Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

1. The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 205 of 2022, dated 09.12.2022, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, and 504 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 3(1) (r) and 3(1)(s) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, (in short ‘SC&ST Act’) registered at Police Station Dharmashala, District Kangra, H.P.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that respondent no. 2/informant made a complaint to the police that he had visited McLeod Ganj on 9th December 2022 at about 2 pm. The accused, Shruti Rana, her mother Anita Sharma, Nisha Sood and her son Shashank Sood were present at home. They were abusing the parents of Rahul Rana. The informant went towards them. The accused abused the informant in the name of his caste in the presence of Neel Kamal and Amrish. The informant enquired from the accused as to why they were abusing him in the name of his caste, and they again abused him. Shruti Rana asked whether the informant was her father-in-law and whether she should call him her father. Shashank Sood opened the zip of his pants in the presence of Braj Bala and said what was uprooted earlier and what would be uprooted then. Rahul Rana enquired from the accused as to why they were using such language. All the accused persons abused and pushed Braj Bala, Devender Rana, Rahul Rana and the informant. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The Police found after the investigation that the accused, Shashank Sood, was present with Shruti Sharma, Nisha Sood and Neha Sharma at the place of the incident. He had abused the informant in the name of his caste in the presence of five persons. The incident had taken place on a public path. The other accused had also committed the offences, hence the chargesheet was filed before the court.

3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and the filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of the same. It has been asserted that FIR number 205/2022 is a counterblast to the FIR registered by the mother of the accused against the in-laws of Shruti Rana. The petitioner was not present on the spot at the time of the incident. He went to the spot to enquire about the well-being of his mother at about 1 PM. This fact can be verified from the CCTV footage, which was not collected by the police. The allegations in the FIR and the statements recorded by the Police during the investigation do not show the commission of any offence punishable under the SC & ST Act. The complaint was filed at the instance of the in-laws of Shruti Rana, as the informant is working as a driver with them. The complaint is false, and the continuation of the proceedings is an abuse of the process of the court. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and that FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed.

4. The petition is opposed by filing a status report, reproducing the contents of the FIR and the steps taken during the investigation. It was asserted that the police filed a chargesheet after the completion of the investigation before the competent court, and the matter was listed before the Court for the consideration of the charge on 19th September 2024.

5. I have heard Mr Janesh Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent. 1/State and Mr. Surinder Singh Saklani, learned counsel for respondent no. 2/informant.

6. Mr Janesh Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the allegations made in the FIR are false. The petitioner was not present on the spot, which is evident from the CCTV footage. The petitioner did not use the words mentioned in the complaint made to the police. There is a discrepancy between the statements recorded by the police during the investigation and the contents of the FIR, which makes the prosecution's case suspect. The incident had not taken place in a public place within public view, and the provisions of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC&ST Act are not attracted to the present case. The informant is the driver of the in-laws of Shruti Rana and had made a false complaint at their instance. The present FIR is a counterblast to the FIR lodged by the petitioner’s mother. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be ordered to be quashed.

7. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1 /State, submitted that the allegations in the FIR disclosed the commission of a cognisable offence. The police conducted an investigation and filed a chargesheet before the competent court. The court is seized of the matter, and this court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR and the consequential proceedings. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

8. Mr. Surinder Singh Saklani, learned counsel for respondent No.2/informant, adopted the submissions made by Mr. Prashant Sen and prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

10. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any oflence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable oflence but constitute only a non-cognizable oflence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

11. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)"

12. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

13. The informant made a complaint against the petitioner that he, along with the co-accused, was abusing Devender Rana. The petitioner and the co-accused abused the informant in the name of his caste in the presence of Neel Kamal and Amrish. When the informant protested, the petitioner and the co-accused persisted in abusing the informant. The petitioner unzipped his pants and told Braj Bala what was uprooted earlier, which could be uprooted then. These allegations show the commission of cognisable offences.

14. It was submitted that the incident had not taken place in a public place within public view, and the provisions of the SC & ST Act were not attracted. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249 and Daya Bhatnagar v. State2004 SCC OnLine Del 33, in support of this submission.

15. Section 3(1) (r) and 3 (1) (s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act reads as under: -

"(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, --

(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;

(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;… shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with a fine."

