"Whether the action of the management of Sangramgarh colliery under Eastern Coalfields Limited, post office Samdi, District Burdwan in terminating the employment of Shri Rameshwar Manjhi coal cutter with effect from the 2nd of July, 1974 was justified If not, to what relief is the concerned workman entitled"

"In support of his contention two rulings have been cited on behalf of workman reported in. The former ruling is of Gujrat High Court while latter of Kerala High Court. In the above two rulings it is held that on the death of a workman during the pendency of the proceeding the Tribunal does not cease to exercise jurisdiction as benefits due to the deceased workman can be realised by his legal heir under Section33 (c) (2) of the I. D. Act. But the ruling of our own High Court (Patna High Court) is contra. It has been held in the ruling reported in 1968 AIR(PAT) 135 (Bihar Working Journalists Union, Petitioner v. H. K. Chaudhury and another, Opp. Parties) that in certain cases on the death of a workman the reference will not be infructuous, but it has been held that there can be no doubt that the death of the workman during these pendency of the adjudication proceeding puts an end to the industrial Dispute for the simple reason he can no longer be reinstated. We are bound by the ruling of the Patna High Court and in the fact of the ruling of the Patna High Court, we cannot follow follow the ruling of any other High Court. The position would have been some ruling of the Supreme Court on the point, but no ruling of the Supreme Court on this point has been cited before me by either party.In the above circumstances, relying on the ruling of the Patna High Court, it is held that due to death of the concerned workman during the pendency of the adjudication proceeding the industrial Dispute has come to an end and the reference cannot proceed further and has become infructuous as such."

"an application under S.33c (2) of the Act can be made only be the workman himself and it must follow that if the workman dies during the pendency of such application, his heirs, successors and legal representatives cannot continue it in the specified Labour Curt because this Court cannot recognize anybody other than a workman as the applicant before it. We should not be taken to have held that the right to sue for money or equivalent of money of he benefit due to a workman does not survive. It survives to heirs, successors and legal representatives and they can take appropriate proceedings by way of a suit in a civil Court. They cannot, however, either continue after his death an application made by the workman under S. 33c (2) or make such an application themselves in the event of his death." *

"It is well established that all civil rights of every and vested in a deceased person and all causes of action in that connection, except those which are in the category of not capable of surviving after his death, survive to his heirs. Causes of action, which are personal, and do not survive, consist of damages due to the personal injuries suffered by a deceased and or defamation and assault. In that connection, Fatal Accidents Act was passed so that in connection with damages suffered in consequence of death of deceased could be claimed on behalf of the dependents of a deceased person. But apart from certain personal causes of action which died with the death of a deceased person every other cause of action for civil claims has been held to have continued in existence so as to survive to his heirs for more than a century now. The decision that was given by the Labour Court, therefor, appears to us contrary to the above well established position." *

The maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona a personal action dies with the person, has a limited application. It operates in a limited class of auction exdelicto such as actions for damages for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party, and in other actions where after the death of the party the relief granted could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. An action for account is not an action for damages exdelicto, and does not fall within the enumerates classes. Nor is it such that the relief claimed being personal could not be enjoyed after death, or granting it would be nugatory."

"The scope of adjudication by a Tribunal under the industrial Disputes Act is much wider than determination of the legal rights of the parties involved of redressing the grievances of an aggrieved workman in accordance with law. As Gajendragadkar, J. points out in Cawnpur Tannery Ltd. v. Guha, the adjudication by the industrial Disputes Act is only an alternative form of settlement of industrial disputes on a fair and just basis. The primary duty of the industrial Tribunal is to establish peace in the industry between employer and workmen. Any unfair action by the management even against an individual worker might cast its shadow on the general body of workers who might get perturbed by such action. A resolution of the dispute might then become necessity for industrial peace notwithstanding the death of the workman concerned pending proceeding. The personal relief to the workman concerned to a certain extent occupies a subsidiary place in the scheme of things. Not that it is not important. It is only a consequential result of the decision primarily arrives at securing industrial peace setting the apprehension of the workman without losing sight of the interest of the industry. As Rajamannar, C.J. stated in Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. State of Madras 1952 (2) LLJ 326-DB), the essential object of enacting the industrial Disputes Act is to provide recourse to a given from of procedure for the settlement of disputes in the interest of maintenance of peaceful relations between the parties without apparent conflicts such as are likely to interrupt production and entail other damages. In the circumstances proceedings before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal under the industrial Disputes Act cannot be equated to a personal action in torts in a Civil Courts which would come to an end with the death of the aggrieved party to the dispute. In the general set up of an industry, in the nature of the relationship between the employer and the employees, a dispute between the employer and even an individual employee generally affects the entire community of workmen in the industry. They acquire an interest in the dispute. It ceases to be an individual dispute and becomes an industrial dispute affecting the interest of the entire body of workman. Any decision of the Labour Court with affect the interest of the whole body of workmen and the dispute therefore, cannot die with the death of the individual workman. Before S.2A of the Act was introduced the Courts had said that an individual dispute. Section 2A makes an individual dispute though not taken up by the collective body of workers, an industrial dispute."

"Even in respect of ordinary judicial proceedings can it be said that the death of party to the proceedings will terminate the action in all cases Even under the English Common Law before the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934 was passed to provide generally or the survival of causes of action in tort, death was considered as extinguishing liability only in respect of cause of action in tort. This was Winfield says in his Law of Tort-due in part to historical connection of the action of trespass, from which much of our law of tort is derived, with the criminal law and in pat to the reference often made to the maxim actio personnels moritur cum persona which, though traceable to the fifteenth century, probably did no more originally than state in Latin a long-established principle concerning torts such as assault and battery of which it was neither the historical cause nor the rational explanation. Actions in contract generally escaped the rule, and so too did those in which property had been appropriated to a deceased person and add to his own estate

"... Therefore, I see no reason why the Labour Court should cease to exercise jurisdiction in considering the question whether the termination of the services of the two employees was justified or not merely because they died during the course of the proceedings. A decision on that is certainly in the interest of the other employees. And the benefits that would be due to the deceased employees on the finding of the Labour Court can be realised on behalf of their estate by their legal heirs under S.33C (2) of the Act." *

"It may be pointed out that under S.306 of the Indian Succession Act, "All demands whatsoever and all rights of prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his executors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. In this context, it must be pointed out that, so far as the granting of relief of reinstatement is concerned, it would be nugatory on the death of the workman concerned pending the reference before the Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be. However, reinstatement involves the concept of back-wages also and very often the Tribunal has to pass order providing for he backwages from the date of wrongful termination of the services till the date of reinstatement. It is only under the industrial Disputes Act that in the field of industrial relations, the Tribunal concerned can direct reinstatement of he workman. The only thing that a civil Court can do is to provide for damages for wrongful termination of service or wrongful dismissal. Again the whole concept under the Industrial Disputes Act of the Tribunal ascertaining whether the temporary of services was proper, legal and just, is the case of a deceased workman where the reference is under S.2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the heirs and legal representatives can agitate the question, firstly, whether the termination of the deceased workman was just, legal and proper, and secondly, if it was wrongful and invalid, then, what compensation in terms of money could have been given to the workman from a particular date fixed by the Tribunal till the date of reinstatement and if reinstatement cannot be granted because of the death of the workman, till the date of his death. It is, therefore, in this context of S.306 of the Succession Act that the right to prosecute these special proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal survives to the administrators, executors, heirs and legal representatives of the deceased workman. It is only a cause of action for personal injury or in the case of defamation or assault or battery or malicious prosecution which cannot be said to survive after the death of the person concerned."