1. We are called upon to answer a pointed question raised by a Division Bench in the order of reference dated 06.08.2016 in an unnumbered Criminal Miscellaneous Case (“Cri.M.C.”, for short). The question is : “Whether an order by which the Special Court, constituted under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (“NIA Act” for short), refused to modify or relax the condition imposed in a bail order can be challenged under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Code” for short)”. Subsequently, another Division Bench raised the same question in another unnumbered Cri.M.C. as per order dated 24.10.2016. On the orders of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, the matters are placed before us for resolution of the issue.

2. We heard Sri.Manu Tom Cheruvally and Sri.Shajimon T.B., learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri.Suvin R.Menon, learned Central Government Standing Counsel (“CGSC” for short) and Sri.Arjun Ambalapatta, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for National Investigation Agency (“NIA” for short).

3. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, we shall take note of the bare minimum facts involved in the cases. Dismissal of Cri.M.P.No.78 of 2016 in S.C.No.2/2013/NIA pending before the Special Court for trial of NIA Cases, Ernakulam (“Special Court” for short) has been challenged in a Crl.M.C, which is the subject matter of the 1* reference. 4°° accused was enlarged on bail with strict conditions. One of the conditions is that the sureties shall, along with basic tax receipts/solvency certificates, produce their title deeds in respect of the property for which they remitted tax. Later, 4" accused filed an application stating that his sureties needed their title deeds returned. In short, he requested the court to modify the bail order, which was turned down through the impugned order. Hence, he approached this Court by invoking Section 482 of the Code.

4. 6" accused in R.C.No.1/2011/NIA/HYD approached the above Court with a petition seeking the release of his passport surrendered as per the directions in a bail order passed by the same court. After considering merits of his contentions, the Special Court dismissed the application. That order is challenged before this Court under Section 482 of the Code which resulted in the 2"° reference order.

5. In the order of reference, the learned Judges pointed out apparent conflicts of judicial opinions expressed in Thadiyantevida Nazeer v. State of Kerala (2011 (3) KLT 734 [LQ/KerHC/2011/1711] ) and Majeed Koliyad v. National Investigation Agency, Kochi (2015 (1) KHC 261 [LQ/KerHC/2014/2718] ). Certain observations in Majeed Koliyad @ Mohammed Abdul Kader Majeed v. National Investigation Agency, Kochi and another (2014 (2) KHC 620 [LQ/KerHC/2014/853] ) are also pointed out in the order of reference dated 06.08.2016. For the sake of convenience, Majeed Koliyad @ Mohammed Abdul Kader Majeed v. National Investigation Agency, Kochi and another (2014 (2) KHC 620 [LQ/KerHC/2014/853] ) is referred to as “Majeed Koliyad-l” and Majeed Koliyad v. National Investigation Agency, Kochi (2015 (1) KHC 261 [LQ/KerHC/2014/2718] ) as “Majeed Koliyad-ll’”.

6. At the outset, Sri.Manu Tom submitted that the petitioner/4" accused in S.C.No.2/2013/NIA is no more. Therefore, Cri.M.C. involved in the 1* order of reference has become infructuous. However, we are bound to answer the issue raised in the order of reference, irrespective of the event that has happened subsequent to the order. Moreover, the same question comes up in the 2™ reference order as well.

7. Since the issue centres around the interpretation of Section 21 of the NIA Act, we shail extract the same:

“21. Appeals.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on law.

(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a bench of two Judges of the High Court and shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal.

(3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (3) of section 378 of the Code an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail.

(5) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from:

Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days:

Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of period of ninety days.”

8. Before analysing the scope and legal effect of the above Section, we shall take cognizance of certain pertinent aspects. Section 2(1) (b) of the NIA Act says “Code” means the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In the NIA Act, Chapter Ill dealing with “Investigation by NIA” and Chapter IV relating to “Special Courts” indicate, in generality, the application of the Code in the matter of investigation into the offences and trial of cases by the Special Courts. Chapter XXIX of the Code, comprising of Sections 372 to 394, deals with appeals. Section 372 says that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided by the Code or by any law for the time being in force. By the Amendment Act, 2008 (Act 5 of 2009), which came into effect on 31.12.2009, a proviso has been added to Section 372 of the Code dealing with the victim's right to prefer an appeal. That provision is not relevant for our purpose.

9. Firmly settled proposition in law is that right to appeal is a creature of statute and it exists only where expressly provided by the statute.

10. From the preamble to the NIA Act it will be evident that it was enacted to constitute an investigation agency at the national level to investigate and prosecute offences affecting the sovereignty, security and integrity of India, security of State and friendly relations with foreign States. It is also intended to conduct investigation into offences under the Acts, enacted to implement international treaties, agreements, conventions and resolutions of the United Nations and other international organizations. What is discernible from the statement of objects and reasons is that the legislature has noticed the happening of innumerable incidents of terrorist attacks, not only in the militancy areas and areas affected by Left Wing Extremism, but also in the form of terrorist attacks and bomb blasts in various parts of the country. A large number of incidents were found to have complex inter-State and international linkages and_ possible connections with other activities like the smuggling of arms and drugs and pushing in and circulation of fake Indian currency, infiltration from across the borders, etc. Reckoning all these aspects, the legislature felt the need of setting up an agency at the central level for investigation of offences relating to terrorism and certain other acts which have national ramifications. Ail the above considerations actuated the Parliament to enact the NIA Act.

11. We may make a passing mention that the NIA Act was amended by NIA (Amendment) Act, 2019 which came into force on 02.08.2019. The amendments so effected have no relevance in these cases.