16. The ingredients of this Section were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249 as under:

"55. The basic ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are:

a. The accused person must not be a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;

b. The accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;

c. The accused must do so with the intent to humiliate such a person; and

d. The accused must do so at any place within public view."

17. It is apparent that the essential ingredient of the commission of offences is that the incident should have taken place in a public place in public view. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Swarn Singh versus State, 2008 (8) SCC 435, that the public place ordinarily means a place owned or leased by the Government or an instrumentality of the State but not by a private person. It was observed:

“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building and also not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building, e.g. on a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends), then it would also be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” (Emphasis supplied)

18. This judgment was followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710, and it was held: -

"14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]. The Court had drawn a distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building, e.g. on a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends), then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:

“Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends), then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view.”]

15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge sheet, certain witnesses are named, but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527], it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.”

19. Similar view was taken in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 668, wherein it was held: -

“16. The first F.I.R. registered at the instance of the complainant is silent about the place of occurrence and who, being a member of the public, was present when the appellant is alleged to have hurled caste-related abuses at the complainant. However, on a reading of the second F.I.R. registered at the behest of the appellant, it appears that the incident took place at the house of the appellant.

17. The first question that calls for an answer is whether it was at a place within public view that the appellant hurled caste-related abuses at the complainant with the intent to insult or intimidate with the intent to humiliate him. From the charge sheet dated 21st January 2016 filed by the I.O., it appears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the evidence of three witnesses to drive home the charge against the appellant of committing offences under sections 323 and 504, IPC and 3(1)(x), SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none other than the complainant, his wife and their son. Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual (a member of the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from the appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son). Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “in any place within public view”, the basic ingredient for attracting section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent. We, therefore, hold that at the relevant point in time of the incident (of hurling of caste- related abuse at the complainant by the appellant), no member of the public was present.”

20. This position was reiterated in Priti Agarwalla v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 973, wherein it was observed-

“20. The cumulative effect of the structured application to a given situation is that the intentional insult or abuse, coupled with the humiliation, is made in any place within public view. The expression “in any place within public view” has an important role to play in deciding whether the allegation attracts the ingredients of an offence or not, and has been the subject matter of consideration in the following decisions:

(1) Swaran Singh v. State (2008) 8 SCC 435-

“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building and also not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building, e.g. on a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends), then it would also be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.”

(2) Daya Bhatnagar v. State2004 SCC OnLine Del 33.-

“19. The SC/ST Act was enacted with a laudable object to protect vulnerable sections of society. Sub-clauses (i) to (xv) of Section 3(1) of the Act enumerate various kinds of atrocities that might be perpetrated against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which constitute an offence. However, Sub-clause (x) is the only clause where even offensive “utterances” have been made punishable. The Legislature required ‘intention’ as an essential ingredient for the offence of ‘insult’, ‘intimidation’ and ‘humiliation’ of a member of the Scheduled Casts or Scheduled Tribes in any place within ‘public view’. Offences under the Act are quite grave and provide stringent punishments. Graver is the offence, stronger should be the proof. The interpretation which suppresses or evades the mischief and advances the object of the Act has to be adopted. Keeping this in view, looking at the aims and objects of the Act, the expression “public view” in Section 3(1)(x) of the Act has to be interpreted to mean that the public persons present, (howsoever small number it may be), should be independent and impartial and not interested in any of the parties. In other words, persons having any kind of close relationship or association with the complainant would necessarily get excluded.”

(3) Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (before the High Court of Bombay) 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 15947-

“17. The requirement of section 3(1)(x) of the old Act is intentional insult and intimidation with intent to humiliate the person belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Messages sent on WhatsApp cannot be said to be an act of intentional insult or intimidation or an intent to humiliate in a public place within public view. As such, it is prima facie seen that no offence under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is attracted in the case in hand.”

21. In the present case, the police found, after the investigation, that the incident had taken place on a passage leading to the house of Shruti Rana in the presence of five people. Therefore, the incident had taken place not only in a public place but within the public view as well, and the submission that the incident had not taken place in a public place within the public view is not acceptable.

