significance than the earlier contract between them. The decree embodies in it, the contract between the parties with the command of the court super added to it, enabling the plaintiff to have the agreement enforced through court. All the same, title to the property continues to remain in the vendor himself and such title passes on to the vendee only when the sale deed is executed by the vendor under the command of the court or on his behalf by the court. The title that the vendee so obtains would not relate back to the date of the contract for sale. The contrary view taken in Jahar Lal v. Bhupendranath [AIR 1922 Calcutta 412] and in Dina v. Gujaba [AIR 1926 Nagpur 95] was dissented from following the dissent of the Nagpur High Court in Shewantibai (supra). Kochuvared (supra) was also followed. The law, with no doubt, is that a decree for specific performance of an agreement for sale would not, by itself, be effective as a transfer of title and so long as the sale deed is not executed in favour of the successful vendee, either by the vendor himself or by the court, the title continues where it was before the passing of the decree. To the same effect is the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Chrisentia Chacko v. Choyikutty [1987(1) KLT 60 Case No.83]. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mahendra Nath and another v. Smt.Baikunthi Devi and Others [AIR 1976 All. 150 [LQ/AllHC/1975/331] ] stated that a person who has got only a contract for sale or has got a decree for the specific performance of the contract, has got no interest in the land. He can only enforce the contract compelling the other side to execute the sale deed failing which the Court might execute a sale deed for the defendant, but the rights and liabilities under the contract do not attach to the land. In Hiralal Agarwala v. Bhagirathi Gore and others [1975 Cal.445], it was stated that a decree for specific performance passed on the basis of a contract for sale of immovable property does not create any interest in the property in favour of the decree holder. It only super-adds the sanction of the court to enforce it through the medium of court. As such the decree holder can enforce the said contract and get it enforced through court, subject to whatever interest the judgment debtor had at the time of execution. Therefore, there can be no doubt about the proposition that the mere existence of a contract for sale or a decree for specific performance on that basis does not, in any manner, affect the title of the vendee who has entered into the contract for sale. With the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as it now stands, the concept of passing a decree as understood in the earlier decisions gets modified to be directions in terms of the provisions of that Act and the decisions referred to above would have only to be read in the light of such modulation of the statute law. But, the law as regards the effect of the direction of the court for specific performance continuous to be the same. Such direction has no efficacy or potency of a transfer of property.

7. Even if the appellants version that he was put in possession by the vendor (the judgment debtor herein) in part performance of that contract for sale, the claim that the appellant may have could be only under S.53A of the Transfer of Property Act as against his vendor. That claim does not contain or recognise any element of title in the vendee, the appellant, who is merely a promisee qua the vendor. Title to that immovable property does not pass even by a direction that is issued by a court in a suit for specific performance requiring a vendor to perform the contract, as already noted. Such a direction, as is contained in Exts.A1 and A2, the judgment and decree, has necessarily to be followed by the transfer of property by a document either on the defendant voluntarily executing it following the direction of the court or by such a document being executed with the intervention of court on the failure of the defendant to abide by the direction of court. The transfer of title occurs only with the execution and registration of the document of transfer of title, wherever registration is required. This is the law.

8. In the case in hand, title passed in favour of the appellant only on 26.03.2005 as per Ext.A3. That was after the charge and the attachment, which are being enforced in the execution proceedings from which these appeals arise. Therefore, the charge that operated in OS No.297/03 and the order of attachment that operated in OS No.205/01 stood with priority, over and above the transfer of property in favour of the appellant by Ext.A3 deed. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, there is no merit in these appeals and they are accordingly to be dismissed. At this point of time, the learned counsel for the appellant requested that in view of the distress, his client may be granted two months time to find out ways and means of liquidating the debts under the decrees and thereby avert sale. We record this submission and order that the preparatory proceeding regarding the sales, which stand adjourned in terms of the earlier interim orders, can be proceeded with by the court below, however, that the sales will not be held except after two months from today. Subject to this, these appeals are dismissed. No costs.