12. In the above backdrop, we shall analyse Section 21 of the NIA Act quoted above. On a plain reading of Section 21(1), it will be clear that an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court, constituted under Section 11, to the High Court, both on facts and on law. Interlocutory orders have been excluded from the purview of appealable orders in clear terms. Sub-section (2) specifically states that every appeal filed under Sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges of the High Court. It is also provided that every appeal shall be disposed of, as far as possible, within a period of three months from the date of its admission. Language used in the Section clearly shows that the High Court, as a court of appeal, can exercise all the powers provided under Chapter XXIX of the Code.

13. Section 21(3) emphatically says that except as provided in Sub-section (1), no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order, including an interlocutory order of a Special Court. Revisional powers of the High Court are specifically referred to in Sections 397, 398 and 401 of the Code falling under Chapter XXX. Plain language in Section 397(2) of the Code explicitly prohibits the exercise of revisional powers against interlocutory orders. Binding judicial precedents have now settled that there can be certain types of orders falling in between interlocutory orders and final orders, which are called ‘intermediate orders’, and they are amenable to revision. That aspect we shall discuss later.

14. In Sub-section (4) to Section 21, it is stated starting with a non obstante clause, that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 378(3) of the Code (which relates to leave of the High Court in respect of an appeal in a case of acquittal), an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. Importantly, under the scheme of the Code, there is no provision empowering a party to challenge in appeal an order passed by a criminal court under Chapter XXXiIll (relating to bail and bonds) either granting or refusing bail. Normally, when a bail application filed before a Magistrate under Section 437 of the Code is dismissed, the accused involved in a non-bailable offence gets a right to approach the Sessions Court concerned under Section 439 of the Code. When a bail plea raised under Section 439 is dismissed by a Court of Session, the accused can move the High Court. In contradistinction to the said provisions in the Code, by enacting Sub-section (4) to Section 21, a right of appeal is allowed to both the parties aggrieved by the grant or refusal of bail. Certainly, this is conferment of a distinct right on the parties. Sub-section (5) to Section 21 mentions about the time prescription to file an appeal and the High Court's limited power to extend the time. That provision has no application in our cases.

15. In the order of reference, it is specifically mentioned that the orders impugned, refusing to modify or relax the conditions imposed in the bail order, are interlocutory orders, pure and simple. In fact, there is no dispute between the contestants on this aspect. We are also of the view that the orders under challenge can only be qualified as interlocutory orders. We shall elaborate the reasons for our view.

16. It may be apposite to understand the expressions “final order, intermediate order and interlocutory order’.

17. Black's Law Dictionary (7" Edition, page 819) defines the word “interlocutory” in the following terms:

“(Of an order, judgment, appeal, etc.) interim or temporary, not constituting a final resolution of the whole controversy.”

“Interlocutory order” is defined at page 1123 thus:

“An order that relates to some intermediate matter in the case; any order other than a final order.

“Final order” according to Black's Law Dictionary, is: “An order that is dispositive of the entire case.”

18. P.Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon (3% Edition, 2012) defines “interlocutory order” at page 876 in the following terms:

“An interlocutory order is one which is made pending the cause and before a final hearing on the merits.

An interlocutory order is made to secure some end and purpose necessary and essential to the progress of the suit, and generally collateral to the issues formed by the pleadings and not connected with the final judgment.

The term ‘interlocutory order’ merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary, nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties.”

19. A final order or judgment is the one that ends an action. Indisputably, granting or refusing a request to modify the conditions in a bail order cannot end a proceeding before a criminal court. Therefore, the impugned orders can never be termed as final orders.

20. In the Law Lexicon referred to above, “intermediate order’ is defined thus:

"Accurately speaking, an order granted before entry of judgment is an intermediate order, while one granted thereafter is not.

An intermediate order is one made between the commencement of an action and the entry of a judgment from which the appeal is taken.”

21. After referring to various decisions, including Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra ((1977) 4 SCC 551) [LQ/SC/1977/299] and Stroud's Judicial Dictionary and aiso Corpus Juris Secundum, a Division Bench, consisting of four Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court, in V.C.Shukla v. State through C.B.1.(AIR 1980 SC 962 [LQ/SC/1979/491] ) held as follows in the context of Section 11 of the Special Courts Act, 1979 and Section 397(2) of the Code:

“To sum up, the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment, Untwalia J. in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra clearly meant to convey that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order but is an intermediate order as defined in the passage, extracted above, in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 60. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made in Corpus Juris Secundum. ........”

22. In the reference order, the learned Judges mentioned about certain observations in Madhu Limaye in regard to the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code. We shall deal with that aspect later.

23. In Madhu Limaye, the question came up for consideration was, whether framing of charges against the appellant under Section 500 IPC was an order challengeable before the High Court in a revision under Section 397(1) of the Code. The High Court held that a revision petition was not maintainable in view of the interdiction in Section 397(2), by qualifying the order impugned as an interlocutory order. Supreme Court, after considering the rival contentions, observed thus:

".........In what cases then the High Court will examine the legality or the propriety of an order or the legality of any proceeding of an inferior Criminal Court Is it circumscribed to examine only such proceeding which is brought for its examination after the final determination and wherein no appeal lies Such cases will be very few and far between. It has been pointed out repeatedly, vide for example, The River Wear Commissioners v. William Adamson ((1876-77) 2 AC 743) and R.M.D.Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India ((1957) SCR 930 [LQ/SC/1957/38] :AIR 1957 SC 628 [LQ/SC/1957/38] ) that although the words occurring in a particular statute are plain and unambiguous, they have to be interpreted in a manner which would fit in the context of the other provisions of the statute and bring about the real intention of the Legislature. On the one hand, the Legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the Legislature was not to equate the expression “interlocutory order’ as invariably being converse of the words “final order’. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in S.Kuppuswami Rao v. The King (1947 FCR 180: AIR 1949 FC 1 [] ), but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order - pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of Section 397(2). It is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well-known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of subsection (2) of Section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course.”