22. It was submitted that there is no allegation regarding the hurling of abuses with the intent to humiliate the informant. Reliance was placed upon the following observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shajan Sakaria (supra):

“60. Thus, the dictum as laid aforesaid is that the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is not established merely on the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe unless there is an intention to humiliate such a member for the reason that he belongs to such community. In other words, it is not the purport of the Act, 1989 that every act of intentional insult or intimidation meted out by a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe to a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 merely because it is committed against a person who happens to be a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. On the contrary, Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation is that the person who is subjected to it belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. We say so because the object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989, was to provide stringent provisions for the punishment of offences which are targeted towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the reason of their caste status.”

23. The term intent to humiliate was explained as under: a. Meaning of the expression “intent to humiliate” appearing in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989

"61. The words “with intent to humiliate” as they appear in the text of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989, are inextricably linked to the caste identity of the person who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation. Not every intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST community will result in a feeling of caste-based humiliation. It is only in those cases where the intentional insult or intimidation takes place either due to the prevailing practice of untouchability or to reinforce the historically entrenched ideas like the superiority of the “upper castes” over the “lower castes/untouchables”, the notions of ‘purity’ and ‘pollution’, etc. that it could be said to be an insult or intimidation of the type envisaged by the Act, 1989.

62. We would like to refer to the observations of this Court in Ram Krishna Balothia (supra) to further elaborate upon the idea of “humiliation” as it has been used under the Act, 1989. It was observed in the said case that the offences enumerated under the Act, 1989, belong to a separate category as they arise from the practice of ‘untouchability’ and thus the Parliament was competent to enact special laws treating such offences and offenders as belonging to a separate category. Referring to the Statements of Objects and Purposes of the Act, 1989 it was observed by this Court that the object behind the introduction of the Act, 1989 was to afford statutory protection to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, who were terrorised and subjected to humiliation and indignations upon assertion of their civil rights and resistance to the practice of untouchability. For this reason, the mere fact that the person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would not attract the offence under Section 3(1)(r) unless it was the intention of the accused to subject the concerned person to caste-based humiliation.

63. V. Geetha, in her paper titled Bereft of Being: The Humiliations of Untouchability, describes humiliation as an experience that is “felt, held and savoured in the very gut of our existence.” Humiliation, in her understanding, can either be suffered as a one-time occurrence which bruises the self-esteem or pride of an individual, or it can be “suflered as a condition that is degrading and wounding.” In the words of Gopal Guru, humiliation is not so much a physical injury but is in the nature of a psychological injury that leaves a permanent scar on the heart.

64. Explaining the social structures that perpetuate humiliation, Gopal Guru, in an introduction to his book, writes that “humiliation is almost endemic to social life that is active basically through asymmetries of intersecting sects of attitudes - arrogance and obeisance, self-respect and servility and reverence and repulsion. Discussing how the basis of humiliation varies in different societies, depending upon the social context, he observes that the idea and practice of humiliation “continues to survive in diflerent forms depending upon the specific nature of the social context. For example, in the West, it is the attitude of race that is at the base of humiliation. In the East, it is the notion of untouchability that foregrounds the form and content of humiliation.”

65. While Gopal Guru makes the aforesaid observation in the context of different societies in relation to one another, such as the East and the West, in our opinion the observations are equally applicable to specific individual societies as well wherein multiple varying grounds of humiliation like gender, caste, race, etc. can co-exist and apply to the same or different individuals and groups.

66. Bhikhu Parekh, in his paper titled Logic of Humiliation attempts to differentiate humiliation from other concepts with which it is generally confused. He gives the example of the ticket inspector who threw Gandhi off the train in South Africa to argue that humiliation might, but need not, involve physical cruelty. On the contrary, he contends that a man who starves another to death and tortures him shows cruelty but does not necessarily humiliate him. He argues the same regarding the difference between insult and humiliation and observes that although humiliation generally involves insult, insult alone is not sufficient to constitute humiliation.

67. On the social context of humiliation, Parekh writes that “organised or institutionalised humiliation exists when social institutions and practices embody disrespect for, and systematically violate the self-respect of, groups of individuals.” Drawing a distinction between systemic and regimented humiliation on the one hand as distinguished from isolated incidents of humiliation on the other, he observes that while the latter is present in modern liberal societies, the former is found in societies structured on the basis of slavery, racial segregation, untouchability, caste system, hierarchical status, etc. According to him, the reason for the same is that modern liberal societies, though marked by deep economic, political and other inequalities, allow for vertical mobility owing to the fluid nature of the inequalities. Whereas, societies based on race, caste system, etc., are grounded in inequalities like colour, birth, ethnicity, etc., which are unalterable and deeply entrenched in the very foundational fabric of such a society. The inflexible nature of the basis of inequalities leads to the existence of a more structural and systemic form of humiliation, as the perpetrator is assured of its place in the structure of society owing to its immobility. Since no one can be assured of the same in a modern liberal society, which is marked by vertical mobility in the social structure, there is no incentive for anyone to have a regimented system of humiliation.

