Oral Judgment: (A.S. Chandurkar, J.)

The challenge in the present writ petition is to the order dated 28-2-1996 passed by the respondent No.2 refusing to condone the delay in filing an application for seeking enhanced compensation under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred as the said Act for short).

On 24-9-1979, an award was passed under Section 9 of the said Act, acquiring the lands of the petitioner. The petitioner had thereafter sought reference under Section 18 of the said Act, seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded to him. The reference proceedings were decided on 17-2-1988. Some other land owners, whose lands were also acquired by the same notification by which the land of the petitioner was acquired, had preferred first appeals under Section 54 of the said Act before this Court. The aforesaid first appeals were decided on 22-3-1993 and the compensation as awarded in the reference proceedings was enhanced. On that basis, the present petitioner moved an application on 19-12-1995 seeking benefit of grant of enhanced compensation in view of the provisions of Section 28A of the said Act. As the aforesaid application was not preferred within stipulated period of 3 months, the same was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. By the impugned order, the respondent No.2 refused to condone the delay on the ground that the cause as shown was not sufficient. It is this order which is challenged in the present writ petition.

None has appeared on behalf of the petitioner. However, we have gone through the contents of the writ petition and the documents filed along with it. According to the petitioner, the application for enhancement of compensation under Section 28A of the said Act had been moved immediately after getting knowledge about the decision of the first appeal under Section 54 of the said Act. It is the case of the petitioner that after applying for the certified copies, the application under Section 28- A had been immediately moved. According to the petitioner, the delay as caused had been sufficiently explained and the respondent No.2 ought to have condoned the same.

On behalf of the respondents Ms. K. Joshi, the learned Asstt. Government Pleader has opposed the writ petition and has submitted that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 were not at all applicable for seeking condonation of delay in moving the application for enhancement of compensation under Section 28-A of the said Act. Relying upon the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of PopatGovardhan and others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and another reported in 2013 10 SCC 765 [LQ/SC/2013/916] , it was submitted that if the application for enhancement of compensation was not filed within a period of three months as stipulated under Section 28-A (1) of the said Act, the delay could not be condoned and the application, therefore, was not liable to be entertained. It was further submitted that as the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 were not applicable even for seeking condonation of delay in making a reference under Section 18 of the said Act, the same was also not applicable while seeking enhancement of compensation under Section 28-A of the said Act. For this purpose, reliance was placed on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Bhaghwandasand others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2010) 3 SCC 545 [LQ/SC/2010/237] . The learned AGP, therefore, sought for dismissal of the writ petition.

A perusal of the provisions of Section 28A of the said Act reveals that the redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court can be sought by making a written application to the Collector within a period of three months from the date of award of the Court. By the proviso to sub section (1) of Section 28A of the Act, only the period that is required for obtaining the copy of the award is excluded. In PopatGowardhan (supra), it has been held by the Honble Supreme Court relying upon its earlier judgment that an application under Section 28A of the said Act has to be filed within the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 28A of the said Act. As the Land Acquisition Officer was not a Court, the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply. It was thus, held that the question of limitation for filing an application under Section 28A of the said Act commencing from the date of knowledge of the Courts award would not arise at all. Such application was required to be made within a period of three months from the date of award of the Court.

Similarly, this position is also not res integra in view of the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of TotaramVs. State of UP and others reported in (1997) 6 SCC 280 [LQ/SC/1997/937] wherein it has been held that in view of the express language of Section 28-A of the said Act, the question of getting knowledge of the award would not arise. The limitation would commence from the date of the award and only the period for obtaining its certified copy should be excluded. It is thus clear that in view of the clear provisions of Section 28A of the said Act, the aspect of imputing knowledge to a land owner of the award has been excluded. What has been provided is the exclusion of time from the day the award was passed and time for obtaining its certified copy for preferring such application under Section 28-A of the.

In the case of Bhagwandasand others (supra), it has been held that the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply while making a reference under Section 18(1) of the said Act and hence, there is no question of the Collector condoning the delay where reference is made belatedly. In view of the fact that though under Section 18 of the said Act, a reference can be made within a time stipulated after getting knowledge of the award, such contingency is not applicable to an application for redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A of the said Act. In view of the aforesaid judgment, it is clear that such application is required to be preferred within stipulated period of three months as mentioned in Section 28A (1) of the said Act.

Perusal of the impugned order dated 28-1-1996 indicates that the respondent No.2 has entertained the said application and has thereafter recorded a finding that the reason for the delay being caused was not sufficient. On that ground, the aforesaid application came to be dismissed.

As held above, there is no question of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act being applicable for seeking condonation of delay in preferring an application under Section 28-A of the said Act. Hence, the application as moved by the petitioner seeking condonation of delay itself was not tenable. As the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are itself not applicable, there is no question of seeking condonation of delay in filing an application for redetermination of compensation under Section 28A of the said Act. Hence, there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule discharged.