In the light of the legal principles enunciated above, the orders impugned in our cases can neither be called final orders nor intermediate orders. They are typical interlocutory orders. Hence, the relevant question is, whether they can be challenged in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code

24. Sri.Manu Tom forcefully argued that the inherent powers safeguarded under Section 482 of the Code, are founded on the principles enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. He placed reliance on a Constitution Bench decision in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay and another (AIR 1967 SC 1639 [LQ/SC/1967/188] ) to contend that the inherent powers of the High Court, saved under Section 561A of Section 482 of the Code, are founded on Article 21 of the Constitution. The the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (“old Code” for short) or relevant observations read thus:

"..........The Constitution confirmed and revested in the High Court all its existing powers and jurisdiction including its inherent powers, and its power to make rules. When the Constitution or any enacted law has embraced and confirmed the inherent powers and jurisdiction of the High Court which previously existed, that power and jurisdiction has the sanction of an enacted "law" within the meaning of Art. 21 as explained in A. K. Gopalan's case, 1950 SCR 88 [LQ/SC/1950/19] - - (AIR 1950 SC 27 [LQ/SC/1950/19] ) (Supra). The inherent powers of the High Court preserved by S. 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are thus vested in it by "law" within the meaning of Art. 21. The procedure for invoking the inherent powers is regulated by rules framed by the High Court. The power to make such rules is conferred on the High Court by the Constitution............ ”

25. A Bench of three learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation (AIR 2018 SC 2039 [LQ/SC/2018/411] ) while answering a reference followed the ratio in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani (supra) and overruled the decision in Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 2001 SC 2856 [LQ/SC/2001/2175] ), wherein it was held that power under Section 482 of the Code cannot be invoked to circumvent the bar in granting an order of stay created by Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. We shall quote paragraph 49 from Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd.:

"It is thus clear that the inherent power of a Court set up by the Constitution is a power that inheres in such Court because it is a superior court of record, and not because it is conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is a power vested by the Constitution itself, inter alia, under Article 215 as aforestated. Also, as such High Courts have the power, nay, the duty to protect the fundamental rights of citizens under Article 226 of the Constitution, the inherent power to do justice in cases involving the liberty of the citizen would also sound in Article 21 of the Constitution. This being the constitutional position, it is clear that Section 19(3)(c) cannot be read as a ban on the maintainability of a petition filed before the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the non-obstante clause in Section 19(3) applying only to the Code of Criminal Procedure. The judgment of this Court in Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 8 SCC 607 [LQ/SC/2001/2175] at paragraphs 14 and 15 (AIR 2001 SC 2856 [LQ/SC/2001/2175] , Para 23, 24) does not, therefore, lay down the correct position in law. Equally, in paragraph 17 of the said judgment, despite the clarification that proceedings can be "adapted" in appropriate cases, the Court went on to hold that there is a blanket ban of stay of trials and that, therefore, Section 482, even as adapted, cannot be used for the aforesaid purpose. This again is contrary to the position in law as laid down hereinabove. This case, therefore, stands overruled.”

According to the learned counsel, in the case of any invasion of right of a citizen involved in a criminal case, which cannot be challenged in appeal or revision before a higher court, certainly the High Court's power under Section 482 of the Code ought to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Per contra, Sri.Suvin, learned CGSC would contend that the scheme of the NIA Act would plainly show that serious cases registered under the Act should not be prolonged by raising trivial challenges against each and every interlocutory order. Besides, the phraseology employed in Section 21 will make it clear that there is an implied bar in the exercise of the High Court's power under Section 482 of the Code.

26. In order to appreciate these contentions, let us examine the legislative history of the present Section 482 of the Code. Section 484 of the Code explicitly says that the old Code has been repealed. Old Code received the assent of the Governor General on 22.03.1898. At the inception of the old Code, a provision expressly saving the inherent power of the High Court was not provided. Subsequently, by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1923, which came into force on 02.04.1923, Section 561A was introduced in the old Code. On juxtaposing Section 482 of the present Code with Section 561A of the old Code, we find that they are not only similarly worded, but also pari materia in scope and legal effect. We shall extract Section 482 of the Code for easy reference:

“Saving of inherent power of High Court.-Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or fo prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

Only distinction in the phraseology between Section 482 of the Code and Section 561A of the old Code is that in Section 561A, a reference was made in regard to “the inherent power of the High Court”, whereas in Section 482, “inherent powers of the High Court’ is the phrase employed. In other words, in Section 482, multiple facets of the High Court's inherent powers have been recognized and safeguarded. On the other hand, in Section 561A, the concept “inherent power’ had been envisaged as a single power. It can be legitimately presumed that the framers of law must have consciously employed the words in Section 482 of the Code to indicate the existence of wider inherent powers in the High Court for removal of any possible doubt. In our opinion, no material difference has occurred on account of the substitution of the word “power” by “powers” since Section 561A of the old Code and Section 482 of the Code always recognized and saved the inherent powers inbuilt in the High Courts.

27. Commentaries on the old Code by V.V.Chitaley and K.N.Annaji Rao (published by All India Reporter Ltd., Nagpur) (Vol.1H) shows the following mentioning about the inherent power :

“In administering justice as prescribed by a Code, there are necessarily two shortcomings:-

1. There will always be cases and circumstances which are not covered by the express provisions of the Code wherein justice has to be done. The reason is that the legislature can foresee only the most natural and ordinary events and no rules can “regulate for all time to come so as to make express provision against all inconveniences which are infinite in number and so that their dispositions shall express all the cases that may probably happen.”

2. The prescribed rules of procedure may be abused, or so used as to give a mere formality, the significance of substantive effect and thus obstruct, instead of facilitating, the administration of justice.