68. Resistance is internal to humiliation, and some scholars have argued that humiliation is only defined on the basis of the claims made against it. Thus, those who are humiliated also inherently possess the capacity to protest against it. However, those who protest also run the risk of inciting opposition from those who want to push the traditionally humiliated groups to the margins. This apprehension of opposition and pushback from the dominant against the marginalised is also evident from the Statements of Objects of the Act, 1989, as discussed by this Court in Ram Krishna Balothia (supra).

69. What appears from the aforesaid discussion is that the expression “intent to humiliate” as it appears in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989, must necessarily be construed in the larger context in which the concept of humiliation of the marginalised groups has been understood by various scholars. It is not an ordinary insult or intimidation, which would amount to ‘humiliation’, that is sought to be made punishable under the Act, 1989. The Parliament, by way of different legislations, has over the years sought to target humiliation based on different grounds and identities which exist in society. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, seeks to punish humiliation based on gender inequalities by specifically including the term ‘humiliation’ in the definition of “domestic violence”. Similarly, the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 includes treatment causing humiliation to a female employee and which may likely affect her health and safety within the definition of sexual harassment.

70. In our considered view, it is in a similar vein that the term ‘humiliation’ as it appears in Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must be construed, that is, in a way that it deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such humiliation is intricately associated with the caste identity of such members.

71. We would also like to refer to Section 7(1)(d) of The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 (“Civil Rights Act”) at this juncture to give a more meaningful construction to Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989. The provision reads as follows:

“7. Punishment for other oflences arising out of “untouchability”.—(1) Whoever—

xxxxxxxxx

(d) insults or attempts to insult, on the ground of “untouchability”, a member of a Scheduled Caste; shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of not less than one month and not more than six months, and also with a fine which shall be not less than one hundred rupees and not more than five hundred rupees.”

72. It is clear from a plain reading of the aforesaid provision that any insult against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the ground of “untouchability” was punishable with imprisonment for a maximum term of six months under the Civil Rights Act. With the passage of time, it was realised by the legislature that the Civil Rights Act was not adequate to tackle caste- based offences and the practice of “untouchability”, leading to the enactment of the 1989 Act, introducing more stringent provisions for combating such practices. Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 should, thus, be seen in the context of Section 7(1)(d) of the Civil Rights Act. Seen thus, the words “with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe” become inseparable from the underlying idea of “untouchability” which is sought to be remedied and punished by the Act, 1989.

73. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya (supra) explained that for an act of intentional insult to attract the offence under erstwhile Section 3(1)

(x) of the Act, 1989 (which is identical to Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989) it was necessary that the insult is laced with casteist remarks. Relevant observations are extracted herein below:

“18. […]The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an oflence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by a user of abusive or oflensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks. […]”

74. Having regard to the reprehensible conduct and the nature of the derogatory statements made, the appellant, at best, could be said to have prima facie committed the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of the IPC. If that be so, it is always open for the complainant to prosecute the appellant accordingly. However, the complainant could not have invoked the provisions of the Act, 1989 only on the premise that he is a member of Scheduled Caste, more so, when a prima facie conjoint reading of the transcript of the video and the complaint fails to disclose that the actions of the appellant were impelled by the caste identity of the complainant.”

24. In the present case, the allegations in the FIR show that the petitioner and other accused had abused the informant in the name of his caste, and when he had protested, the petitioner and the co-accused persisted in their abuses. The complaint also mentions that Neel Kamal and Amrish Rana were present at the time of the incident. The fact that the petitioner and the co-accused had persisted in the abuses clearly shows that they intended to humiliate the informant, otherwise there was no need to persist in the abuses.

25. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false, and the petitioner was not present at the time of the incident. This is evident from the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses. The submission will not help the petitioner. The Court, exercising inherent jurisdiction, cannot determine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held: -

“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:

“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23].

