(1.) In this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding respondents 1 to 4 to settle a fishery known as Anaith Ahar in favour of the petitioner after cancelling the settlement made in favour of respondent No. 5 by the impugned order dated 28th August, 1978, as contained in Annexure 7. The aforesaid order was passed by the Collector. Bhojpur (Respondent No. 3) by which settlement of the fishery in question was directed to be made in favour of respondent No. 5 for the years 1978-79 and 1979-80, the year in each case beginning on the 1st of April. Subsequent to the filing of the writ application an order dated 12th September, 1978 was passed by which settlement was actually made by the Additional Collector (Respondent No. 4) in favour of respondent No. 5. A copy of this order has been annexed as Annexure E to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 5, Although no formal application has been made by the petitioner for amendment of the original writ petition learned counsel in the petitioner also challenged the order of settlement made on 12th Sept, 1973 as borne out by Annexure E to the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 5.

(2.) The facts, as admitted by the petitioner, are these:-- An auction is said to have been held for the settlement of the fishery in question at which the petitioner also participated along with his so-called Benamidar who figures as respondent No. 6 in this application. It is stated that the petitioners bid having been accepted there he was called upon to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,500/-which was required under the terms of the auction inviting competitive bids. It seems, the petitioner deposited a sum of Rs. 1000/- only. By an order dated 20th July, 1978, as incorporated in Annexure 3, the petitioner was called upon to deposit the remaining amount of the first instalment of the auction money, namely, Rs. 500/-, failing which it was stated that on 21st July, 1978, the fishery in question would be resettled. Admittedly, the petitioner did not deposit the balance amount of the first instalment as was required of him to be done before the 21st of July, 1978. Subsequently, on 24th July, 1978 as the petitioner states, he deposited the balance amount of the first instalment of Rs. 500/-. As admitted by learned counsel for the petitioner, no settlement could have been finally made unless approval thereto was accorded by the commissioner of the Division. Admittedly, no approval was given to the petitioners so-called settlement Subsequently, it is stated, a fresh auction was held at which respondent No. 5 being the highest bidder, the impugned order as contained in Annexure E was passed in his favour by the Collector (Respondent No. 3). As already stated above, on 20th July. 1973., respondent No. 4, the Additional Collector, made settlement in favour of respondent No. 5 pursuant to the direction made by the Collector.

(3.) Two contentions were raised by learned counsel for the petitioner in support of this application. It was submitted, firstly, that there is no power in the Collector to upset the order passed by the Additional Collector nor was there any such power under which he could interfere in any manner with the orders passed by the Additional Collector. It was submitted that it amounted to an order of review which is always a creature of Statute. The only other point raised in support of this application was that there being a complete contract in favour of the petitioner by virtue of his previous bid having been accepted, a legal right under the contract had accrued to the petitioner which was enforceable in or through this writ application.

(4.) We are afraid, there is no merit in either of the two contentions. The term review has a distinct legal connotation and is used whenever a Court or a quasi-judicial Tribunal reopens a proceeding culminating in an earlier final order and passes an order on such reopening either varying, modifying or nullifying the effect of the previous judicial or quasi-judicial order. The principle that there is no inherent right of review in any judicial or quasi-judicial Court or Tribunal, the power of review being a creature of Statute, is established by a catena of decisions. No one can take exception to such a principle (To wit, State of Bihar v. Ram Dayal Missir-1962 BLJR 385 (SC) and, Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Paradyu-mansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 [LQ/SC/1970/95] etc.). The nature of the impugned order however, as was ultimately admitted by learned counsel for the petitioner was purely an administrative one. The power to make settlement of a fishery carries no quasi-judicial element in the exercise of that power. Such a settlement is made purely in the exercise of administrative or executive power and there is no question of review in such cases. The Collector of the district who is certainly higher in the rank of hierarchical ladder in the administration of a district is certainly invested with the administrative control over his subordinate administrative officers such as the Additional Collector is. The first point of learned counsel, therefore, has to be stated merely to be rejected.

(5.) Apropos the second point raised, it is even less meritorious. Decisions are legion by now laying down well established princinles in the matter of the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of mandamus. There is a three fold answer to the second submission of Teamed counsel. Firstly, it is difficult to hold that there was any concluded contract in favour of the petitioner in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of the Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd. V. Sipahi Singh (A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 2149). Admittedly, there is no document of settlement. Admittedly, again, the entire amount of the first instalment much less the entire consideration money was not paid by the petitioner. It is further admitted that no document of contract complying with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution was ever brought into existence. There was thus no concluded contract too. Assuming, there were, decisions are not lacking on the point that contractual obligations pure and simple are not to be enforced by having resort to a writ application, especially one for a writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus, it is so well settled, cannot be issued to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple. Apart from that it is also equally settled that before a writ of mandamus can issue, the petitioner must establish a legal or statutory right in himself and a corresponding statutory or legal obligation on the part of the administrative machinery which can induce the Court of writ jurisdiction to issue mandamus commanding the party offending or avoiding the legal and statutory obligation to rectify the mistake by acting within the four corners of the statutory or legal provision circumscribing the powers of such administrative or executive body. As we have noticed already, there is neither any legal nor any statutory right in the petitioner nor could learned counsel for the petitioner show to us any legal or statutory obligation on the part of any of the respondents 1 to 4 for the breach of which a writ of mandamus can issue. In such cases it is also too late in the day to suggest that the principle of equitable estoppel can be invoked. There is no room for the application of that doctrine.

(6.) Testing the matter from any point of view, therefore we find that the petitioner has not established any right which can induce us to issue a writ of mandamus. The application is, accordingly dismissed as being without any merit. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.