It cannot be said that in the above circumstances Courts have no power to do justice or redress a wrong merely because no express provision of the Code can be found to meet the requirements of a case. Every Court, whether a civil or a criminal Court, must, therefore, in the absence of express provision in the Code for that purpose be deemed to possess, as inherent in its very constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of thé administration of justice. This is based on the principle embodied in the maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit concedere videtur id sine quo resipsa esse non potest - when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist. Wherever artything is required to be done by law ar it is found impossible to do that thing unless something not authorized in express terms be also done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment.”

28. Learned authors, quoting the principles enunciated in large volume of case law in this regard, further observed thus:

“But the power to be exercised under this Section is in its nature extraordinary and ought not to be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily but is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. The High Court must, therefore, be careful to see that its decision is based on sound general principles of criminal jurisprudence and is not in conflict with them or with the intentions of the legislature as indicated in statutory provisions. Thus this Section cannot be invoked to override an express provision of law or when there is another remedy available.”

Insofar as the interference by the High Court at an interlocutory stage of a criminal proceeding, the above commentary says thus:

“The High Court has power, no doubt inherent, to interfere with the proceedings of the lower Court at any Stage thereof, if it finds that an abuse of the process of law is being carried on in the trial of the case or that such an interference is necessary to secure the ends of justice. This power is, however, to be exercised subject to certain limitation. Though ordinarily the High Court need not interfere at an interlocutory stage of a criminal proceeding in a Subordinate Court, it can interfere whenever there is an exceptional and extraordinary reason for doing so or in order to prevent the harassment of a party by an illegal prosecution. ......”

29. Neither Section 561A of the old Code nor Section 482 of the present Code has given any enlargement to the powers existing in the High Court. Even before enacting the respective provisions, the High Courts possessed inherent powers, because it is a power necessary to secure the ends of justice.

30. ALarger Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Jairam Das v. Emperor (1945 (47) Bom L.R. 634 = MANU/MH/0008/1945) considered the question whether a High Court in India had power to grant bail to a person who was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and to whom His Majesty in Council had given special leave to appeal against the conviction and sentence. After analysing the provisions, finally it was held that old Code conferred no power on a High Court to grant bail to such a person. According to the learned Judges, such a power, if it existed, must be statutory. It did not reside in the inherent powers of the court. In the course of discussion, it is held that Section 561A of the old Code conferred no powers on the High Court; it merely safeguarded ail existing inherent powers possessed by a High Court necessary (among other purposes) to secure the ends of justice.

31. Relying on the ratio in Jairam Das (supra), learned CGSC contended that it cannot be assumed under all circumstances that the High Court has inherent power under Section 482 of the Code to entertain a challenge against an interlocutory order, disregarding the prescriptions in the special statute, viz., NIA Act. He drew our attention to Section 4(2) of the Code, wherein it is stated that all offences under any law other than Indian Penal Code, 1860 shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions in the Code, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the mariner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. According to him, the manner in which Section 21 of the NIA Act is worded will indicate the non-availability of the powers under Section 482 of the Code when the High Court deals with a case registered by NIA. It is his argument that bar in the exercise of inherent powers can be inferred from the language employed in the NIA Act. This submission is strongly contested by Sri Manu Tom.

32. Before going further on this point, we shall examine the scope and legal effect of Section 482 of the Code. Neither Section 561A of the old Code nor Section 482 of the present Code has given any increased powers to the High Court which it did not possess before they were enacted. In Madhu Limaye (supra), a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court after taking note of the statements in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana ((1977) 4 SCC 137) [LQ/SC/1977/232] made the following observations:

"..........On 4 plain reading of Section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, "shall be deeméd to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court." But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation ,with is the harmonious way out In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have fio power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then, if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abusé of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necéssary, then nothing contained iri Section 397 (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. ............. ”

Supreme Court, in the below mentioned decisions, has held that the following principles would govern the exercise of inherent powers of a High Court recognized under Section 482 of the Code:

(1) The power shall not be resorted to, if there is a specific provision in the Code for redressal of the grievance of an aggrieved party.

(2) It should be exercised very sparingly to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

(3) It should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code (Madhu Limaye (supra), Smt.Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal and another (AIR 1981 SC 736 [LQ/SC/1981/12] ), Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. (AIR 1999 SC 2554 [LQ/SC/1999/636] ) and Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava (AIR 2006 SC 2872 [LQ/SC/2006/706] ).

Supreme Court has consistently held that the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code is generally an exception and not a rule. Section 482 of the Code envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, viz.,

(1) to give effect to an order under the Code

(2) to prevent an abuse of the process of court, and

(3) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

It has been held that it may be neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. (State of Punjab v. Kasturi Lal and others (AIR 2004 SC 4087)

33. Learned CGSC contended that if a special statute specifies a procedure to be followed by the court, then, in the tight of Section 4(2) of the Code, that procedure will prevail over the general directions in the Code. To buttress this argument, reliance is placed on State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh (AIR 1994 SC 1872 [LQ/SC/1994/291] ) and C.B.I., Patna and others v. Braj Bhushan Prasad and others (AIR 2001 SC 4014 [LQ/SC/2001/2265] ). Principle of law declared in the decisions is that Section 4(2) of the Code clearly says that the statutory prescription therein shall be applicable insofar as they are not inconsistent with the special enactments. Nevertheless, the question to be considered here is whether the argument raised on behalf of NIA that an interlocutory order of the Special Court cannot be challenged under Section 482 of the Code, in view of the bar contained in Section 21(3) of the NIA Act, is sustainable or not

34. Our attention has been drawn by learned CGSC to Section 5 of the Code which says that nothing contained in the Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or arty special form of procedure prescribed by any other law for the time being in force. According to the learned CGSC, Section 5 of the Code unambiguously states that the Code will not affect the special form of procedure prescribed by the NIA Act and therefore Section 482 of the Code cannot be invoked to challenge an interlocutory order.