In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)

“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge- sheet, documents, etc. or not.”

26. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC, cannot conduct a mini- trial. It was observed at page 397:

“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)

6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …

7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.”

27. A similar view was taken in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 6, wherein it was observed at page 111:

“29 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1- 2018.]. The High Court, in our view, failed to see the extent of its jurisdiction, which it possesses to exercise while examining the legality of any FIR complaining commission of several cognizable offences by the accused persons. In order to examine as to whether the factual contents of the FIR disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can it exercise the powers like an appellate court. The question, in our opinion, was required to be examined keeping in view the contents of the FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof.

30 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1- 2018.] . At this stage, the High Court could not appreciate the evidence, nor could it draw its own inferences from the contents of the FIR and the material relied on. It was more so when the material relied on was disputed by the complainants and vice versa. In such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the court to examine the questions once the charge sheet is filed, along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material.

31. In our considered opinion, once the court finds that the FIR does disclose the prima facie commission of any cognizable offence, it should stay its hand and allow the investigating machinery to step in to initiate the probe to unearth the crime in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code.

32. The very fact that the High Court, in this case, went into the minutest details in relation to every aspect of the case and devoted 89 pages of judgment to quash the FIR in part led us to draw a conclusion that the High Court had exceeded its powers while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. We cannot concur with such an approach of the High Court.

33. The inherent powers of the High Court, which are obviously not defined as being inherent in its very nature, cannot be stretched to any extent and nor can such powers be equated with the appellate powers of the High Court defined in the Code. The parameters laid down by this Court while exercising inherent powers must always be kept in mind, else it would lead to committing a jurisdictional error in deciding the case. Such is the case here.

34. On perusal of the three complaints and the FIR mentioned above, we are of the considered view that the complaint and FIR, do disclose a prima facie commission of various cognizable offences alleged by the complainants against the accused persons and, therefore, the High Court instead of dismissing the application filed by the accused persons in part should have dismissed the application as a whole to uphold the entire FIR in question.”

28. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR.

29. It was submitted that the FIR was lodged by the informant at the instance of the in-laws of Shruti Rana as a counterblast to the FIR lodged by the petitioner’s mother. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Chhattisgarh vs Amar Kumar Singh 2023(6) 559 that when an investigation was conducted and a charge sheet was filed, the question of mala fide would become meaningless. It was observed:

“78. Thirdly, it must be remembered that when information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered in respect of a disproportionate assets case, it is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused. To our mind, whether the first information report is the outcome of mala fides would be of secondary importance. In such a case, should the allegations of mala fides be of some prima facie worth, they would pale into insignificance if sufficient materials are gathered for sending the accused up for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not per se form the basis for quashing the first information report/complaint.

79. Finally, following the above, what is of substantial importance is that if criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives. We can say without fear of contradiction that it is not in all cases in our country that an individual, who is accused of acts of omission/commission punishable under the PC Act but has the blessings of the ruling dispensation, is booked by the police and made to face prosecution. If, indeed, in such a case (where a prosecution should have been but has not been launched) the succeeding political dispensation initiates steps for launching prosecution against such an accused but he/she is allowed to go scot- free, despite there being materials against him/her, merely on the ground that the action initiated by the current regime is mala fide in the sense that it is either to settle scores with the earlier regime or to wreak vengeance against the individual, in such an eventuality we are constrained to observe that it is criminal justice that would be the casualty. This is because it is difficult to form an opinion conclusively at the stage of reading a first information report that the public servant is either in or not in possession of property disproportionate to the known sources of his/her income. It would all depend on what is ultimately unearthed after the investigation is complete. Needless to observe, the first information report in a disproportionate assets case must, as of necessity, prima facie, contain ingredients for the perception that there is fair enough reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence relating to “criminal misconduct” punishable under the PC Act and to embark upon an investigation.”

30. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed:

“30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated because of a political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, “If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.”

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39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.”

31. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the ground of mala fide.

32. It was submitted that there is insufficient material to convict the petitioner. This will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed:

"21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra.

22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita, (2023) 12 SCC 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89], this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC.

23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51], a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC, being wholly inadmissible in evidence, could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC.”

33. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR and the proceedings on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

34. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:

“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.”

35. The FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offences, and it cannot be quashed at this stage.

36. No other point was urged.

37. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed.

38. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.