BHARGAVA, J.

1. The appellant-firm was carrying on business as commission agents in cotton and food-grains in Punjab, so that its income in respect of the year 1959-60 became liable to sales tax under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act (No. 46 of 1948) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The appellant did not submit any return, and consequently, a notice under section 11(5) of the Act was issued, and the case was fixed for 1st July, 1960. The appellant then filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the imposition of purchase tax on cotton, and proceedings in the assessment of sales tax were stayed under the orders of the High Court. After the decision of the High Court in that writ petition, proceedings were resumed on 30th November, 1961. Then, there were various dates fixed in the proceedings and adjournments were granted at the request of the appellant. Ultimately, 17th February, 1962, was fixed for final hearing. On that date, information was given on behalf of the appellant that the firm had ceased to work in February, 1961, and that, subsequently, a formal document evidencing the dissolution of the firm was executed on 8th August, 1961. The Assessing Authority disregarded this claim that the appellant could not be assessed on account of the dissolution as a firm, and proceeded to pass an order of assessment on 12th March, 1962. Thereupon, the appellant filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab High Court, praying for the quashing of this order of assessment on the ground that no such order could be made after the dissolution of the appellant-firm. The High Court dismissed the petition, and consequently, the appellant has come up to this Court on certificate granted by the High Court.The point raised on behalf of the appellant was that, under the Act, there was no provision for making an assessment after the dissolution of a firm, even in respect of income earned by the firm while it was in existence, and consequently, the order passed by the Assessing Authority on 12th March, 1962, was void. The High Court in dealing with the petition, held that the following facts were admitted :-

(1) that the firm was in existence and actually did business during the period 1959-60 for which assessment has been made;

(2) that proceedings were initiated long before the alleged date of dissolution of the firm; and

(3) that no formal intimation as required under section 16 of the Act relating to the dissolution of the firm was given to the prescribed authority and intimation of the dissolution was given only by the counsel during one of the hearings before the final assessment order was passed.

2. On these facts, the High Court took the view that the dissolution of the firm did not stand in the way of the Assessing Authority passing the order of assessment, because it was alleged that the dissolution took place after the assessment proceedings had been initiated and the intimation of the dissolution was not given until shortly before the final order of assessment was passed. This view taken by the High Court has to be held to be incorrect because of the decision of this Court in the State of Punjab v. M/s. Jullundur Vegetables Syndicate ([1966] 17 S.T.C. 326; A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1295). That was a case in which the assessee-firm was, no doubt, dissolved before assessment proceedings were started, but this Court held that, while there was no provision in the Punjab General Sales Tax Act for making assessment after dissolution of a firm, no valid assessment order could be made if the dissolution took place before that order of assessment was made. Subba Rao, J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, held :"Though under the partnership law a firm is not a legal entity but only consists of individual partners for the time being, for tax law, income-tax as well as sales tax, it is a legal entity. If that be so, on dissolution, the firm ceases to be a legal entity. Thereafter, on principle, unless there is a statutory provision permitting the assessment of a dissolved firm, there is no longer any scope for assessing the firm which ceased to have a legal existence. As in the present case, admittedly, the firm was dissolved before the order of assessment was made, the said order was bad."

Thereafter, he referred to certain decisions of the various High Courts and, after considering the reasons given by the High Courts, came to the conclusion that "for the reasons we have already given earlier, we cannot accept the validity of the reasons given in the said judgments of sustaining an assessment on a dissolved firm, whether the proceedings were initiated before or after the firm was dissolved."

On this decision given by this Court, it has to be held that the High Court in this case proceeded on the wrong basis that an assessment of the appellant-firm could be made because the firm was dissolved after the assessment proceedings had been initiated and intimation of that dissolution was not given in accordance with section 16 of the Act.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the Assessing Authority urged before us that, in the case, the High Court had not at any stage, recorded a definite finding that in fact the firm was dissolved either in February, 1961, or on 8th August, 1961, as claimed by the appellant. This appears to be correct. The High Court, in its judgment, has, when dealing with the facts, referred to the dissolution of the firm as "alleged" dissolution. This course was adopted by the High Court because of the view of law taken by that Court that it was unnecessary to give a definite finding about the dissolution of the firm, when the appellant was not entitled to claim its benefit even on the assumption that there was a dissolution as alleged. It appears to be necessary that the High Court should now be asked to decide the writ petition, after recording a finding on this question of fact in the light of the law explained by us above. Consequently, this appeal is allowed with costs, and the order of the High Court is set aside. The case will now go to back to the High Court for giving a fresh decision in the petition, after recording a definite finding whether the appellant-firm was in fact dissolved before the order of assessment was made on 12th March, 1962.

4. Appeal allowed.