35. Ofna plain reading of Section 5 of the Code, it can be seen that ordinarily the Code will not affect (i) any special law, (ii) any local law, (iii) any special jurisdiction and power and (iv) any special form of procedure. Supreme Court in State (Union of India) v. Ram Saran (AIR 2004 SC 481) laid down that where any special law envisages special procedure for manner or piace of investigation, the provisions thereof must prevail and no provisions of the Code can apply. The contention raised by the learned CGSC based on Section 5 of the Code, that a special form of procedure has been prescribed by the NIA Act and therefore it excludes invocation of Section 482 of the Code, cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the NIA Act actually does not prescribe a special procedure for investigating, inquiring into or trying the offences under the Act. In fact, the NIA Act is intrinsically interlinked with the provisions of the Code in the matter of investigation and trial. We shall explain this reasoning.

36. Chapter Ili of the NIA Act, dealing with investigation by NIA, specifies the various powers given to the investigators. Section 6 specifically deals with investigation of the offences scheduled to the NIA Act. Another important provision in this Chapter is Section 8, which says that while investigating any scheduled offence, NIA may also investigate any other offence, which the accused is alleged to have committed, if the offence is connected with the scheduled offence. Provisions in the NIA Act, relating to the manner of investigation by NIA, do not prescribe a procedure different from the procedure set forth in the Code.

37. Provisions in Chapter IV, dealing with the “Special Courts”, aiso fortify our view. Section 11 clearly says that the Central Government shall in consuitation with the Chief Justices of the High Courts by notification in the official gazette designate one or more Courts of Session as Special Courts for the trial of scheduled offences. Section 13 deals with the jurisdiction of Special Courts. Section 14 in clear terms speaks about the powers of Special Courts with respect to other offences. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 says that when trying any offence, a Special Court also may try arty other offence with which the accused may, under the Code, be charged at the same trial, if the offence is connected with such other offence. This would ciearly indicate that the procedure for trial envisaged under the Code will be applicable to cases registered under the NIA Act too. Section 16 deals with the procedure and powers of the Special Courts. Section 16(1) says that a Special Court may take cognizance of any offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon receiving a complaint of facts that constitute such offence or upon a police report of such facts. Normally, a Sessions Court can take cognizance of a case only when the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under Section 193 of the Code. Perceivable difference here is that this essential requirement in the case of an ordinary Sessions Court has been dispensed with in the case of a Special Court under the NIA Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 16 of the NIA Act in crystal clear terms says that subject to the other provisions in the Act, a Special Court shall, for the purpose of trial of any offence, have all the powers of a Court of Session and shall try such offence as if it were a Court of Session so far as may be in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code for trial before a Court of Session. Sub-section (5) to Section 16 States that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, but subject to the provisions of Section 299 of the Code, a Special Court may, if it thinks fit and for reasons to be recorded by it, proceed with the trial in the absence of the accused or his pleader and record the evidence of any witness subject to the right of accused to recall the witness for cross-examination. This power conferred on the Special Court permits it to deviate from the procedure to be followed before a Court of Session. Merely by looking at Sections 16(1) and 16(5) of the NIA Act, it cannot be said that the general procedural formalities prescribed in Chapter XVIII in the Code, dealing with triat before a Court of Session, are made inapplicable to the proceedings before a Special Court. In other words, except for some minor deviations, all other procedural aspects envisaged by the Code for trial of a Sessions Case are made applicable in a trial before the Special Court constituted under the NIA Act. For the aforementioned reasons, we are not able to agree with the contentions raised by the learned CGSC that the NIA Act prescribes a special form of procedure for investigation or trial of the offences. So much so, we cannot agree with the claim raised by NIA to exclude the powers exercisable by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code.

38. Another contention raised by the learned CGSC is that the NIA Act has been enacted immediately after the terrorist attack at Mumbai. Reference was made to the preamble to the statute which we have discussed above. Relying on Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and others ((1990) 3 SCC 682) [LQ/SC/1990/312] , a decision rendered by a Constitution Bench, learned CGSC contended that the principles in Heydon’s rule will have to be applied while interpreting the provisions in the NIA Act. In paragraph 65, the following observations have been made:

“The Heydon's Rule requires that the court will look at the Act to see what was its purpose and what mischief in the earlier law it was designed to prevent. Four things are to be considered (i) What was the law before the making of the Act (ii)What was the mischief and defect for which the earlier law did not provide (iii) What remedy the Parliament had resolved to cure (iv) What is the true reason for the remedy The Court shall make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the rerriedy."

It is further held that where the statute has been passed to remedy a weakness in the law, it is to be interpreted in such a way as well to bring that remedy. According to the learned CGSC, before enacting the NIA Act, even a terrorist attack case was_ considered as one of the categories of cases to be tried by ordinary courts under the procedure prescribed by the Code. Since there occurred huge delay in the disposal of cases, the legislature thought of enacting a special law to tackle the menace. According to him, the mischief, for which the Code did not provide a remedy, was that trial of cases involving terrorism had no precedence/preference over other cases. That also contributed to the inordinate delay in disposal of many cases. On many occasions public outcry had been there complaining about inexplicable delay. It is therefore argued that the said mischief was not addressed by the then prevailing penal and procedural laws.

39. It is the argument raised by the learned CGSC that the Parliament resolved to enact the NIA Act and to constitute Special Courts under Section 11 of the Act to achieve the goal of speedy trial for grave offences covered by it. He would forcefully contend that Section 21 of the NIA Act should be understood in this context and reason for the remedy is to attain speedy trial in such cases.

40. We are in agreement with the learned CGSC that cases involving terrorist attacks and other grave offences affecting national security should be expeditiousty and effectively tried and decided. Creation of Special Courts and conferment of some additional powers on such courts are certainly done with a laudable objective to have speedy trial in such cases. However, we are unable to agree with the argument raised by the learned CGSC that by applying Heydon’s Rule and reckoning the salutary object of speedy trial in respect of cases registered under the NIA Act, the plain language employed in Section 21 of the NIA Act should be understood in a manner restricting the scope of judicial review under Section 482 of the Code. it is all the more difficult when the NIA Act itself confers rights on aggrieved parties to approach the High Court for redressal of their grievances. Moreover, exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court invoking Section 482 of the Code cannot be a ground for causing delay because there are binding decisions touching upon the manner in which it has to be exercised. it has been held in many decisions that power under Section 482 of the Code shall not be exercised as a matter of course. It shall be exercised sparingly and only in extraordinary situations, that too if any of the conditions in the Section is satisfied.

41. Our attention has been drawn to State of Andhra Pradesh through I.G. National Investigation Agency and others v. Md.Hussain and others ((2014) 1 SCC 258) [LQ/SC/2013/1030] wherein the point raised is that appeals against the orders granting or refusing bail under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act need not be heard by a Bench of two Judges. In that context, the Supreme Court held thus:

“16. The abovereferred Section 21(4) of the NIA Act provides that an appeal lies to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. However sub-section (3) which is a prior sub-section, specifically states that ‘except as aforesaid’, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court. Therefore, the phrase ‘éxcept as aforesaid’ takes us to sub-sections (1) and (2). Thus when anybody is aggrieved by any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of the Special Court, no such appeal or revision Shall lie to any court except as provided under subsections (1) arid (2), meaning thereby only to the High Court. This is the mandate of Section 21(3) of the NIA Act.

17. Theére is no difficulty in accepting the submission on behalf of the appellant that an order granting or refusing bail is an interlocutory order. The point however to be noted is that as provided under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, the appeal against such an order lies to the High Court only, and to no other court as laid down in Section 21(3). Thus it is only the interlocutory orders granting or refusing bail which are made appealable, and no other interlocutory orders, which is made clear in Section 21(1), which lays down that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order of a Special Court. Thus other interlocutory orders are not appealable at all. This is because as provided under Section 19 of the Act, the trial is to proceed on day-to-day basis. It is to be conducted expeditiously. Therefore, no appeal is provided against any of the interlocutory orders passed by the Special Court. The only exception to this provision is that orders either granting or refusing bail are made appealable under Section 21(4). This is becausé thosé orders aré concerning the liberty of the accused, and therefore although other interlocutory orders are not appealable, an appeal is provided against the order granting or refusing the bail. Section 21(4), thus carves out an exception to the exclusion of interlocutory orders, which are not appealable under Section 21(1). The order granting or refusing the bail is therefore very much an order against which an appeal is permitted under Section 21(1) of the Act.”

Above decision, according to us, is not an authority to hold that Section 482 of the Code cannot be applied by the High Court, if a party aggrieved by an interlocutory order approaches the court. It is primarily because the question about invocation of the powers under Section 482 of the Code was not raised before the Supreme Court in the above case, nor was it considered.

42. Another decision relied on by the learned CGSC is Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon and others v. State of Gujarat ((1988) 2 SCC 271) [LQ/SC/1988/171] . An appeal was taken before the Supreme Court by special leave against the judgment and order of the Gujarat High Court and the orders passed by various designated courts under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (“TADA Act” for short). In the said Act, a sun set provision was provided under Section 1(4) stating that the Act would remain in force only for a period of eight years from 24.05.1987. Notwithstanding that provision the Repealing and Amending Act, 2001 (Act 30 of 2001), which came into force on 03.09.2001, has specifically repeated TADA Act as a whole. We mentioned these facts only to understand the background of the said legislation. Mainly two issues were raised before the Supreme Court in the above case. First one is about the jurisdiction and power of the High Court to grant bail under Section 439 of the Code or by recourse to its inherent powers under Section 482 to a person held in custody under the provisions of the TADA Act. Second one is about the nature of the restraint placed on the power of the designated courts to grant bail to such a person in view of Section 20(8) of the TADA Act. While considering these questions, the Supreme Court specifically noticed Section 19 of the TADA Act, which réad thus:

“19(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie as a matter of right from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Designated Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law.

(2) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shalt lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Designated Court.

(3) Every appeal under this Section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment, senterice or order appéaled from:

Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days.”

The Supreme Court, after an elaborate consideration of the law, upheld the view taken by the High Court that under TADA Act there was total exclusion of the jurisdiction of High Court. And, therefore, it could not have entertained an application to grant bail under Section 439 of the Code. After considering the various provisions of the Code and TADA Act, finally the Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in finding that it could not have invoked Section 439 of the Code to grant bail to the accused. In our considered opinion, observations in the above decision cannot be made use of by the learned CGSC in this case, because under the scheme of TADA Act the High Court was completely bypassed; whereas under the scheme of the NIA Act, especially Section 21, the High Court is the court empowered to hear and decide appeals against any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court. Once the NIA Act allows an aggrieved party to take recourse before the High Court, it cannot be heard to say that the High Court will only have appellate power and no other power, including the inherent powers saved under Section 482 of the Code.

43. Learned CGSC forcefully argued that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code can only be an appendage to the statutory power of the High Court and if no statutory power is expressly conferred on it by the special statute to remedy a perceived malady, the inherent powers cannot be exercised to grant any relief to the party. We reject this contention unhesitatingly for the reason that if it is accepted, it will go against the fundamental concept of inherent powers, which existed in the High Courts de hors the statutory powers conferred on them. In other words, inherent powers vested in the High Court cannot be dependent on or subservient to the statutory powers conferred on it, unless the statute expressly prohibited the exercise of inherent powers. Pertinently, there is no provision in the NIA Act either expressly or impliedly barring the exercise of the High Court's inherent powers. Section 21 does not expressly bar the power of the High Court exercisable under Section 482 of the Code, nor the words therein are indicative of any implied bar.

44. Sri.Manu Tom contended that Section 21(1) of the NIA Act provides for an appeal only against any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, passed by a Special Court and the appetiate forum is the High Court. It also shows that an appeal can be filed against the findings on facts or on law. According to him, no appeal can be filed against some other orders passed by a Special Court which could be per se illegal, irregular or incorrect. It is his argument that Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code could take care of such a situation, if revision could be exercised by the High Court. He would further argue that Section 21 of the NIAAct does not in any way fetter the scope of a revision against any procedural incorrectness, illegality or impropriety of any finding, sentence or order. It is therefore contended that various Sub-sections in Section 21 of the NIA Act do not restrict the power of the High Court as a court of appeal or as a revisional court. For the same reason, it neither directly nor indirectly interdict the exercise of High Court's power under Section 482 of the Code. It is also pointed out that if the legislature had any intention to exclude the exercise of inherent powers or to impose restriction on the High Court's powers other than the appellate power, it could have excluded intermediate orders also from the purview of challenge. On the contrary, Section 21(1) of the NIA Act creates a prohibition for appealing against an interlocutory order alone. Since the revisional power of the High Court in respect of cases under the NIA Act is not a subject matter of these references, we do not express any opinion on that aspect. But then, we agree with the arguments raised by Sri.Manu Tom that the High Court's power in matters arising out of the NIA Act cannot be restricted to the appellate jurisdiction alone in the absence of any express or implied bar created by the statute.

45. Another contention raised by the learned CGSC is that even if powers under Section 482 are not ceded to the High Court, the aggrieved party can very well approach the court by invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of india. No doubt, there cannot be any Statutory provision abridging or limiting or barring the constitutional powers of the High Court. lt is an indisputable proposition that power conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is a power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The power of superintendence under this Articte is very wide and discretionary in nature. In the exercise of supervisory power the High Court cannot go into intricate details of facts and decide factual questions. But, in cases where orders of the Subordinate Court or Tribunal are perverse and arbitrary, interference will be justified (Guljar Singh and others v. Deputy Director (Consolidation) and others (2009) 12 SCC 590) [LQ/SC/2009/833] . In Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and others v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi Deceased through his heirs and legal representatives (JT 1995 (7) SC 400 [LQ/SC/1995/938] =MANU/SC/0828/1995). High Court under Article 227 cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardships or wrong decisions. {t must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.

46. Indisputable is the proposition that under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court is concerned not with the decision of the lower court or tribunal, but with its decision making process (Sugarbai M.Siddiq v. Ramesh S.Hankare ((2001) 8 SCC 477) [LQ/SC/2001/2199] and State of Andhra Pradesh v. P.V.Hanumantha Rao (AIR 2004 SC 627 [LQ/SC/2003/1031 ;] ">AIR 2004 SC 627 [LQ/SC/2003/1031 ;] [LQ/SC/2003/1031 ;] )). The Supreme Court had emphasized again and again that power under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be used as appellate or revisional power. High Court's power is supervisory in nature to see that an inferior court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. (Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim (AIR 1984 SC 38 [LQ/SC/1983/280] ), Mohan Amba Prasad Agnihotri v. Bhaskar Balwant Aher (AIR 2000 SC 931 [LQ/SC/2000/435] ) and Shama Prashant Raje v. Ganpatrao (AIR 2000 SC 3094 [LQ/SC/2000/1452] )).

47. lt is therefore clear that the powers exercisable by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code, viz., to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of ary court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, are not identical with the constitutional powers provided under Article 227. In other words, the ambit, intendment and scope of these two powers are not similar and one cannot be regarded as a substitute for the other. We, therefore, hold that availability of supervisory power under Article 227 can never be a reason to exctude the inherent powers existing in the High Court, which is expressly saved under Section 482 of the Code. We also hold that there is no express or implied bar created by the NIA Act in the exercise of the High Court's inherent powers safeguarded under Section 482 of the Code. Besides, as held by the Constitution Bench of the apex Court in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani and followed in Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Constitution confirmed and revested in the High Court all the existing powers and jurisdictions, inctuding its inherent powers. The inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by Section 561A of the old Code and Section 482 of the present Code, are thus vested in the High Court by “law” within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution. We shall neither negate nor abdicate or abridge the inherent powers of the High Court by relying on some flimsy infererices because the exercise of such powers will be essentially required in certain cases. We, therefore, hold that in appropriate cases the High Court has power to invoke its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

48. Having field as above, we shall examine the ratio of the decisions doubted in the reference order. In Thadiyantevida Nazeer (supra), some of the accused persons in a Case, pending before the Special Court, challenged an order passed by it dismissing their application seeking the cancellation of tendering pardon to the 7" accused in the case, ‘who became an approver in the case and testified as PVWV1 at the trial. When the Cri.M.C. was filed, Registry raised an objection on the ground that the impugned order was a final order and it was, at best, a revisable order. it was contended before the court that the order impugned would not have terminated the main proceedings before the Special Court and therefore it was only an interlocutory order. Since no revision would lie against an interlocutory order under Section 397(2) of the Code, the Cri.M.C. should be entertained invoking Section 482 of the Code. These contentions were considered by a Division Bench and in paragraph 7 it was decided thus:

“If, in the alternative, the order dated 2.9.2011 is to be treated as an interlocutory order then S.27(3) is an express bar to an appeal or revision even against interlocutory orders. When the Legislature has specifically prohibited an appeal or revision even against interlocutory orders, the above statutory obstacle cannot bé indirectiy surmounted by filing a pétition under S.482 Cr.P.C. In other words, the inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for doing some thing which is expressly prohibited by the statute.”

49. Another Division Bench in Majeed Koliyad-! (supra) considered the question whether the Special Court's refusal to lift the condition in the bail order, that the petitioner's passport would stand surrendered, could be challenged in a proceeding under Section 482 of the Code In paragraph 6 the following observations are made:

“In the nature of the issues raised, it is not necessary for us to dwell (sic. detve) deep into the question as to the quality of the orders impugned and Say whether they could be subjected to appeal or revision, in terms of the provisions of the NIA Act. All that the petitioner has sought for in these matters is exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. That, obviously, would be done only in cases of manifest miscarriage of justice or when an inferior Criminal Court acts in excessive exercise of jurisdiction or when the action of that Court is in lack of jurisdiction and in situations when the order impugned would result in gross injustice and violation of rights, if allowed to stand. This is the only law, which is trite, as can be fished out from the ocean of precedent law. We do not deem it necessary to quote the precedents settling this iconic principle.”

Albeit making the above observations, the Division Bench, on finding that the challenge against the impugned order in the petition under Section 482 of the Code was without any merit, dismissed the same.

50. Later, another Division Bench in Majeed Koliyad-l! (supra) was called upon under Section 482 of the Code to decide the legality of refusal by Special Court of the petitioner's plea for permitting him to go to Dubai for 15 days. When the matter was placed before a Single Bench, considering the pronouncement in Thadiyantevida Nazeer, it was referred to a Division Bench. After considering the rival contentions, the Bench observed thus:

“Bar to remedy under a particular provision has to be specific. The semblance of a bar to jurisdiction cannot be imported by inference when the requirement is to find whether the superior Courts would stand deprived of their inherent power of superintendence, including within the nature of the powers recognized under Section 482 of CrPC. We notice this poignant issue at this point of time only to say that the availability or not, to recourse to Section 482 of CrPC need not always be relevant when access is permissible in the form of an appeal under Section 21(1) and 21(4) of the NIA Act read together, which is more comprehensive in content. Therefore, when an application for interference under Section 482 is rade, in any situation, nonethelss, it has to be heard by a Bench of two Judges, since the relief sought for is akin to what could be granted in an appeal under Section 21 of the NIA Act. This is how sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the NIA Act will have to be meaningfully understood to exclude cortflict of decisions in matters relating to orders of NIA Court. This is how sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the NIA Act will have to be meaningfully understood to exclude conflict of decisions in matters relating to orders of NIA Court. In the backdrop of the different provisions of the NIA Act and the CrPC, in the backdrop of the equality and liberty doctrines enshrined in the Constitution of India, we hold that all persons involved in cases falling under the canopy of the NIA Act, even if no NIA Court is constituted, are entitled to urge their grievance before a Bench of two Judges, whatever be the provision they invoke for institution of proceedings. This would also ensure institutional consistency in the judiciary.”

51. Notwithstanding the fact that the Division Bench did not, in clear terms, pronounce on the question whether powers under Section 482 of the Code can be invoked in such situations, the innate spirit of the decision appears to be in favour of invoking inherent powers.

52. Upshot of the above discussion is that the inherent powers of the High Court safeguarded under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised in an appropriate case when atleast one of the stipulations in the Section is satisfied. View taken in Thadiyantevida Nazeer contrary to the above finding is legally unsound. Therefore, we overrule the decision fendered by this Court in Thadiyantevida Nazeer (supra).

53. We are conscious of the fact that generally the cases registered under the NIA Act are very serious in nature and they should be expeditiously tried arid disposed of. Any factor interposing the triat may cause procrastination and consequent prejudice to the parties and at times, it may adversely affect the national interest too. We are certainly bound to balance the rights of all concerned.

54. In order to dispel the apprehension regarding causation of delay, we hereby declare that the High Court's inherent powers saved under Section 482 of the Code cannot be invoked on flimsy reasons or on trivial grounds. Large body of case law on the point would clearly show that the powers should be exercised with great care and caution. Also, the High Court should apply its sound judicial discretion when a matter is brought up in the form of a petition under Section 482 of the Code. Uniess it is established that one of the ingredients of Section 482 of the Code is satisfied, the High Court will take its hands off.

55. Taking cue from Section 21 of the NIA Act, it has been held in Majeed Koliyad-lIl that an application under Section 482 of the Code filed in a case under the NIA Act shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges of the High Court. Section 4(1) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 supports the above view. It reads thus:

“4. Powers of a Bench of two Judges.- The powers of the High Court in relation to the following matters may be exercised by a Bench of two Judges, provided that if both Judges agree that the decision involves a question of law they may order that the matter or question of law be réferred to a Full Bench:-

(1) Any matter in respect of which the powers of the High Court can be exercised by a Single Judge.

XXXXXKXXX”

56. Hence, we are of the view that when a petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code challenging an interlocutory order passed in a case registered under the NIA Act, it shall be placed before a Bench of two Judges for hearing and disposal. We are sure that the Bench certainly will consider the issues raised therein and decide the plea based on the precedential taw relating to the exercise of inherent powers of the High Court. We are also sure that the Bench will take note of the prejudice likely to be caused by a delayed decision.

57. To conclude, we sum up the findings as follows:

(1) Section 27 of the NIA Act neither expressty nor impliedty bars the High Court's inherent powers saved under Section 482 of the Code.

(ll) An interlocutory order, pure and simple, passed by a Special Court under the NIA Act which cannot be challenged either in appeal or revision, can be challenged in a petition under Section 482 of the Code. It is made clear that the challenge can be sustained onty when the party satisfies the High Court that orders thereon will be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

(III) Any petition filed under Section 482 of the Code in relation to a case under the NIA Act shall be heard and decided by a Bench of two Judges of the High Court.

(IV) The Bench hearing a petition under Section 482 of the Code, following the lead from Section 21(2) of the NIA Act, wherein three months time has been stipulated for appeals, will hear and dispose of the petition, as far as possible, within the said period.

(V) Registry shall number the petitions, if they are otherwise in order, and place it before a Bench of two Judges in accordance with the roster.